Volume XXVIII, No. 12 (No. 737)
Friday, November 20, 2026
A Biweekly Electronic Newsletter
As a public service, Hurwitz Fine P.C. is pleased to present its biweekly newsletter, providing summaries of and access to the latest insurance law decisions from the New York, New Jersey, and Connecticut appellate courts and Canadian appellate courts. The primary purpose of this newsletter is to provide timely educational information and commentary for our clients and subscribers.
In some jurisdictions, newsletters such as this may be considered Attorney Advertising.
If you know of others who may wish to subscribe to this free publication, or if you wish to discontinue your subscription, please advise Dan D. Kohane at [email protected] or call 716-849-8900.
You will find back issues of Coverage Pointers on the firm website listed above.
Dear Coverage Pointers Subscribers:
Do you have a situation? We love situations.
Congrats to Evan Gestwick:
Hurwitz Fine Insurance Coverage attorney Evan D. Gestwick was honored with the John J. Moore Writing Award from the Defense Association of New York (DANY). The award was presented at DANY’s annual Past Presidents Dinner, held on November 16, 2026, in New York City and the photo depicts the presentation of the award by DANY president Kevin Faley, a great defense lawyer and defense leader, from Morris Duffy Alonso Faley & Pitcoff.
PS, Evan is the younger one of the two (sorry Kevin).
This recognition highlights Evan’s contributions to legal writing and his commitment to sharing knowledge and insights with the legal community. DANY recently published an article Evan wrote in its magazine, The Defendant. In addition to The Defendant, Evan has published articles in Mondaq, Law360, and the American Bar Association’s TIPS’ The Brief magazine. Evan also serves as Associate Editor of Hurwitz Fine's bi-weekly newsletter, Coverage Pointers.
Evan is actively involved in DANY, serving as Insurance Law Chair and Co-Fourth Department Chair. As Insurance Law Chair, he contributes to and coordinates insurance law articles for The Defendant. In his Fourth Department leadership role, he helps expand the organization's presence and engagement throughout Western New York, connecting attorneys and other legal professionals across the region.
Congratulations to Evan on this well-deserved recognition!
Congratulations to Kate Fleming, who was sworn into practice by the New Hampshire Supreme Court.
This week’s issue
We welcome our new subscribers and advise new one, and remind old ones, that the actual issue of Coverage Pointers is attached to this cover note. While this letter may be entertaining, the issue attached, with has a very interesting cases on construction defect, and a Fourth Department win by our Steve Peiper on the Broad Evidence rule, are surely worth your time,
For those who need to keep up to date on insurance coverage between issues of Coverage Pointers, we’re happy to help. Just follow me on LinkedIn and we’ll keep you up to date. I’m easy to find – my linked in name is (ready for this unusual and unexpected name): Kohane and you can find me here: https://www.linkedin.com/in/kohane/
Need a Mediator or Arbitrator, Give a Call:
I am now a part of NAM (National Arbitration and Mediation) as a Hearing Officer. NAM is one of the nation's leading full-service providers of Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR) services and as a member of their esteemed panel, I will be available to arbitrate and mediate cases throughout New York State. Reach out to NAM My NAM bio is here., 716.849.8942 or send an email to [email protected] and I’ll try to help.
Newsletters:
We have other firm newsletters to which you can subscribe by simply letting the editor (or me) know, including a new publication, which was created to advise on business and employment law questions:
- Premises Pointers: This monthly electronic newsletter covers current cases, trends and developments involving premises liability and general litigation. Our attorneys must stay abreast of new cases and trends across New York in both State and Federal Court and will now share their insight and analysis with you. This publication covers a wide range of topics including retail, restaurant and hospitality liability, slip and fall accidents, snow and ice claims, storm in progress, inadequate/negligent security, inadequate maintenance and negligent repair, service contracts, elevator and escalator accidents, swimming pool and recreational accidents, negligent supervision, assumption of risk, tavern owner and dram shop liability, homeowner liability and toxic exposures (just to name a few!). Please drop a note to Jody Briandi at [email protected] to be added to the mailing list.
- Labor Law Pointers: Hurwitz Fine P.C.’s Labor Law Pointers offers a monthly review and analysis of every New York State Labor Law case decided during the month by the Court of Appeals and all four Departments. This e-mail direct newsletter is published the first Wednesday of each month on four distinct areas – New York Labor Law Sections 240(1), 241(6), 200 and indemnity/risk transfer. Contact Dave Adams at [email protected] to subscribe.
- Products Liability Pointers: Whether the claim is based on a defective design, flawed manufacturing process, or inadequate instructions/warnings, product liability litigation is constantly evolving. Products Liability Pointers examines recent New York State and Federal cases as well as high court decisions from other jurisdictions, keeping our readers up to date with the latest developments and trends, and providing useful practice tips and litigation strategies. This monthly newsletter covers all areas of product liability litigation, including negligence, strict products liability, breach of warranty claims, medical device litigation, toxic and mass torts, regulatory framework, and governmental agencies. Contact V. Christopher Potenza at [email protected] to subscribe.
- Medical & Nursing Home Liability Pointers. Medical & Nursing Home Liability Pointers provides the latest news, developments, and analysis of recent court decisions impacting the medical and long-term care communities. Contact Elizabeth Midgley at [email protected] to subscribe.
Cancer Cured – 100 Years Ago:
The Buffalo News
Buffalo, New York
20 Nov 1926
SEVENTEEN CANCER CURES
REPORTED BY NEW METHOD
LONDON, Nov. 19. - Details of 17 cases of cancer said to have been cured by a revolutionary method of treatment discovered by Dr. Fortunato Pitta of Funchal, Madeira, are being investigated by the British Medical Research council at the instigation of Dr. Michael Comport Grabham, an octogenarian Madeira specialist, with long experience in cancer research who is now in London.
The effective agency, according to Dr. Grabham, is a discharge from an irritation of the human eyelid. Its efficacy, which is said to consist in dissolving the malignant growth while leaving the healthy tissue untouched, was discovered accidentally. Many patients since have been reported to have been completely restored to health.
Peiper on Property (and Potpourri):
Nothing for me this week, but we note the interesting decisions in Dan’s column.
An “impaired property” case and a case discussing the Broad Evidence Rule in the same week.
Quite good reading for property nerds. Enjoy.
Steve
Steven E. Peiper
[email protected]
Sad Times – 100 Years Ago:
The Buffalo Times
Buffalo, New York
20 Nov 1926
UNCONSCIOUS,
VERY NEAR
DEATH
Harry Finngean, South
Park High School Half-
Back, Mortally Hurt in
Scrimmage.
Harry Finnegan, halfback on the South Park High School football team, who suffered a broken back yesterday in the South Park-Canisius game, still is unconscious in the Sisters' Hospital, with no, apparent change in his condition. Both legs are paralyzed completely and both arms partly so. Finnegan is 19 years old and lives at No. 42 Ashton Place.
Lee’s Connecticut Chronicles:
On the road.
Lee
Lee S. Siegel
[email protected]
Love Suit – 100 Years Ago:
The Buffalo Times
Buffalo, New York
20 Nov 1926
Divorcee Wins $5.000
Verdict in Love Suit
TORONTO, Nov. 20. – The story of a romance which began aboard a liner in the Pacific Ocean, and which died a sudden death in Ontario a year later was unfolded in the Assize Court when Ethel Violet Chandler won a verdict for $5,000 against Joseph Harry Boyd, formerly of New Zealand, for breach of promise.
Mrs. Chandler, a divorcee, sued for $25,000, and has no certainty of being able to collect even the amount awarded her, as Boyd’s present whereabouts are unknown. He was not present at the court hearing, and his counsel offered no defense, beyond questioning the court’s jurisdiction.
Ryan’s Federal Reporter:
Hello Loyal Coverage Pointers’ Subscribers!
My oldest is starting to take an interest in volleyball and we signed him up for his first round of volleyball clinics to see what he thinks about it. Nine-year-old volleyball can be tough because at that age they have just learned how best to catch the ball—redirecting it, accurately is quite literally a whole other ballgame. But I’m invested as the son of volleyball parents and a former collegiate volleyballer myself. It will be welcomed change to be back at volleyball practices again, provided we get through the first few with his fire still lit on the concept. Stay tuned.
This edition, my column tackles reinsurance issues involving assignments, and cedents, and settlements, oh my. Well, that, and I was introduced to the telex for the first time.
Until next time…
Ryan
Ryan P. Maxwell
[email protected]
Editor’s Note: Ryan didn’t mention it, but I will. His wife, Lorraine Wingenbach Maxwell, was not only a volleyball player, but the first women to be awarded All American status in Volleyball while at Brandeis University. She was inducted into the Brandeis Athletic Hall of Fame in 2019.
Married at 14? No School Necessary – 100 Years Ago:
Buffalo Courier Express
Buffalo, New York
20 Nov 1926
DIDN’T GO TO SCHOOL AFTER
MARRIAGE; ARREST FATHER
Niagara Falls, Nov. 19 – Arraigned on a charge of failing to send his fourteen-year-old daughter, Isabelle, to school, George Thomas, 429 Nineteenth Street, escaped with a suspended sentence today when he explained to Police Justice Charles H. Piper that the girl was married. She is reported to have eloped and been married in Tonawanda.
Storm’s SIU:
Hi Team:
Two interesting case digests for you this edition: invoking the 5th Amendment privilege in a deposition involving a discovery protective order; and an insurable interest issue:
- Invoking the Fifth Amendment in a civil deposition and confidentiality designations under a discovery protective order.
- Invoking the Fifth Amendment in a civil deposition, without more, is not “personal or intimate” information justifying a confidentiality designation under a typical discovery protective order.
- A non‑party’s desire to avoid embarrassment or hypothetical jury‑pool taint from public knowledge of Fifth Amendment invocations is generally insufficient, standing alone, to establish good cause for a protective order under Rule 26(c); courts can address any future prejudice through trial procedures if criminal proceedings arise.
- Filing discovery materials in connection with a motion to strike confidentiality does not automatically convert those materials into “judicial documents” with a presumption of access under the common law or First Amendment; courts reject attempts to bootstrap public access in that way.
- A condominium board can have an insurable interest in interior-unit repairs following a casualty where governing documents impose repair obligations or emergency duties that expose the board to pecuniary loss; explicit allocations in those documents (like for a specific elevator) can narrow that interest.
I hope you have a Happy Thanksgiving with your family and friends!
Scott
Scott D. Storm
[email protected]
Skyscraper Predictions – 100 Years Ago:
Wilkes-Barre Times Leader, the Evening News
Wilkes-Barre, Pennsylvania
20 Nov 1926
LANDINGS TO
BE BUILT ATOP
OF BUILDINGS
Will Work And Live In Same
Skyscrapers 100
Years Hence
BUILDERS’ PREDICTION
Cleveland, O., Nov. 20. – A hundred years from now great grandchildren of the present generation will be working and living in the same skyscrapers which now mark the skylines of our cities.
This prediction was made here by Colonel John Reed Kilpatrick, of New York City, at the convention of the American Construction Council. He is president of a great construction company.
“The recent hurricane in Florida has demonstrated the durability of modern construction,” the builder declared. “Buildings which has been erected by ethical concerns suffered little less than shattered windows while ‘jerry-built’ edifices were demolished or badly damaged.”
Constructors already are taking into consideration the necessity of providing for sky transportation, according to plans shown at the conventions. The future apartment house is to have its individual landing area atop the building.
Modern buildings are to be built, it was pointed out by delegates, so that changes in methods of lighting, heating, and equipping can be installed. Arrangements must be made on the roofs of buildings so that the sun’s rays can be harnessed for heat and light and Winter’s blasts bottled up for Summer consumption.
Fleming’s Finest:
Hi Coverage Pointers Subscribers:
Last week, I had my attorney admission ceremony at the New Hampshire Supreme Court! The ceremony in Concord was lovely followed by a dash over the Merrimack River to take the oath at the federal court as well. I am looking forward to starting my legal career in New Hampshire/expanding my practice in New England.
This edition’s case comes from the Supreme Court of Appeals in West Virginia and considers whether conditioning the availability of underinsured motorist coverage by requiring the owner or operator of the vehicle’s liability for damages to arise out of the ownership, maintenance or use of the vehicle is void as against public policy.
Happy Thanksgiving! See you in a fortnight.
Kate
Katherine A. Fleming
[email protected]
Edison’s View of the Future – 100 Years Ago:
Worcester Telegram
Worcester, Massachusetts
20 Nov 1926
Mr. Edison Looks at
Cities of the Future
Thomas A. Edison, in his recent interview on the city of the future, predicts a solution of the traffic problem by the mathematician instead of the traffic officer; a decrease in crime as a result of the advent of the scientific policeman; an astonishing reduction in municipal taxes through expert management; an increase in noise; restriction of skyscrapers as a move to relieve congestion on the streets, and the use of tops of buildings as landing places for aircraft.
Most of these predictions come naturally to anyone watching present tendencies. The traffic problem is more and more being looked upon as one to is be worked out by mathematicians and engineers. Police work is more and more being looked upon as something which requires the most modern equipment and the most efficient military methods to be successful. The wisdom of erecting towering skyscrapers is being widely questioned, and the development of flying is taken as a matter of course.
The surprising thing about Mr. Edison's look forward is the complacent way in which he accepts the inevitability of noise. He says the human being will become so deafened by nature that his nerves will be able to stand the increased din. He points to his own deafness, declaring that it has given him steady nerves which the noisiest of cities cannot jar. But does everybody want to be deaf? Doesn’t Mr. Edison’s own deafness lead him to underestimate the seriousness of the noise problem? If his own hearing were good, would not be more likely to see opportunity for scientists to make cities quieter?
Gestwick’s Garden State Gazette:
Dear Readers:
I was presented with the John J. Moore Writing Award, presented by the Defense Association of New York, at this year’s Past Presidents Dinner in Manhattan earlier this week. I am honored and grateful to have received such an award, and it is a testament to the outstanding support I have around me, both personally and professionally.
I am writing to you on the precipice of leaving for my honeymoon. While we were married back in August, we decided to forestall the honeymoon until it became a bit cooler here in Buffalo. Now that temperatures have dropped, we are off to Jamaica for a week.
Speaking of marriage, the case I have this week deals with a lawsuit brought by a woman against her husband. They were both insureds under their personal umbrella policy. Is there coverage? I know the answer, and I hope to never find myself in this situation.
More in two weeks—Happy Thanksgiving!
Evan
Evan D. Gestwick
[email protected]
Accurate Predictions of the Future – 100 Years Ago:
The Times-Union
Rochester, New York
20 Nov 1926
THREE NATIONS
TO DOMINATE
FUTURE WORLD
China, Russia, and U.S.
Named by Lewis S. Gannett –
None Is Prominent
In Nation’s League
China, despite the apparent chaos of civil war, is stronger today than she has been at any time for hundred years and most of us will probably live to see the day when China will be one of the three great powers of world. Lewis s. Gannett told the Men's and Women's city clubs in Powers Hotel today.
Mr. Gannett, a former Rochesterian, son of the late Rev. William C. Gannett, last May returned from winter's stay in China where he studied the situation confronting that nation.
The other two nations which Mr. Gannett believes will be at the top with China are the United States and Russia, "and yet", he said, "not one of these three is one of the Great Powers today represented as permanent members of the League of Nations.”
China, he said, is not yet a nation in the modern sense of the word, but a civilization, a continent bursting out of the Middle Ages.
O’Shea Rides the Circuits:
Readers,
This year I will not be running a turkey trot or requesting for reader submitted recipes for Thanksgiving. Instead, I will be indulging in two same-day dinners a few hours apart. Although I am looking forward to stuffing and smoked turkey. Hope everyone has a safe holiday week.
This week I have an insured v. insured exclusion from the Tenth Circuit. The court noted the plain terms of the exclusion applied and a carveout was inapplicable due to the timing of the suit.
Until Next Time,
Ryan
Ryan P. O’Shea
[email protected]
Future of Women – 100 Years Ago:
The Herald Statesman
Yonkers, New York
20 Nov 1926
WOMEN FORGING AHEAD
It is astounding how on all sides advantage is being taken of women by men. On two occasions when they have tried, to get the best of me in a transaction, just as soon as I brought a male relative or my lawyer into the deal they soon came to time, says a well-known woman writer.
Somehow or other they seem to think that women can be easily hoodwinked. So long has it been such a simple matter to defraud women that they have been regarded as easy prey.
When the would-be offender learns that there is a man behind a woman on any proposition, and he stands to lose all chance of completing the transaction, then he becomes honest.
I would advise every woman who is not certain of a deal or who has any faint suspicion to secure some good man upon whom she can rely to take charge of her interest, concluded this woman.
While I do not altogether agree with the latter suggestion, that men are necessary to aid women in the proper conduct of their commercial activities, yet there is something to he said about women having been cheated because of their ignorance of business affairs.
There are men who thrive on the weakness of women and their lack of knowledge of everyday affairs; but it is usually the fault of the woman herself--her unwillingness to go into the matter thoroughly and learn for herself all the various angles of it.
She trusts to luck or is easily led, to her subsequent regret. The one protection to women is to study and understand every phase of a deal and its probable tendencies for loss before she goes into it.
In a word, if she fortifies herself with a thorough knowledge of the situation no man will dare to cheat her.
It is because wily individuals have known the average, womanish trait to waive off business matters as something they could never understand that so many of the sex have been victims of fraud.
Yet: a new day is dawning. Thousands of women are entering industrial ranks who formerly were sheltered at home, whose business dealings had been left to male members of the family.
Today women are rubbing elbows with men in business affairs of every description. These women will be able to take care of themselves in future business relations.
There are still a number of women, mothers of children, with small properties, or widows left with a little money, who need aid in this direction.
I can only say that any woman who so desires may carefully go into every matter bit by bit, until she understands it so that no one may take advantage of her. If in doubt, it is easy to get good advice from reliable sources.
The big thing for her to guard against is dealing with someone she has not known for any length of time, and who has, by smooth words and wily ways, gained her confidence to her later loss.
The main reason why women are subjected to these wrongs is because they are lax in learning all about the transaction of which they are "party of the first part."
LaBarbera’s Lower Court Library:
Dear Readers:
This week I am reporting on a New York County decision denying an insurance carrier’s motion for summary judgment. In short, while the Court acknowledged that a change in premium was sufficient to establish that a misrepresentation was material, the Court did deny the motion, finding that the evidence submitted in support was conclusory.
Until next time…
Isabelle
Isabelle H. LaBarbera
[email protected]
Property for Sale, Sold by the President’s Father – 100 Years Ago:
The Chat
Brooklyn, New York
20 Nov 1926
Lexi’s Legislative Lowdown:
Dear Readers,
I’m looking forward to hosting Thanksgiving for the third straight year. My grandma always warned me that hosting Thanksgiving once would mean hosting it forever, and so far she’s been right. She seems more than happy to have passed the torch, although I still have a lot to learn before I reach her level.
This year’s goals are simple: a speedy Turkey Trot in the morning and a turkey that actually makes it to the table on time. (for the sake of everyone involved, let’s not discuss last year’s dinner schedule.) Either way, I’m thankful for the chance to spend the day with my family, and I hope everyone has a wonderful Thanksgiving.
This week we discuss the Governor’s signing of Bill S3460, which grants employees access to their personnel records and requires notice when negative information is placed in those records.
Thanks for reading,
Lexi
Lexi R. Horton
[email protected]
Love Ain’t Worth that Much– 100 Years Ago:
The Herald Statesmen
Yonkers, New York
20 Nov 1926
SUPREME COURT SETS
ASIDE $5,000 AWARD
Trenton, N.J., Nov. 19. – The Supreme Court today set aside a $5,000 verdict awarded to Jesse Barlow of Jersey City against Harry M. Selfridge of east Orange for alienation of his wife’s affections.
The court said that in view of the fact that Mrs. Barlow had secured a divorce on the grounds of desertion and that the couple had not lived in harmony since 1923 the verdict was against the weight of evidence.
Victoria’s Vision on Bad Faith
Dear Readers,
Thanksgiving is upon us, which means I need to figure out which desserts to make for my Thanksgiving dinner contribution. I'm repeating pear chai pie, which was a hit last year, pumpkin cheesecake and …? Still trying to decide the last one. Comment your suggestions below (email me with the recipe).
More importantly, looking forward to the Bills/Chiefs Thanksgiving game and to finally buying a couch for my downstairs living room on Black Friday.
Have a great weekend and Thanksgiving,
Victoria
Victoria S. Heist
[email protected]
Hmm, Statutory Charges – 100 Years Ago:
Rochester Journal and the Post Express
Rochester, New York
20 Nov 1926
YOUTH ACQUITTED
IN GIRL’S CHARGE
Harry Sloan, Twenty-one, No. 332 Kenwood Avenue, today was acquitted by a County Court jury after a three-day trial of statutory charges preferred by a seventeen year old girl.
His two companions, Edward M. Dwyer, No. 244 Winbourne Road, and Joseph Lorscheider, no 1317 Genesee Street, pleaded guilty to similar charges and are awaiting sentence.
Editor’s Note: Not sure of Joseph Lorscheider’s sentence, but he served in WW II and lived to93.
Shim’s Serious Injury Segment
Hi Readers,
With Thanksgiving a week from the writing of this column, I thought it would be interesting to revisit the historical roots of the holiday, which many are unfamiliar with.
The first Thanksgiving is cited as a harvest celebration which occurred in 1621 in New England. English colonists (i.e., pilgrims) of modern-day Massachusetts (then Plymouth) and indigenous Wampanoags gathered to celebrate the harvest. The Wampanoags surprised the pilgrims with foods including fowl, venison, fish and vegetables. The celebration was harmonious and spanned multiple days. Although they struggled to communicate, Wampanoags and pilgrims alike enjoyed a harvest, ran races, and fired guns together. Though the future proved both tumultuous and unfortunately quite tragic, the first Thanksgiving is recorded as an amicable meeting and celebration between Native Americans and English colonists.
Perhaps as equally as unknown is how and why Thanksgiving became a national holiday in the United States. President Abraham Lincoln created the federally recognized holiday known as Thanksgiving in 1863 by proclamation. Such proclamation emerged from 1800s harvests and prayer. It was also proclaimed by President Lincoln in an attempt to unite our great country during its Civil War.
By now, many who follow my columns have deduced that I am a proud American and have unwavering love and support for our great country. For those reasons I enjoy holidays and events that celebrate the nation’s heritage and perpetuate American tradition. Not to mention, there will also be a few NFL games to enjoy.
In this week’s issue, I have shared an Appellate Division, First Department, decision wherein the Court affirmed the Order of the Supreme Court, New York County, thereby granting defendant’s summary judgment motion on the basis that the plaintiff did not sustain a “serious injury” within the meaning of Insurance Law § 5102(d).
Wishing you all a very Happy and Healthy Thanksgiving!
See you in the next issue!
Stephen
Stephen M. Shimshi
[email protected]
Who Can Argue?– 100 Years Ago:
The Times-Union
Rochester, New York
20 Nov 1926
Friendship Wins
If you would win a man to your cause, first convince him that you are his sincere friend. – Lincoln.
The pessimist is one who sees a difficulty in every opportunity. The optimist is one who sees an opportunity in every difficulty. – Sire Henry Thornton, President, National Railways of Canada.
New England Almanack
Dear Readers,
I’m writing this note the day before Iryna and I make our Coverage Pointers University debut with our webinar on “Claims File Discovery: Attorney Client and Work Product Privilege Protections.” Over 100 attendees have signed up for the 11/19 webinar which draws upon presentations we’ve both made to other insurance industry groups over recent years with favorable feedback received. We hope CP subscribers will gain helpful takeaways from this session.
For the current CP issue, we bring you a recent decision from the Massachusetts Superior Court Business Litigation Session concerning the Town of Braintree’s right to obtain LEL coverage from its insurer, MIIA Property & Casualty Group, Inc., for a 40.62% time on the risk share of a $14.9 million dollar settlement entered into to resolve two underlying D. MA wrongful conviction lawsuits brought by an individual who was released from prison in 2017 after serving 36 years (on a sentence to life in prison) for a murder that he did not commit. After granting the Town summary judgment on its breach of contract claim, the trial court held that the existence of a bona fide coverage dispute shielded the insurer from liability on the Town’s c. 93A/176D claim under the Massachusetts Unfair Trade Practices Act.
Happy Reading
Barbara
Barbara A. O’Donnell
[email protected]
Alex
Alexander G. Henlin
[email protected]
Iryna
Iryna N. Dore
[email protected]
That’s One Way to Find a Spouse – 100 Years Ago:
Rochester Journal and the Post Express
Rochester, New York
20 Nov 1926
INDIAN MARRIAGE
PLAN ENDORSED
The success of prearranged marriages in India was understood today by Y. W. C. A. women as directly due to a study of the matter by the parents of both parties, following a talk last evening by Miss Martha Downey, head of the Y. W. C. A., in Calcutta, India, at the association building in Franklin Street.
In such cases, according to Miss Downey, the husband and wife have the same background, and their tastes are much alike, while in the United States many marry merely on infatuation, with no thought for adaptability.
North of the Border:
On a National Geographic tour of Southeast Asia..
Heather
Heather A. Sanderson, K.C.
Sanderson Law
Calgary, Alberta, Canada
[email protected]
Headlines from this week’s issue, attached:
KOHANE’S COVERAGE CORNER
Dan D. Kohane
[email protected]
- What Is Insurance, Anyway?
- Delivery and Instillation of Fault Antenna System Is Not an Occurrence Where There Was No Damage to Other Property
- Bare Bones Contract Does Not Satisfy Contemplation of Parties to Trigger Consequential Damages; Broad Evidence Rule May Apply to Third-Party Property Damage Claims
- Framed Issue Necessary to Determine Whether Driver Was Uninsured and/or Committed an Intentional Act. Before MVAIC Has to Defend
PEIPER on PROPERTY (and POTPOURRI)
Steven E. Peiper
[email protected]
- Nothing for me this week, but we note the interesting decision in Dan’s column
LEE’S CONNECTICUT CHRONICLES
Lee S. Siegel
[email protected]
- On the road
RYAN’S FEDERAL REPORTER
Ryan P. Maxwell
[email protected]
- Reinsurer Required to Pay on Reinsurance Certificates Following Valid Assignment of Claims by Ceding Insurer to Settlement-Funder
STORM’S SIU
Scott D. Storm
[email protected]
- Invoking the Fifth Amendment in a Civil Deposition and Confidentiality Designations Under a Discovery Protective Order
- A Condominium Board Can Have an Insurable Interest in Interior-Unit Repairs Following a Casualty Where Governing Documents Impose Repair Obligations or Emergency Duties That Expose the Board to Pecuniary Loss; Explicit Allocations in Those Documents Can Narrow That Interest
FLEMING’S FINEST
Katherine A. Fleming
[email protected]
- Provision Conditioning Availability of Underinsured Motorist Coverage by Requiring Owner or Operator of Underinsured Motor Vehicle’s Liability for Damages to Arise Out of the Ownership, Maintenance or Use of the Vehicle Void Against Public Policy
GESTWICK’S GARDEN STATE GAZETTE
Evan D. Gestwick
[email protected]
- Court Enforces Exclusion for Bodily Injury to an Insured in a Claim Made by Wife Against Husband
O’SHEA RIDES the CIRCUITS
Ryan P. O’Shea
[email protected]
- Cross Suits Exclusion Applies to Shareholder Claims Against Named Insured
LABARBERA’S LOWER COURT LIBRARY
Isabelle H. LaBarbera
[email protected]
- Court Denies Insurer’s Summary Judgment Motion Based on Alleged Residence Misrepresentation, Finding Underwriting Proof Insufficient to Establish Materiality as a Matter of Law
LEXI’S LEGISLATIVE LOWDOWN
Lexi R. Horton
[email protected]
- Governor Signs Bill S3460 Granting Employees Access to Their Personal Records
VICTORIA’S VISION ON BAD FAITH
Victoria S. Heist
[email protected]
- Bad Faith Claims Are Bound by Suit Limitations
SHIM’S SERIOUS INJURY SEGMENT
Stephen M. Shimshi
[email protected]
- The Appellate Division, First Department, Affirms the Order of the Supreme Court, New York County, Thereby Granting Defendant’s Summary Judgment Motion on the Basis That the Plaintiff Did Not Sustain a “Serious Injury” Within the Meaning of Insurance Law § 5102(d)
NEW ENGLAND ALMANACK
Barbara A. O’Donnell
Alex G. Henlin
Iryna N. Dore
- Massachusetts Superior Court Business Litigation Session Judge grants Town of Braintree Summary Judgment Regarding its Insurer’s Obligation to Cover Approximately 40% Time on Risk Share of $14.9 Million Wrongful Conviction Settlement but Bona Fide Coverage Dispute Shields Insurer From c.93A/176D Unfair Claims Handling Liability
NORTH of the BORDER
Heather A. Sanderson, K.C.
Sanderson Law
Calgary, Alberta, Canada
[email protected]
- Traveling through Southeast Asia
Hurwitz Fine P.C. is a full-service law firm providing legal services throughout the State of New York and providing insurance coverage advice and counsel in Connecticut, New Jersey, and across New England.
In addition, Dan D. Kohane is a Foreign Legal Consultant, Permit No. 0119144, issued by the Law Society of Upper Canada, and authorized to provide legal advice in the Province of Ontario on matters of New York State and federal law.
NEWSLETTER EDITOR
Dan D. Kohane
[email protected]
ASSOCIATE EDITOR
Evan D. Gestwick
[email protected]
INSURANCE COVERAGE/EXTRA CONTRACTUAL LIABILITY TEAM
Dan D. Kohane, Chair
[email protected]
Steven E. Peiper, Co-Chair
[email protected]
Michael F. Perley
Agnieszka A. Wilewicz
Lee S. Siegel
Barbara A. O’Donnell
Brian F. Mark
Scott D. Storm
Alexander G. Henlin
Iryna N. Dore
Ryan P. Maxwell
Katherine A. Fleming
Evan D. Gestwick
Ryan P. O’Shea
Isabelle H. LaBarbera
Lexi R. Horton
Victoria S. Heist
FIRE, FIRST PARTY AND SUBROGATION TEAM
Steven E. Peiper, Team Leader
[email protected]
Michael F. Perley
Scott D. Storm
NO-FAULT/UM/SUM TEAM
Jessica L. Deren
Ryan P. O’Shea
[email protected]
APPELLATE TEAM
Jody E. Briandi, Team Leader
[email protected]
Topical Index
Kohane’s Coverage Corner
Peiper on Property and Potpourri
Ryan’s Federal Reporter
Storm’s SIU
Fleming’s Finest
Gestwick’s Garden State Gazette
O’Shea Rides the Circuits
LaBarbera’s Lower Court Library
Lexi’s Legislative Lowdown
Victoria’s Vision on Bad Faith
Shim’s Serious Injury Segment
New England Almanack
North of the Border
KOHANE’S COVERAGE CORNER
Dan D. Kohane
[email protected]
11/19/26 Brinks Global Services USA, Inc. v. D'Amati, LLC
Appellate Division, First Department
What Is Insurance, Anyway?
An insurance contract is "any agreement" where an insurer "is obligated to confer benefit of pecuniary value upon another party . . . dependent upon the happening of a fortuitous event" (Insurance Law § 1101 [a] [1]). A "fortuitous event" is in turn defined as "any occurrence or failure to occur which is, or is assumed by the parties to be, to a substantial extent beyond the control of either party" (id. at § 1101 [a] [2]).
A "Valuables Transport Contract" at issue here did not fall within the above definition because it was one for transportation, not insurance. The contract states that "in the event that any of the Property included in the shipment is lost during the period in which Brinks is responsible, Brinks will pay to You the actual monetary value of the Property, which is lost, up to the declared value."
Under Brinks' "Door to Door" service, its "responsibility for a Shipment begins when it . . . physically takes possession of the shipment," and "ends when [it] . . . delivers the shipment." Thus, the contract assigns Brinks the simple responsibility to transport defendant's jewelry shipment from one point to another and to assume responsibility only should something go awry while the jewelry was in its control.
A contract is one for insurance only when the contract provided coverage for events beyond the control of the party determined to be an insurer.
It is irrelevant whether Brinks's executives referred to the contract as one for insurance. The contract itself is dispositive because an unambiguous contract is examined by "looking solely to the plain language used by the parties within the four corners to discern its meaning and not to extrinsic sources".
Since contract is not an insurance contract, defendants' argument that the contract is illegal because plaintiff sold insurance without a license is unavailing.
11/17/26 Corning Inc. v. National Union Fire Ins. Co. of Pittsburgh, PA
Appellate Division, First Department
Delivery and Instillation of Fault Antenna System Is Not an Occurrence Where There Was No Damage to Other Property
The motion court correctly determined that plaintiff's actions of designing and delivering a faulty Distributed Antenna System (“DAS”), was not a covered "occurrence" as contemplated by defendant's liability policy. Although the motion court conceded that such a policy would apply if the faulty workmanship provided by plaintiff caused "property damage to something other than the work product," it correctly held that plaintiff did not adequately identify property damage to property that was not its own work product.
Plaintiff relied on its own vice president's testimony that he believed damages were made to the stadium from "de-installation and re-installation" by "drilling holes or cutting concrete or mounting stuff in the wall." However, he admitted information was not told to him directly by IBM, nor was plaintiff able to provide corroborating evidence of that information. Therefore, plaintiff's allegations are conclusory and thus unavailing.
Further, defendant properly disclaimed coverage under Exclusion D of the policy. That exclusion states that there is no coverage for "impaired property," which the policy defined as "tangible property, other than your product or your work, which cannot be used or is less useful because . . . it incorporates your product or your work that is known or thought to be defective, deficient, inadequate or dangerous; or . . . you have failed to fulfill the terms of a contract or agreement," and the property can be restored through specified means. The exclusion applies as the physical DAS and stadium are considered "tangible property."
Moreover, plaintiff did not own either, they were damaged after incorporating plaintiff's deficient DAS design, plaintiff, who was ultimately responsible for the DAS project, did not fulfill its obligations to install a properly working DAS, and the plaintiff in the underlying action was able to improve the damaged property and fix the deficient DAS.
Plaintiff's contention that the Professional Liability Exclusion provides coverage is misplaced, because "an exclusion from insurance coverage cannot create coverage".
11/13/26 Clean and Green CNG Tech. v. Diversified Erection Services
Appellate Division, Fourth Department
Bare Bones Contract Does Not Satisfy Contemplation of Parties to Trigger Consequential Damages; Broad Evidence Rule May Apply to Third-Party Property Damage Claims
Clean and Green purchased a used natural gas compressor for $210,000. It intended to use the compressor as part of a new commercial venture that would serve as a Compressed Natural Gas filling station for the general public in Jamestown, New York. As part of installation, Clean and Green retained Diversified to serve as the crane operator who would lift the compressor into position. During the hoist, however, the rigging straps broke and the compressor was dropped a few inches causing significant damage.
Plaintiff’s, subrogee, Erie Insurance, promptly paid Clean and Green $205,000 under a Commercial Property Policy. $190,000 was allocated for the cost of the damaged compressor which, it was estimated, would take in excess of $300,000 to repair. Erie also allocated an additional $20,000 for possible damage to storage bottles that were purchased along with the compressor. After a $5,000 deductible was applied, Erie issued payment to Clean and Green, and the instant lawsuit was commenced.
Erie sought recovery of the $205,000 it paid to its subrogor, Clean and Green. Clean and Green sought recovery for the cost of a new compressor which was estimated to be in excess of $450,000. In addition, Clean and Green asserted consequential damages in the form of lost anticipated profits from the filling station.
All parties moved for summary judgment before the trial court. Diversified successfully dismissed the negligence claims asserted against it as duplicative of the breach of contract claim pressed by Erie/Clean and Green. Diversified also moved to dismiss Clean and Green’s loss profits claim as not within the contemplation of the parties at the time of the oral contract (i.e., the agreement to lift the compressor). Finally, Diversified moved for summary judgment dismissing Clean and Green’s claims for a new compressor on the basis that the Fair Market Value had been paid by Erie, and Erie was subrogated to that loss.
Clean and Green moved for summary judgment on its breach of contract and loss profits claim. Erie moved for summary judgment seeking recovery of the $210,000 it allegedly paid Clean and Green.
The trial court dismissed the negligence claims, granted Erie’s request for a sum certain of $210,000, and found questions of fact on all other issues as to valuation. On appeal, the Appellate Division modified the Order.
In addressing, first, the appropriate valuation of the damage to the compressor, plaintiffs contended its contractual damages should have been the full amount of replacing the compressor. Under New York law, damages on a breach of contract claim are intended 'to place the nonbreaching party in as good a position as it would have been had the contract been” successfully completed. And, to do that, the general rule is that the measure of damages to personal property "is the difference in [its] market value immediately before and immediately after the accident, or the reasonable cost of repairs necessary to restore it to its former condition, whichever is the lesser".
The Court went on to note, however, that "where property is totally destroyed, 'the measure of damages is its reasonable market value immediately before destruction.'" The general rule, therefore, "presupposes the existence of a broad market with frequent trading in articles of an identical character with the article lost [ or destroyed]."
Plaintiffs argued, and the Court generally agreed, that if “property lost or destroyed does not have such a market, the loss in money that the party suffered by reason of the loss or destruction of the property may be measured by considering evidence of any factor relevant to establishing the value of the property.” The Court, then, essentially held that a question of fact existed as the Fair Market Value, and, if no market, what the fair overall value of the compressor was to make plaintiff whole. In so holding, the Court appeared to suggest New York’s Broad Evidence Rule should guide the quantum of proof offered on the appropriate valuation.
The question of fact for Clean and Green was that it failed to offer proof of the lack of any market for used compressors. In so holding, the Court noted that Clean and Green’s principal’s self-serving testimony was insufficient to carry plaintiff’s burden. Because the appropriate valuation of the compressor was not established by either Clean and Green, or Erie, Erie’s request for sum certain judgment was also inappropriate. The entire matter, therefore, was remanded to the trial court for trial on the appropriate value of the compressor.
With regard to Clean and Green’s lost profits claim, the Court reversed the trial court and ruled that such damages were not within the contemplation of the parties at the time of the contract. There was no proof that Diversified recognized it could be potential liable for lost profits when it agreed to perform the work. And further the “contract” was a “bare bones” lift ticket that made no mention of indemnity or consequential damages. Because consequential damages (which lost profits are in a breach of contract context) can only be recovered when “(1) it is demonstrated with certainty that the damages have been caused by the breach, (2) the extent of the loss is capable of proof with reasonable certainty, and (3) it is established that the damages were fairly within the contemplation of the parties” there was no basis for Clean and Green’s claims.
Editor’s Note: Kudos to Steve Peiper on his representation of Diversified on this appeal.
11/12/26 Whidbee v. Layla and MVAIC
Appellate Division, Second Department
Framed Issue Necessary to Determine Whether Driver Was Uninsured and/or Committed an Intentional Act. Before MVAIC Has to Defend
On January 22, 2024, the plaintiff, as administrator of the estate of Brenda Ann Whidbee (“decedent”), commenced this action against the defendant Layla to recover damages for pain and suffering that the decedent sustained when the defendant driver struck the decedent with a vehicle while she was sitting on the sidewalk outside her home in Brooklyn. The decedent died from the injuries.
The plaintiff subsequently served an amended complaint adding the Motor Vehicle Accident Indemnity Corporation (“MVAIC”) as a defendant. Thereafter, MVAIC moved to dismiss the amended complaint.
Since the defendant driver's identity is known, the amended complaint insofar as asserted against MVAIC in this action must be dismissed.
Article 52 of the Insurance Law . . . is intended to compensate, through MVAIC, innocent victims who, among other things, were involved in accidents caused by uninsured motor vehicles" "Article 52 does not, however, cover incidents that are the result of intentional conduct by a tortfeasor, because those incidents are not caused by accident."
Since questions of fact remain, the Supreme Court should not have summarily granted the plaintiff's cross-motion to compel MVAIC to defend the defendant driver The Supreme Court, Kings County, to conduct a framed-issue hearing on the issues of the vehicle's insurance coverage on the date of the incident and whether the incident was the result of an accident or of intentional conduct.
PEIPER on PROPERTY (and POTPOURRI)
Steven E. Peiper
[email protected]
Nothing for me this week, but we note the interesting decisions in Dan’s column.
An “impaired property” case and a case discussing the Broad Evidence Rule in the same week.
Quite good reading for property nerds. Enjoy.
LEE’S CONNECTICUT CHRONICLES
Lee S. Siegel
[email protected]
On the road.
RYAN’S FEDERAL REPORTER
Ryan P. Maxwell
[email protected]
11/12/26 Tig Ins. Co. v. Swiss Reinsurance Am. Corp.
Eastern District of New York
Reinsurer Required to Pay on Reinsurance Certificates Following Valid Assignment of Claims by Ceding Insurer to Settlement-Funder
TIG Insurance Company (as successor by merger to Ranger Insurance Company) and Associated Electric and Gas Insurance Services Limited (AEGIS) sued Swiss Reinsurance America Corporation (SRA), formerly North American Reinsurance Corporation (NARe), alleging SRA breached six facultative reinsurance certificates issued to Ranger in the early 1980s. NARe had issued six facultative reinsurance certificates to Ranger, each corresponding to an excess liability policy written in Ranger’s name, three for Duke Power Company and three for Carolina Power & Light Company, with aggregate ceded limits totaling $130 million.
Duke notified AEGIS and TIG of potential environmental liability from coal ash at multiple North Carolina power plants and sought coverage under the six Ranger-fronted policies. In a 2017 letter agreement, AEGIS assumed control of the defense and settlement and accepted responsibility for “100% of past and future loss and defense costs,” while the parties expressly preserved TIG’s reinsurance rights against SRA. Beginning in early 2017, SRA was notified of the potential reinsurance exposure, located the certificates in its records, repeatedly reserved its rights, and monitored the Duke litigation through 2020–2021, including receiving updates under a common-interest arrangement.
AEGIS ultimately settled the Duke litigation for $185 million in an agreement that AEGIC funded and TIG was a signatory on. Thereafter, TIG (through RiverStone) authorized AEGIS to bill SRA and assigned to AEGIS amounts paid in connection with the defense and settlement. AEGIS billed SRA $114,272,539 (57% of the settlement) plus $15,478,138 in expenses, but SRA declined to pay and this lawsuit followed.
TIG and AEGIS contend the NARe/Ranger certificates obligate SRA to indemnify TIG for the settlement and defense costs allocated to the covered policies and that TIG validly assigned its claim to AEGIS. SRA disagreed citing, among other things, that TIG did not “pay” the loss because AEGIS funded the settlement; that AEGIS (not TIG) is the real party in interest under the 2017 agreement; that TIG had no claim to assign; and that Plaintiffs’ allocation (including the 57% share) is improper.
Responding to these contentions, the SDNY evaluated the certificates’ language, the 2017 agreement’s express reservation of reinsurance rights, and the evidence of the parties’ fronting and allocation arrangements and ultimately concluded that SRA breached their obligations under the six NARe/Ranger Certificates.
The court found the six NARe/Ranger facultative certificates unambiguously indemnify TIG for its “insurance liability” under the identified policies up to stated limits. It rejected SRA’s request to read in a limitation that the certificates covered only Ranger’s “fronting risk” or amounts TIG personally paid, noting no such text appears in the contracts and refusing to itself supply absent limitations for sophisticated parties. Contemporaneous telexes (e.g., describing a “clear path to Swiss Re”) and the structure’s economics reinforced, rather than undermined, the plain-text reading.
Applying New York reinsurance principles, the court held a cedent’s right to indemnity accrues when its underlying liability is resolved by payment and further that the identity of who tenders the funds is not dispositive where a principal pays under a fronting arrangement. AEGIS’s settlement payment discharged TIG’s policy-level liability and is properly attributed to TIG for reinsurance purposes, especially where the certificates required that claims be “settled by the Company” and did not impose a proof-of-payment condition on TIG itself.
SRA’s argument that AEGIS’s assumption of 100% responsibility eliminated TIG’s reinsured liability failed. Reading the agreement as a whole, Paragraph 6 expressly preserved TIG’s reinsurance rights against SRA and to interpret Paragraph 4 to strip those rights would impermissibly render Paragraph 6 meaningless. Testimony showed Paragraph 6 was inserted at TIG’s insistence, and, in any event, a bilateral agreement between AEGIS and TIG could not alter SRA’s obligations as a nonparty.
Addressing whether AEGIS had standing, The SDNY applied New York’s two-part test—(i) whether TIG had a viable claim and (ii) whether the assignment was valid—and answered both affirmatively. TIG had a reinsurance claim once its liability was released by the settlement, and the August 10, 2021, letter effected a valid assignment (confirmed by TIG’s participation as co-plaintiff and testimony that TIG authorized AEGIS to bill and collect from SRA). AEGIS therefore could enforce TIG’s reinsurance rights.
The SDNY dispelled various defenses asserted by SRA. Waiver and estoppel failed because SRA consistently reserved rights and the plaintiffs could not have relied on any representation of coverage. Its notice defense failed for lack of prejudice, where SRA had actual notice by early 2017, located the certificates, monitored the case for years, and engaged counsel. And finally mutual mistake failed for lack of clear and convincing evidence because the decades-long course of performance (AEGIS handling and paying claims) reflected the intended fronting structure, not a shared error.
Maxwell’s Minute: Full disclosure to my readers 50 and over. I had to look up what a telex was. At least I have a new word to include in my discovery requests, which should fit somewhere between mind-meld and smoke signal.
STORM’S SIU
Scott D. Storm
[email protected]
11/04/26 Great Am. Ins. Co. v. Gemstone Property Management, LLC.
United States District Court for the Southern District of New York
Invoking the Fifth Amendment in a Civil Deposition and Confidentiality Designations Under a Discovery Protective Order.
- Invoking the Fifth Amendment in a civil deposition, without more, is not “personal or intimate” information justifying a confidentiality designation under a typical discovery protective order.
- A non‑party’s desire to avoid embarrassment or hypothetical jury‑pool taint from public knowledge of Fifth Amendment invocations is generally insufficient, standing alone, to establish good cause for a protective order under Rule 26(c); courts can address any future prejudice through trial procedures if criminal proceedings arise.
- Filing discovery materials in connection with a motion to strike confidentiality does not automatically convert those materials into “judicial documents” with a presumption of access under the common law or First Amendment; courts reject attempts to bootstrap public access in that way.
Plaintiff Great American Insurance Company moved to strike the confidentiality designations that non‑party Herbert Subin placed on portions of his deposition transcript after he repeatedly invoked the Fifth Amendment. The motion was granted in part and denied in part.
Subin, a non‑party, was deposed on July 24, 2026, in this insurance coverage dispute. During questioning by Great American’s counsel, he invoked the Fifth Amendment numerous times. His counsel read into the record a statement explaining that there were pending fraud and RICO‑related allegations in other lawsuits, that plaintiffs here had referenced those allegations, and that Subin would invoke the privilege question‑by‑question; counsel emphasized that invocation is not an admission of wrongdoing.
After the deposition, Subin designated significant portions of the transcript “Confidential” pursuant to the case’s existing Protective Order, including his counsel’s on‑the‑record statement and the Fifth Amendment invocations themselves. Great American challenged those designations as overbroad, beyond the Protective Order’s scope, and unsupported by good cause.
The issues include:
- Do Subin’s designations fall within the categories of “Confidential” material under the existing Protective Order (particularly as “personal or intimate” information)?
- Even if not covered by the existing order, has Subin shown “good cause” under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(c) for a new or supplemental protective order shielding his Fifth Amendment invocations from disclosure?
- Should the deposition transcript, filed in connection with the motion, be treated as a judicial document subject to a presumption of public access under the common law or First Amendment?
Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(c) permits protective orders for good cause to protect against annoyance, embarrassment, oppression, or undue burden, and the court has wide discretion in fashioning such orders. The court noted that, whether stipulated or contested, protective orders require a finding of good cause. It also reiterated that protective orders govern use of discovery materials but do not by themselves control sealing of court filings, which is governed by rights of public access.
The Fifth Amendment privilege protects the innocent as well as the guilty; a witness may assert it even where there is only a reasonable, non‑imaginary possibility of prosecution. In this very case, the court had previously recognized that allegations in civil complaints can create a reasonable fear of prosecution justifying invocation of the privilege.
Parties cannot create a right of access by filing materials simply to destroy confidentiality; the Second Circuit has rejected that bootstrapping argument in the context of deposition materials used only to seek or oppose protective relief.
The court held that a deponent’s act of invoking the Fifth Amendment is not “personal or intimate” information within the Protective Order’s enumerated categories and therefore cannot be designated “Confidential” on that basis. The court also observed that, if Great American later moved to compel answers, Subin would in any event have to reveal publicly that he invoked the Fifth Amendment, underscoring why the invocation itself does not fit within the order’s confidentiality categories.
Subin argued that public disclosure of his invocations could taint a future criminal jury pool and cause embarrassment. The court rejected that as insufficient to show good cause. Invoking the Fifth Amendment does not imply wrongdoing; the law explicitly recognizes that the privilege protects the innocent, and the risk of prosecution need only be reasonably feared, not proven likely. Concerns about potential juror prejudice can be addressed through voir dire and other trial‑management tools if a prosecution ever materializes. On this record, Subin failed to demonstrate a specific harm that Rule 26(c) is designed to avert; protecting the fact of his invocations would not promote the “free flow” of discoverable information between parties, as he seeks only to shield the questions asked and his invocation responses themselves.
Great American asked the court to treat the deposition transcript filed with the motion as a “judicial document” entitled to a presumption of access. The court denied the request, explaining that a party cannot manufacture the predicate for public access by filing a motion aimed at destroying confidentiality; Second Circuit precedent forecloses that tactic.
The court granted in part and denied in part Great American’s motion. It struck Subin’s confidentiality designations to the extent they purported to treat his Fifth Amendment invocations as “Confidential” under the existing Protective Order and declined to issue a separate protective order on good‑cause grounds. At the same time, it refused to deem the deposition transcript a judicial document entitled to a presumption of access based solely on its filing with this motion. The court directed the parties to meet and confer on unsealing, in light of the memorandum and order.
06/09/26 Bd. of Managers of the 866 Third Ave. Condo. v. Cincinnati Ins. Co.
United States District Court for the Southern District of New York
A Condominium Board Can Have an Insurable Interest in Interior-Unit Repairs Following a Casualty Where Governing Documents Impose Repair Obligations or Emergency Duties That Expose the Board to Pecuniary Loss; Explicit Allocations in Those Documents Can Narrow That Interest
A major water leak on December 23, 2024, at 866 Third Avenue in Manhattan flooded common areas and individual condominium units, damaging, among other things, the building’s elevators, and fire alarm system. Units impacted included a Marriott-branded hotel owned by DiamondRock Realty, an outpatient care facility used by Memorial Sloan Kettering (title held by SKI Realty), and retail space operated by 866 Third Retail. The Condominium promptly began repairs.
The Board submitted a claim on December 23 or 24, 2024, under a Cincinnati “Commercial Output” policy effective December 13, 2024, to December 13, 2025, which covered direct physical loss or damage but capped payment at the insured’s “insurable interest.” Cincinnati retained Young & Associates, then issued net payments exceeding $320,000, but refused additional invoices for work done within individual unit interiors, contending those were the owners’ responsibility under governing documents.
The property is governed by an Amended and Restated Declaration of Condominium and By-Laws. Key provisions: Section 24.1(A) (Board to repair “damage to or destruction of the Building” caused by casualty), Section 18.1(B) (exception placing casualty repairs on the Board), Section 10 (Board’s operational responsibilities, including maintaining fire alarm equipment), and Section 7.2 (allocating costs to maintain/repair the Common Freight Elevator to the Hotel Unit). The By-Laws, Art. III, § 6(a)(5), authorize the Board to cause repairs within a Unit in an emergency.
The Board sued Cincinnati Insurance Company and Cincinnati Financial Corporation in New York state court on August 13, 2025, for breach of contract, breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, and declaratory judgment.
The issue is whether the Board had an “insurable interest” in the property for which it sought coverage, given that some repairs occurred inside individual units and the policy limited payment to the insured’s insurable interest.
Governing law incudes Scarola v. Insurance Co. of North America, holding that an insured has an insurable interest if it stands to derive pecuniary benefit from the property’s preservation or risk pecuniary loss from its damage; New York applies “great liberality” in recognizing insurable interests.
The court held that the Board had an insurable interest in nearly all disputed repairs because the governing Declaration and By-Laws obligated the Board to repair casualty damage and to cause repairs in emergencies, creating a real risk of pecuniary loss if owners did not pay. The court emphasized Section 24.1(A) (casualty repairs), Section 18.1(B) (casualty exception to owner repair duty), and the By-Laws emergency-repair authority, and noted the policy in Scarola favoring recognition of insurable interests. The court also observed that the Declaration requires the Board to obtain “all risk” insurance, and Cincinnati’s reading would render that requirement nugatory if the Board could not insure the costs of emergency repairs.
An exception existed for the common freight elevator. Because Section 7.2 expressly allocates maintenance and repair costs for the Common Freight Elevator to the Hotel Unit, the Board lacked an insurable interest as to those elevator repairs; the Board did not offer a contrary reading.
As a result, partial summary judgment was granted for the Board on liability on the contract and related declaratory claims, except as to unpaid claims for the Common Freight Elevator.
After the May 12, 2026, order, the parties met and conferred and agreed Cincinnati owes $290,457.04 (sum of payable invoices less the deductible and prior payments). The court independently verified the calculation and entered final judgment awarding $290,457.04 and declaratory relief consistent with the opinion.
The Board’s obligations under the Declaration/By-Laws meant it faced potential economic loss if it undertook required emergency or casualty repairs and owners failed to reimburse; that risk satisfied New York’s flexible insurable-interest doctrine. Cincinnati’s arguments that the Board had interest only in general common elements or merely coordinated rather than bore responsibility for interior-unit repairs, were rejected. The only carve-out was dictated by the Declaration’s express allocation of Common Freight Elevator costs to the Hotel Unit.
FLEMING’S FINEST
Katherine A. Fleming
[email protected]
11/13/26 Showalter v. Milbank Ins. Co.
Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia
Provision Conditioning Availability of Underinsured Motorist Coverage by Requiring Owner or Operator of Underinsured Motor Vehicle’s Liability for Damages to Arise Out of the Ownership, Maintenance or Use of the Vehicle Void Against Public Policy
Ratcliffe drove a vehicle owned by Mattson the wrong way and collided head on with a vehicle operated by Day. Five people died, including Ratcliffe and Mattson. Milbank insured Mattson’s vehicle. Ratcliffe separately owned and insured his own vehicle with Erie Insurance Property and Casualty Company, and his vehicle was at home and in no way involved in the accident. The Estate filed liability claims under the Milbank and Erie policies. Both companies tendered policy limits to be split among the multiple claimants. The Estate claimed the liability policy proceeds were insufficient to satisfy Mattson’s damages and filed a claim for benefits under her UIM policy, treating Ratcliffe’s Erie-insured (not involved) vehicle as the underinsured motor vehicle. Milbank denied the claim and commenced a declaratory judgment action for a declaration that it had no obligation to provide UIM coverage, asserting, among other things, a provision requiring the underinsured motorist’s “liability” to “arise out of the ownership, maintenance or use” of the underinsured vehicle. The Estate filed a counterclaim alleging breach of contract, unfair settlement practices, and bad faith. The parties filed cross motions for summary judgment. The circuit court granted summary judgment to the Estate, finding UIM coverage was available under the Milbank policy because Ratcliffe’s vehicle qualified as an underinsured motor vehicle under the relevant statute and the policy. The circuit court found no policy provision requiring the underinsured vehicle to be involved in the accident and concluded that Ratcliffe’s ownership of the underinsured (Erie-insured) vehicle was sufficient to trigger UIM coverage. The circuit court deemed this result consistent with the statute and its public policy.
Milbank argued at the Intermediate Court of Appeals that it owed no UIM coverage because Ratcliffe’s vehicle was not involved in any way. The ICA reversed the circuit court’s grant of summary judgment to the Estate, concluding that UIM coverage under the Milbank policy was unavailable pursuant to the language in the UIM endorsement. The ICA found that the circuit court’s coverage determination erroneously focused on “the ownership interest a permissive driver (Ratcliffe) possessed in a tangential vehicle wholly unrelated to the accident.” The ICA also rejected any conflict between the policy language and the applicable statute.
The Supreme Court of Appeals noted the purpose of UIM coverage is to allow the insured to protect themselves against losses caused by other underinsured drivers. The Estate argued that nothing in the policy required the underinsured vehicle to actually be involved in the accident. Further, the Estate argued the “arise out of” language runs afoul of the relevant statute and public policy. The Milbank policy and the statute defined underinsured motor vehicle similarly. However, Milbank relied on its policy’s UIM endorsement which conditioned the availability of UIM coverage on accidents where “[t]he owner’s or operator’s liability . . . arise[s] out of the ownership, maintenance or use” of the underinsured vehicle. The Court held that a provision in a motor vehicle insurance policy that conditions the availability of underinsured motorist coverage to an insured by requiring the owner or operator of the underinsured motor vehicle’s “liability” for the damages to “arise out” of the ownership, maintenance or use of the underinsured motor vehicle is more restrictive than the statutory requirements and is void as against public policy and unenforceable to that extent. The Court reasoned the policy endorsement is subservient to West Virginia law and must comply with its UIM insurance statute. As a result, Ratcliffe’s vehicle qualified as an underinsured motor vehicle under the statute because his “ownership” of a vehicle with applicable Erie liability coverage—which was insufficient to pay the full amount of damages—was what triggered Mattson’s UIM coverage. The Court reversed and remanded to reinstate summary judgment in favor of the Estate on the issue of UIM coverage.
GESTWICK’S GARDEN STATE GAZETTE
Evan D. Gestwick
[email protected]
11/18/26 State Farm Indem. Co. v. Houtsma
United States District Court, District of New Jersey
Court Enforces Exclusion for Bodily Injury to an Insured in a Claim Made by Wife Against Husband
On July 30, 2022, husband and wife Tracy and Greg Houtsma were involved in a one-vehicle automobile accident in which Tracy was injured. Tracy commenced an underlying bodily injury action against Greg as a result of her injuries.
At the time of the accident, Greg and Tracy were each named insureds under a personal liability umbrella policy issued by State Farm. That policy contained an exclusion for bodily injury or personal injury to any insured as defined in the policy, including any claim made or suit brought against any insured to share damages with or repay someone else who may be obligated to pay damages because of such bodily injury or personal injury.
The policy defined an “insured” to mean, inter alia, the named insureds shown in the declarations.
State Farm disclaimed coverage to Greg with respect to Tracy’s claims, since Tracy was also an insured under the policy. State farm commenced this declaratory judgment action to uphold its denial of coverage. Greg defaulted in this action. State Farm then brought a motion for a default judgment against Greg.
On a motion for default judgment, the moving party bears the burden of establishing: (1) that the defendant is in default; and (2) that the plaintiff has a meritorious cause of action. In support of the second prong of that test, State Farm showed that Tracy was a named insured under the policy at issue, and that the above exclusion therefore barred coverage for her claims against Greg.
Finding that State Farm established that Greg was in default, and that State Farm presented a meritorious cause of action, the District Court granted State farm’s motion for a default judgment.
Editor’s Note: A copy of this decision is available upon request.
O’SHEA RIDES the CIRCUITS
Ryan P. O’Shea
[email protected]
11/03/26 Tri Cnty. Tel. Ass’n v. Twin City Fire Ins. Co.
United States Court of Appeals, Tenth Circuit
Cross Suits Exclusion Applies to Shareholder Claims Against Named Insured
Tri County Telephone Association’s (“TCT”) prior director, Campbell, attempted to block TCT’s acquisition. Campbell failed and later filed a class action suit against TCT. Twin City denied coverage to TCT for the suit under the directors and officers (“D&O) policy previously issued to TCT. Twin City relied on an insured v. insured exclusion which applied to claims brought or maintained by or on behalf any Insureds (in any capacity) or any security holder of an Insured Entity."
A carveout to the exclusion stated:
(5) a civil proceeding by or on behalf of a former Manager who has not served in such capacity for at least one year prior to such Claim being made, provided that such Claim is made without the assistance, participation or solicitation of any current Manager or any former Manager who has served in such capacity during the one year prior to such Claim being made.
Campbell and TCT’s former board tendered their resignations on December 31, 2014. On December 28, 2015, Campbell filed his suit against TCT, TCT’s prior board, TCT’s former CEO, and others. The class consisted solely of TCT’s former members who were also considered security holders for purposes of the acquisition.
The Tenth Circuit held the insured v. insured, also known as a cross-suits exclusion, applied. It was obvious Campbell’s suit (not soup), and the class fell within the exclusion’s scope. Indeed, the entire class was considered security holders, and the suit was brought against TCT. The court also held the former manager carveout did not apply since Campbell resigned on December 31, 2014, and filed suit on December 28, 2024. Thus, Campbell’s status as a board member did not end more than a year from the claim. Due to this fact, the carveout did not apply.
The court also rejected TCT’s attempt to extend coverage due to the later joinder of TCT’s prior CFO who held position. TCT claimed the prior CFO’s acts were wrongful acts that occurred a year after he acted as a manager. But the policy stated claim based upon, arising from or in any way related to the same Wrongful Act or Interrelated Wrongful Acts are deemed a single Claim. The claims asserted against TCT’s CFO arose from the same conduct alleged against TCT. Thus, the claims against TCT and TCT’s CFO constituted a single claim.
LABARBERA’S LOWER COURT LIBRARY
Isabelle H. LaBarbera
[email protected]
09/08/26 Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Deabreu
Supreme Court of New York, New York County
Court Denies Insurer’s Summary Judgment Motion Based on Alleged Residence Misrepresentation, Finding Underwriting Proof Insufficient to Establish Materiality as a Matter of Law
Liberty Mutual Insurance Company and LM General Insurance Company (“Liberty”) brought a declaratory judgment action arising from first-party no-fault claims and moved for summary judgment under CPLR 3212 against several medical-provider defendants, who are assignees of the insured, Keron Deabreu (“Deabreu”). Liberty sought declarations that it owes no no-fault benefits arising from an August 6, 2024, motor vehicle accident, as well as permanent stays and injunctive relief barring the providers’ arbitrations and proceedings.
Liberty investigated on suspicion of “rate evasion.” The policy listed an address in Latham, New York, but Liberty’s investigation, and Deabreu’s own EUO testimony, showed that he had lived in Brooklyn for roughly three years and kept the vehicle there. The Court found substantial, largely undisputed evidence of this address discrepancy, which provider counsel conceded at oral argument. Liberty’s underwriting affiant stated that the policy would carry a premium of $13,336 using the Brooklyn address, versus $5,858 using the Latham address, and attached “Premium Determination Pages.” Liberty also argued that Deabreu failed to cooperate with its investigation, and that the providers, as assignees, have no greater rights than Deabreu.
The Court first rejected the providers’ argument that a misrepresentation cannot be material under Insurance Law § 3105 where the insurer would have written the policy at a higher premium. Under First Department precedent, a misrepresentation is material if the insurer would not have issued the policy, or would have charged a higher premium, and even an innocent misrepresentation suffices.
Nevertheless, relying on Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v Valera (208 AD3d 1104 [1st Dept 2022]) and State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v Able Chiropractic, P.C. (234 AD3d 537 [1st Dept 2025]), the Court held that Liberty failed to establish materiality as a matter of law. The underwriter’s affidavit was conclusory, and Liberty did not submit the underlying rating manuals, rules, or guidelines, which the affiant acknowledged exist. The premium computation pages showed that changing the territory produces a different premium, but not why, or that they reflected Liberty’s actual underwriting practice rather than a post-loss rerating exercise. The Court also found the motion premature under CPLR 3212(f), because the underwriting, claim, and SIU materials the providers requested remain in Liberty’s control, and Liberty’s service of discovery responses did not resolve that issue.
The Court likewise rejected the independent failure-to-cooperate theory. Deabreu appeared for his EUO and answered extensive questions, and Liberty’s EUO scheduling letter stated that production of documents was “not a prerequisite.” Liberty identified no specific post-EUO verification demand, with a stated deadline, and the November 19, 2024, reservation-of-rights letter in the record merely invited Deabreu to provide additional information. The Court also noted that EUO requests must rest on objective standards under 11 NYCRR § 65-3.5(e). Although it agreed that an assignee takes subject to defenses against the assignor, that principle does not relieve Liberty of its threshold burden to prove the defense.
On Vehicle and Traffic Law § 313, the Court declined to decide the issue but refused to hold that it categorically bars Liberty’s defense, or to enter an immediate declaration extinguishing all claims. Because Liberty did not show entitlement to the underlying declaration, the permanent stays and injunctive relief were also denied.
The Court denied the motion in its entirety, without prejudice to renewal following appropriate discovery on Liberty’s underwriting practices and guidelines and, if still pursued, the specifics of its verification demands and any non-compliance. The Court emphasized that it did not determine that the stated address was accurate, or that the discrepancy was immaterial, and the parties were directed to a preliminary conference on October 20, 2026. A good reminder that, in the residence and garaging misrepresentation context, an insurer should be prepared to support materiality with actual underwriting manuals and rules, not just an affidavit and premium printouts.
LEXI’S LEGISLATIVE LOWDOWN
Lexi R. Horton
[email protected]
11/20/26 New York Senate Bill S3460
Governor Signs Bill S3460 Granting Employees Access to Their Personnel Records
On September 9, 2026, the Governor signed into law Bill S3460 (Chapter 293 of the Laws of 2026), which adds a new Section 210-b to the Labor Law granting employees access to their personnel records.
The Bill applies to private and public sector employers, including governmental entities and labor organizations, and to former employees. “Personnel record” is defined broadly to include a record used, or that may be used, in relation to an employee’s qualifications for employment, promotion, transfer, additional compensation, or disciplinary action, such as job applications, resumes, performance evaluations, written warnings, probationary periods, waivers, termination notices, and other disciplinary documents. It also reaches records held by a third party under contract with the employer.
Among other things, the Bill provides that:
- An employer must notify an employee within ten days of placing in the employee’s personnel record any information that is, or may be, used to negatively affect the employee’s qualification for employment, promotion, transfer, or additional compensation, or to subject the employee to discipline;
- Upon written request, an employer must provide a copy of the personnel record at no cost within five business days;
- An employer is not required to permit review more than twice per calendar year, although a review prompted by the placement of negative information does not count toward that limit;
- If an employee disagrees with information in the record and the parties cannot agree on its removal or correction, the employee may submit a written statement that becomes part of the record and must be included when the information is sent to a third party;
- Employers must retain personnel records for the duration of employment and for three years after termination;
- Retaliation against an employee for exercising these rights is prohibited, including threats related to immigration enforcement; and
- Violations are enforceable by the Attorney General, with civil fines ranging from $500 to $2,500.
The Bill preserves collective bargaining agreements that provide substantially similar access to personnel records.
The sponsor’s memo states that the purpose of the Bill is to ensure that all laborers in the state have a fair opportunity to review their personnel records and are notified when a negative report is filed against them.
VICTORIA’S VISION ON BAD FAITH
Victoria S. Heist
[email protected]
11/16/26 Bernacchi v. Travelers Personal Insurance Co.
United States District Court Northern District of Indiana
Bad Faith Claims Are Bound by Suit Limitation
In February 2024, Plaintiff Bernacchi sustained water damage to his property in Wheatfield, Indiana. He held a homeowners policy issued by Travelers. The policy includes a suit limitation provision requiring that any action against the insurer be started within two years after the date of loss. The policy cover page and a reinstatement letter had Geico branding, including references to GEICO Insurance Agency, LLC.
In February 2026, within the two-year period, Bernacchi sued Geico Insurance Agency, LLC d/b/a Traveler's Personal Insurance Company in Indiana state court. Travelers was not named as a defendant or served. In April 2026, Bernacchi moved to amend to dismiss Geico and name Travelers, explaining that Geico may not have been doing business as Travelers. The state court granted the motion and deemed the Amended Complaint filed as of April 21, 2026. The Amended Complaint alleges breach of contract and bad faith. Travelers was served in July 2026 and removed the case to federal court in August 2026, then moved to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6).
The Court denied Travelers' motion to dismiss. First, the Court denied dismissal based on the two-year suit limitation provision. The Court found the provision plain and enforceable, and applicable to the bad faith claim, so the claims were untimely unless the Amended Complaint related back to the original Complaint. Applying Indiana Trial Rule 15(C), the Court found that the claims arose from the same occurrence and that, at the pleading stage, Bernacchi plausibly showed that naming Geico was a mistake rather than a deliberate strategy, and that Travelers should have known the action would have been brought against it but for that mistake. Though, the Court discussed that the two-year suit limitations provision applies to bad faith claims.
As to notice under Rule 15(C)(1), the Amended Complaint alone did not allow the Court to infer that Travelers received notice within 120 days of the original Complaint. The Court, however, considered Bernacchi's argument in his response brief that Geico was Travelers' agent and that Travelers therefore had constructive notice. Under Indiana law, a broker acts for the insured until a policy issues, but agency is generally a question of fact. The Court found notice plausibly alleged and saw no facts suggesting Travelers' defense on the merits was impaired.
Second, the Court denied dismissal for failure to allege compliance with conditions precedent. Under both the federal and Indiana rules, a general allegation of performance is sufficient. The Amended Complaint alleged that Bernacchi submitted documentation of damages and repairs and that Travelers rejected the claims. The Court held that Travelers, who had the burden on a motion to dismiss, never identified any specific condition precedent that Bernacchi failed to allege.
SHIM’S SERIOUS INJURY SEGMENT
Stephen M. Shimshi
[email protected]
11/12/26 Sanchez v. Hanne
Supreme Court of New York, Appellate Division, First Department
The Appellate Division, First Department, Affirms the Order of the Supreme Court, New York County, Thereby Granting Defendant’s Summary Judgment Motion on the Basis That the Plaintiff Did Not Sustain a “Serious Injury” Within the Meaning of Insurance Law § 5102(d)
This matter arises from a motor vehicle accident that occurred on August 27, 2017, at approximately 9:40 p.m. at or near 1100 2nd Avenue, New York, New York. Plaintiff, Osiris A. Maria ("plaintiff"), alleged injuries to his left knee and lumbar and cervical spines. On February 27, 2025, the Supreme Court, New York County entered an Order, which granted defendants', Mbaye Hanne’s and Oscar A. Landaverde’s, motion for summary judgment to dismiss plaintiff’s claims of permanent consequential limitation of use and significant limitation of use of his left knee and 90/180-day claim, for lack of a serious injury within the meaning of Insurance Law § 5102 (d). Plaintiff appeals.
According to the Appellate Division, First Department, defendants established that plaintiff's alleged left knee injury was not causally related to the subject accident. This was accomplished through the report of defendants’ expert radiologist, who identified only chronic, degenerative changes in the MRI of plaintiff's left knee, none of which, the radiologist opined, was causally related to the accident (see e.g. Kemegue v Rosario-Ramirez, 250 AD3d 565, 566, 257 N.Y.S.3d 326 [1st Dept 2026]; Cooke v Jean-Baptiste, 247 AD3d 447, 448, 255 N.Y.S.3d 210 [1st Dept 2026]; McKenzie-Moses v Lelcaj, 238 AD3d 415, 415, 234 N.Y.S.3d 455 [1st Dept 2025]).
In opposition, plaintiff failed to raise an issue of fact because the medical records submitted by plaintiff were uncertified (see e.g. Natera v Veloz Livery Rentals Inc., 206 AD3d 428, 429, 167 N.Y.S.3d 783 [1st Dept 2022]), and plaintiff’s expert orthopedist's report was unaffirmed (see e.g. Morrison v Santana, 183 AD3d 456, 457, 121 N.Y.S.3d 858 [1st Dept 2020]).Plaintiff’s sur-reply submitted in an attempt to correct the aforementioned defects was filed without leave of court and therefore inadmissible (see Uniform Rules for Trial Cts [22 NYCRR] § 202.8-c).
However, even if plaintiff's evidence was admissible or he proffered a reasonable excuse for failing to tender it in admissible form (see generally Friends of Animals v Associated Fur Mfrs., 46 NY2d 1065, 1068, 390 N.E.2d 298, 416 N.Y.S.2d 790 [1979]), the Appellate Division held that plaintiff’s evidence nevertheless failed to raise a triable issue of fact, since his orthopedist did not address any of defendants' radiologist's findings of degeneration and preexisting conditions on the MRI of plaintiff's left knee (see Pommells v Perez, 4 NY3d 566, 579-580, 830 N.E.2d 278, 797 N.Y.S.2d 380 [2005]; Franchini v Palmieri, 1 NY3d 536, 537, 807 N.E.2d 282, 775 N.Y.S.2d 232 [2003]; Cooke, 247 AD3d at 448).
Based on the foregoing, the Appellate Division, First Department, held that defendants were properly granted summary judgment to dismiss the plaintiff's claims of permanent consequential limitation of use and significant limitation of use of his left knee for lack of causation. This lack of causation also defeated plaintiff's 90/180-day claim as well (see Harvey v New York Foundling Hosp., 248 AD3d 689, 689, 253 N.Y.S.3d 626 [1st Dept 2026]; Cooke, 247 AD3d at 449).
NEW ENGLAND ALMANACK
Barbara A. O’Donnell
[email protected]
Alexander G. Henlin
[email protected]
Iryna N. Dore
[email protected]
10/02/26 Town of Braintree v. MIIA Property & Casualty Group, Inc.
Commonwealth of Massachusetts, Suffolk County Superior Court Business Litigation Session
Insurer Owes Approximately 40% Time on Risk Share of $14.9 Million Wrongful Conviction Settlement but Existence of Bona Fide Coverage Dispute Shields it From c.93A/176D Unfair Claims Handling Liability
In October 2026, a Massachusetts trial court judge enters summary judgment for the Town of Braintree regarding its right to recover 40.62% of a $14.9 million dollar settlement reached with Fredrick Weichel concerning his wrongful conviction and incarceration for 36 years (on a sentence to life in prison) for a murder in 1980 that he did not commit. Following the reversal of his conviction in 2017 due to exculpatory evidence obtained through public record requests that was withheld during the 1981 trial, Weichel filed wrongful conviction lawsuits against the Town and certain Town police officers in the United States District Court in the District of Massachusetts in Civil Action No. l:20-cv-11456-IT ("Weichel I") and in Civil Action No. 1:22-cv-12126-IT ("Weichel II").
The Town’s insurer on the risk from 2002 through Weichel’s release from custody in 2017, MIIA Property & Casualty Group, Inc. (“MIIA”), provided the Town with defense coverage in the Weichel I and II lawsuits under a reservation of rights. MIIA is a self-insurance group that insures cities, towns, and government entities in the Commonwealth against property and casualty losses.
In addition to his lawsuits against the Town, Weichel also filed a civil suit against the Commonwealth. In 2022, Weichel obtained a $33 million verdict against the Commonwealth that was reduced to the $1 million statutory cap available under G.L. c. 258D, §5A. Following the jury verdict, the Town’s counsel recommended that it pursue a settlement with Weichel to avoid its potential exposure to "astronomical damages."
During negotiations concerning the Town’s effort to settle the Weichel litigation, it obtained contributions from some of its insurers, but MIIA contested its indemnity coverage obligation and refused to contribute more than $1 million toward the $14.9 settlement rather than its pro rata time-on-the-risk share (around $6 million).
After settling the Weichel litigation, the Town filed a lawsuit against MIIA for breach of contract and a violation of M.G.L. c. 93A and 176D, the Massachusetts unfair trade practices and claims handling statutes. The Action was assigned to the Business Litigation Session in Suffolk Superior Court.
On cross motions for summary judgment, MIIA argued that the Law Enforcement Liability (“LEL”) provisions in its Policies did not cover Weichel’s claims because: (i) the Town knew about Weichel’s false imprisonment prior to the initial policy’s inception; and (ii) the ‘willful violation of law’ exclusion eliminated coverage because the only reasonable conclusion from the available information is that one or more Town officers intentionally declined to produce exculpatory evidence in 1980.
To support its entitlement to indemnity coverage for a portion of the settlement amount, the Town argued that MIIA had to establish that it was aware of Weichel’s innocence to carry its burden of proof regarding the Town’s asserted knowledge of the injury before the initial policy incepted in 2002. The Town also argued that the willful violation of law exclusion did not apply to reckless conduct and the evidence did not establish an intentional violation by any of its officers.
Ruling in the Town’s favor on its breach of contract claim, the Court concluded that Weichel’s wrongful imprisonment constituted a continuing ‘occurrence’ arising from the Town’s law enforcement activities encompassed by the plain language of the Policies’ LEL Coverage A insuring agreement. The Coverage B “personal and advertising injury” insuring agreement did not serve as a source of coverage for Weichel’s claims because the wrongful conviction and false imprisonment offenses predated the inception of the initial MIIA Policy. Under Massachusetts law, an initial wrongful conviction does not trigger coverage during the entire imprisonment period. See, Billings v. Commerce Ins. Co., 458 Mass. 194, 199 (2010).
Turning from the LEL insuring agreement requirements to the applicable Exclusions, the Court concluded that the willful violation of law Exclusion did not relieve MIIA of its indemnity coverage obligations because it failed to establish that any of the Town's officers knew that the exculpatory evidence was withheld or that the Town had a policy against withholding evidence.
The CGL provisions in MIIA’s Policies did not afford coverage for the Weichel settlement amount because his claims fall squarely within the Exclusion for any “act or omission’ of the ‘police … or law enforcement” and the Town did not establish an entitlement to personal and advertising injury coverage under the CGL provisions for its alleged post-conviction failure to disclose exculpatory evidence.
After concluding that MIIA breached its obligations under the Policies’ LEL Coverage A provisions by denying indemnity coverage for the Weichel settlement, the Court used a time-on-the-risk method of allocation to quantify its liability because it was not possible to carry out a reliable “fact-based allocation” which examines “precisely what injury or damage took place during each contract period or uninsured period and allocate[s] the loss accordingly.” See, Boston Gas Co. v. Century Indem. Co., 454 Mass. 337, 367 (2009).
As the Court explained, the Weichel settlement extinguished claims for multiple types of harm including bodily injury and differing types of personal injuries, some of which occurred during the MIAA Policy periods. Weichel’s amended complaint in the underlying litigation alleged that he “suffered ‘mental and physical health problems’ from the ‘unlawful arrest. prosecution, and imprisonment’ which ‘continue to this day. Given the available factual record, it was not possible for the Court to assign a percentage of the settlement amount to each category of harms and/or accurately to assign a monetary value to each of the harms based upon the available evidence. Under the time on the risk approach, MIIA was responsible for a 40.62% share of the $14.9 million settlement amount.
Turning from the breach of contract to the c.93A/176D claims, Judge Krupp concluded that MIIA was entitled to summary judgment on this aspect of the Town’s claims because it relied upon a plausible, reasoned position when it denied coverage and “offered a smaller amount ($1 million) than its pro rata time-on-the-risk share (around $6 million)” given its reading of Rass Corp. v. Travelers Cos., Inc., 90 Mass. App. Ct. 643 (2016)] concerning the Town’s burden of proof “even though I find that position to be mistaken.” In this regard, MIIA took the position that it was the Town’s burden to prove coverage, and it could not demonstrate bodily injury and an ‘offense’ leading to personal injury through undisputed facts.
NORTH of the BORDER
Heather A. Sanderson, K.C.
Sanderson Law
Calgary, Alberta, Canada
[email protected]
Traveling through Southeast Asia
Editor’s Note – Some people will do anything to avoid a CP column! Ha
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