Labor Law Pointers - Volume XV, No. 6

Speechio v Starbucks Corp.
April 2, 2026
Appellate Division, First Department
 

Plaintiff testified that he slipped on a piece of loose electrical wire as he walked around a pile of discarded wires in order to retrieve additional work material. The pile of discarded wire, was placed at the site by third-party defendant DAL, the electrical subcontractor. Plaintiff moved for summary judgment, which was granted pursuant to Labor Law § 241(6) insofar as predicated on Industrial Code (12 NYCRR) § 23-1.7(e)(2); third-party defendants, Eclipse Contracting Corp.’s and DAL Electric Corp.’s motions for summary judgment dismissing defendants' claims for contractual and common-law indemnification, contribution, and attorneys' fees.
 
Labor Law § 241(6) (JLD)
The First Department concluded that the trial court properly granted the plaintiff’s partial summary judgment on the § 241(6) cause of action, predicated on violation of Industrial Code § 23-1.7(e)(2) because the pile of discarded wire over which plaintiff tripped constituted debris which was not integral to the work being performed at the accident site.

 

Indemnity Issues in Labor Law (AMC)
The First Department held that Third-Party Defendant Eclipse established the accident did not arise out of its work, as the Court found it is not sufficient that plaintiff was injured in the course of performing Eclipse’s work to find the accident arose from it. As a result, contractual indemnification did not apply under the language of the contract. As Plaintiff did not suffer a grave injury, indemnification claims against it were dismissed.
 
The First Department also held that the Trial Court should have denied DAL’s motion seeking dismissal of contractual indemnification and attorney fee claims against them, as Plaintiff tripped over DAL’s debris, and they had piled. Nonetheless, the First Department found the Trial Court properly dismissed the common-law indemnification and contribution claims against DAL, as they did not control the injury-producing work and was free from negligence. The First Department rejected defendants’ contention that DAL should have removed the debris based on an alleged contractual obligation, as the record established the General contractor (Shawmut) had undertaken the work.

 
 
Gonzalez v 60-74 Gansevoort St. LLC
April 7, 2026
Appellate Division, First Department
 

Plaintiff claims that while in the course of his employment for Alba Environmental, he was caused to catch his leg in a hole in the roof that developed under his foot and cause his leg up to his knee to enter the hole (NYSCEF 228). The Trial Court denied 60-74 Gansevoort Street LLC’s and MJM Associates Construction LLC’s for summary judgment dismissing Plaintiff's claims for violations of Labor Law §§ 240(1), 241(6), and 200, and common-law negligence, and for contractual indemnification against third-party defendant/second third-party defendant Alba Services, Inc.
 

Labor Law § 240(1) (TJE)
PRACTICE POINT:
The First Department affirmed the Trial Court’s denial of defendants’ motion for summary judgment on Labor Law §§ 240(1) grounds and did not provide any further analysis or rationale.

 
Labor Law § 241(6) (JLD)
The Appellate Court reversed the trial court, concluding that the trial court should have granted defendant’s motion for summary judgment on the § 241(6) claim, premised on violation of Industrial Code § 23-3.3(c). § 23-3.3(c) requires only continuing inspections against hazards that are created by the progress of the work. This provision has been interpreted as a safety rule designed to protect workers from hazards created when a structure is weakened by the progress of demolition. It does not require inspection of the roof’s structural integrity before commencing any asbestos abatement work.

 

Labor Law § 200 and Common-Law Negligence (AMC)
The Appellate Division held that the Supreme Court properly denied that portion of Defendants' motion seeking dismissal of Plaintiff's Labor Law § 200 and common-law negligence claims as defendants failed to establish that they lacked constructive notice of the hazardous condition that allegedly caused plaintiff's injury.
 
Indemnity Issues in Labor Law (TJE)
The First Department held that the Trial Court properly denied defendants’ motion for summary judgment for contractual indemnification against Alba Services, due to issues of fact as to the defendants’ negligence. As the General Obligations Law prevents defendants being indemnified for their own negligence, a partially negligent owner must seek conditional contractual indemnification as a separate form of relief, which defendants in this instance failed to do.

 

Jadan v 414 Gerard Owner, LLC
April 7, 2026
Appellate Division, First Department

 
On the day of his accident, plaintiff was moving a loaded mini container to another floor when he heard the wheel screech, felt a "snag," and then the mini container tipped over and fell on his foot. Plaintiff noticed a bent wheel on the mini container immediately after his accident. Monadnock contracted with Citywide to provide the construction site with mini containers to be used for the collection of construction debris. Citywide's representative testified that, as a matter of practice, Citywide inspected all the mini containers and made any necessary repairs before delivering them to a construction site, at which point the customer took possession and was responsible for moving them into the site. Defendants/Third-Party Plaintiffs 414 Gerard Owner LLC, the property owner, and Monadnock Construction, Inc., the general contractor for the construction project, seek contribution and common-law and contractual indemnification from Citywide.
 
Indemnity Issues in Labor Law (TJE)
The Frist Department held that Citywide failed to meet their prima facie case supporting dismissal of the contractual and common-law claims against it. The First Department noted that Citywide’s obligation was to deliver mini containers that were free from defects and fit for ordinary purpose, and there was an issue of fact as to whether a defective wheel contributed to Plaintiff’s accident. The First Department rejected that Citywide’s representative testimony regarding general inspections was sufficient to establish that the mini container was defect-free when supplied in light of Plaintiff’s provided testimony. The First Department also affirmed the Trial Court’s denial of dismissal of common-law indemnification claims against them due to the same question of fact.

 

Moreno-Santos v Real Bldrs. Inc.
April 9, 2026
Appellate Division, First Department

 
Plaintiff, a mason employed by North South Masonry, was allegedly injured when an unsecured ladder suddenly slipped out from under him while he was standing on it to finish work on a block wall. The evidence established that the ladder was only the upper part of an extension ladder that had been separated from its bottom part when plaintiff found it at the work site, and the owner defendants acknowledge that it was an inadequate safety device. The Trial Court, denied plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment on their Labor Law § 240(1) claim, and denied Defendants/Third-Party Plaintiffs Real Builders Inc.’s and HP MLK Plaza Housing Development Fund Company Inc.’s motion for summary judgment dismissing Plaintiffs' Labor Law §§ 240(1), 241(6), and 200 claims and for summary judgment on their contractual indemnification claim against Third-Party Defendant North South Masonry Inc.
 
Labor Law § 240(1) (TJE)
The First Department reversed the trial court and granted Plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment on his Labor Law 240(1) claim. Plaintiff’s testimony established that an unsecured ladder slipped out from him, and the defendants’ acknowledged the ladder used was an inadequate safety device. Defendants’ relied on a sole proximate cause argument which the First Department rejected, as there was no provided evidence that Plaintiff disobeyed instructions not to use an inadequate ladder, or an instruction to use an appropriately available ladder. Rather, the Plaintiff requested a ladder and was told by his foreman to go find one himself, and reluctantly used the inadequate ladder when there were no other ladders on the jobsite which he had access to. As a result, since Plaintiff’s injury resulted at least in part from a failure to provide an adequate safety device, Plaintiff cannot be solely to blame and a violation of Labor Law § 240(1) was established.

PRACTICE POINT: Plaintiff fell from an unsecured ladder which shifted, which entitled him to a presumption that the ladder was inadequate – which Defendants acknowledged. Defendants argued that Plaintiff was the sole proximate cause of his injuries but offered no testimony to create issues of fact as to whether adequate safety devices were available at the job site, or whether Plaintiff was instructed to use an adequate safety device. Plaintiff’s own comparative negligence in using the upper part of an extension ladder which had been separated from its bottom part does not prevent an award of summary judgment under Labor Law § 240(1) as a matter of law.    
 
Labor Law § 241(6) (JLD)
As the plaintiff was entitled to summary judgment on their Labor Law § 240(1) claim, the arguments regarding Labor Law § 241(6), was deemed academic.
 
Labor Law § 200 and Common-Law Negligence (AMC)
The Appellate Division held that the owner Defendants did not establish prima facie entitlement to dismissal of the Labor Law § 200 and common-law negligence claims, as the defective ladder constituted a dangerous or defective condition existing on the job site and they did not offer evidence to show that they did not have actual or constructive notice of that condition. Furthermore, evidence that other trades used the unsafe ladder for weeks before plaintiff was injured raises triable issues as to whether the owner defendants had notice of the dangerous condition.
 
Indemnity Issues in Labor Law (TJE)
The First Department held the owner defendants established their entitlement to conditional summary judgment on their contractual indemnification claims based on evidence the indemnifications provisions in their subcontract with North South Masonry were triggered. The Court noted that the facts established evidence the loss was caused by North South Masonry’s negligence, but the record raised triable issues as to whether the owner defendants had actual or constructive notice of the unsafe ladder which was used on the job site for weeks prior to the accident. As a result, the owner defendants were only entitled to conditional indemnification. North South Masonry argued that alternative dispute resolution provisions in its contract required dismissal of the third-party complaint against it, but the Court rejected this argument nothing it had waived this defense by failing to assert it in its answer and participating in discovery.

 
Veloso v City of New York
April 9, 2026
Appellate Division, First Department

 
Plaintiff was injured when he was hit by a rock while working in a trench. At the time of the injury, he was working on the excavation of the trench, in which utility lines were to be placed, and on shoring the sides of the trench. The Trial Court granted Defendants' motion for summary judgment dismissing Plaintiffs' claims for negligence and violations of Labor Law §§ 200, 240(1), and 241(6), and denied Plaintiffs' cross-motion for partial summary judgment on the Labor Law §§ 240(1) and 241(6) claims.
 
Labor Law § 240(1) (TJE)
The First Department affirmed the Trial Court’s grant of summary judgment to Defendants on Plaintiff’s Labor Law § 240(1) claim. Although the risk of a collapse or cave-in on the side of a trench can form the basis of a failure to protect against an elevation differential, the trench wall in this case was actively being excavated. Securing the wall of the trench in the very direction that work was progressing would have been contrary to the objectives of the work plan.
 
PRACTICE POINT: Labor Law §2 40(1) should be construed with a commonsense approach to the realities of the workplace at issue, and if installation/provision of the safety device sought by Plaintiff would have been contrary to the objectives of the work plan resulting in an illogical or contrary approach, defendants are entitled to summary judgment dismissing the claim.
 
Labor Law § 241(6) (JLD)
The First Department concluded that the trial court properly dismissed plaintiff’s § 241(6) claim. Industrial Code §§ 23-4.1(b) and 23-4.2(k) are not sufficiently specific for liability to attach. Industrial Code § 23-4.2(b) does not apply , as there were no sides or banks sloped back from the trench. Industrial Code §§ 23-4.2(a) and 4.4(a) were not violated. Plaintiff’s employer installed shoring on the side of the trench, his employer’s witness testified to having personally inspected the shoring at the start of plaintiff’s shift, plaintiff himself was involved in the installation of shoring at the time, the shoring was in contact with the sides of the trench and did not give way, and the front of the trench was actively being expanded.
 
Labor Law § 200 and Common-Law Negligence (AMC)
The Appellate Division upheld the Supreme Court decision to grant summary judgment to Defendants on the negligence and Labor Law § 200 claims. Plaintiff failed to submit any argument before Supreme Court in opposition to this branch of Defendants' motion. Additionally, Plaintiff’s arguments on appeal fail to identify a triable issue of fact; the record demonstrates that none of the Defendants exercised direction or control of the injury producing work performed by plaintiff and his employer in connection with the excavation and shoring of the trench; and, the recorded demonstrates that Defendants did not create or have actual or constructive notice of the dangerous condition.
 
 

Ramaj v Franciosa Complex, LLC
April 14, 2026
Appellate Division, First Department

 
Plaintiff was allegedly injured when he fell into a 7½-foot deep trench when the wood planking covering the trench broke. The Trial Court granted Plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment on their claim pursuant to Labor Law § 240(1).
 
Labor Law § 240(1) (TJE)
Plaintiff made a prima facie Labor Law §240(1) case by showing that defendants failed to provide an adequate safety device to protect Plaintiff from failing into a 7^1/2 foot trench when the wood planking covering the trench broke. Defendants provided testimony from a coworker that the covering was secured with nails, contradicting Plaintiff’s claim the covering was not secured to the ground. The First Department found this inconsistency did not raise a material issue of fact as to whether the trench covering failed as a safety device.
 
PRACTICE POINT: To overcome Plaintiff’s prima facie case, a Defendant must show a material issue of fact sufficient to prevent summary judgment as a matter of law. Offering testimony of a contradiction which does not specifically address whether the device provided was adequate will be insufficient to overcome summary judgment, even when the accident is unwitnessed.
 
 

Amancha v 720-730 Fort Wash. Ave. Owners Corp.
April 14, 2026
Appellate Division, First Department

 
Plaintiff, testified that while working atop an unsecured A-frame ladder it suddenly moved and caused him to fall. The Trial Court denied Plaintiff's motion for summary judgment on liability on his Labor Law § 240(1) claim; denied 720-730 Fort Washington Avenue Owners Corp.’s and Gumley-Haft LLC’s motion for summary judgment on their cross-claims for contractual indemnification and breach of contract as against Third-Party Defendants TRB No. 1 Corp. and for dismissal of TRB's cross-claim for contractual and common-law indemnification.
 
Labor Law § 240(1) (TJE)
The First Department reversed the Trial Court and found plaintiff met his prima facie case and Defendants failed to offer a material face in opposition. Plaintiff was entitled to a presumption of a violation of Labor Law § 240(1),  as he was working on an unsecured ladder which shifted or moved. The fact that plaintiff testified that the ladder had a brace was immaterial, as the relevant issue is whether the ladder was secured to something stable or held in place so that it remained steady and upright while being used. Additionally, the First Department rejected the expert opinion of defendant’s professional engineer, noting that her examination did not occur until two years after the accident, and it was not established it was the same ladder Plaintiff used. Additionally, her opinion that the ladder tipped over due to plaintiff applying a later force was found to be conclusory and speculative due to lack of cites to the record.
 
PRACTICE POINT: Plaintiff is entitled to a presumption Labor Law § 240(1) was violated if he was working on an unsecured ladder which shifted or moved. The analysis as to whether a ladder is properly secured  is whether the ladder was secured to something stable or held in place so it remained steady and upright while being used. Finally, any expert affidavit must lay the proper foundation for an expert opinion, including indicating that the examined ladder was the ladder used by the Plaintiff, and citing to the factual record such that the opinion is not conclusory or speculative.
 
Indemnity Issues in Labor Law (TJE)
The First Department held that the Trial Court properly denied 720-730 Fort Washington Avenue Owners Corp.’s and Gumley-Haft LLC’s motion for summary judgment to the extent it sought contractual indemnification against TRB, but found the Trial Court erred in failing to dismiss TRB’s cross-claim for contractual and common-law indemnification against them. The First Department found that the relevant agreement with the indemnification clause did not clarify whether “Fort Washington Avenue Owners Corporation” referred to “720-730 Fort Washington” and found a question of fact as to whether it was a party to the agreement. As a result, contractual indemnification and breach of contract claims asserted could not be determined as a matter of law. The First Department found TRB’s cross-claim for contractual and common-law indemnification should be dismissed as Plaintiff was no longer asserting any claim of negligence against 720-730 Fort Washington, and TRB failed to point to any contractual provision requiring indemnification.

 

Jover v 1540 Second Realty, LLC
April 14, 2026
Appellate Division, First Department

 
Plaintiff was allegedly injured when his co-worker dumped debris that fell on him while he was cleaning up debris that clogged the hole on the second floor. Plaintiff's foreman testified that construction debris was dumped into a chute system that passed through holes in the floors from the higher floors to the first floor, where debris then fell into containers that had to be replaced after they were filled. Plaintiff's foreman testified that plaintiff was on the first floor performing the container replacement job prior to his accident, but that debris dumping activities had completed, and Plaintiff had been instructed to come upstairs from the first floor before the accident. The Trial Court denied Plaintiff's motion for summary judgment on the Labor Law §§ 240(1) and 241(6) claims.
 
Labor Law § 240(1) (TJE)
The First Department reversed the Trial Court’s denial of plaintiff’s summary judgment on Labor Law 240(1), finding that conflicting testimony concerning how plaintiff’s accident occurred did not prevent a finding of summary judgment as a matter of law if Plaintiff would be entitled to summary judgment under either scenario. Plaintiff testified his employer created holes in each floor of the building to allow coworkers to dump construction debris down to the first floor. Plaintiff testified his foreman ordered him to clean the hole on the second floor, and while doing so, a coworker dumped debris on him which caused injury. Plaintiff’s foreman testified that construction debris was dumped into a chute system, where it fell into containers on the first floor that needed to be replaced once filled. He testified Plaintiff was on the first floor performing the container replacement job, and that Plaintiff had been instructed to come upstairs prior to the accident.
 
PRACTICE POINT: Demonstrating inconsistencies in plaintiff’s testimony is insufficient to prevent summary judgment under Labor Law § 240(1) as a matter of law. If defendants are liable to Plaintiff for a violation of Labor Law § 240(1) under both versions of conflicting testimony, then no question of fact exists sufficient to prevent an award of summary judgment on Plaintiff’s Labor Law § 240(1) claims.
 

Labor Law § 241(6) (JLD)
In light of granting plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment under §240(1), consideration of §241(6) is academic.

 

Lardiere v Site 6 Dsa Owner LLC
April 14, 2026
Appellate Division, First Department
 

Plaintiff was a salesman visiting a construction site where he had brokered the sale of air handlers to Peepels, the HVAC subcontractor; when a pipe fell on him. The Trial Court Plaintiff's motion for summary judgment on liability on his Labor Law §§ 240(1) and 200 claims and his common-law negligence claim; granted Defendants Site 6 DSA Owner LLC’s, Site 6 Commercial LLC’s, Taconic Investment Partners, LLC’s, L&M Development Partners, Inc.’s, Delancey Street Associates LLC’s, and BFC Phase I DSA’s, LLC’s, and NYU Langone Health System’s, and Hunter Roberts Construction Group’s motions to dismissal Plaintiff's Labor Law § 240(1) claim; granted the motion to dismiss  Plaintiff’s Labor Law § 200 claim as against the owners except for Hunter Roberts; granted Peepels Mechanical Corp.’s motion to dismiss Plaintiff's Labor Law § 240(1) claim as against it, but denied the portion of the motion that sought dismissal of Plaintiff's Labor Law § 200 claim as against it; and denied Third-Party Defendant Gil-Bar Industries motion to dismiss the third-party complaint and all cross-claims against it.
 
Labor Law § 240(1) (TJE)
The First Department found that the Trial Court correctly dismissed Plaintiff’s Labor Law §240 claim against the Owners, NYU Langone, Hunter Roberts, and Peepels as Plaintiff was not within the class of workers covered by Labor Law §240(1). Plaintiff was a salesman visiting a construction site to broker sale of air handlers to Peepels, and had not experience or construction-related role in the installation of the air handler units and his employer Gil-Bar had no role on the construction project. Even if he was conducting an inspection, he was doing so as a salesman of component equipment that Peepels would install, and not as an employee of a contractor tasked with a protected activity under Labor Law § 240(a).
 
PRACTICE POINT: For Labor Law § 240(1) Liability to attach, plaintiff must be within the class of workers designed to be protected. An employee who has no role in the construction project and is a seller of component equipment to be installed by another contractor on the jobsite is not entitled to the protections of Labor Law § 240(1).
 
Labor Law § 200 and Common-Law Negligence (AMC)
The Appellate Division held that although the Labor Law § 200 claims must be reinstated as against Hunter Roberts and Peepels, as the Trial Court erred in finding that Plaintiff was not a covered employee under Labor Law § 200, Plaintiff is not entitled to summary judgment on the § 200 claims against Hunter Roberts or Peepels, as the record presents several questions of fact precluding summary judgment
 
Indemnity Issues in Labor Law (TJE)
The First Department held the third-party complaint against Gil-Bar, and any cross-claims against it must be dismissed as it was not a trade that was performing work on the project and played no role in any of the work leading to the accident. Further, there was no indemnity agreement which applied, and the contract between Hunter Roberts and Gil-Bar was for work different to Plaintiff’s work and unrelated to the reason he was on site.

 
Unzain v NW 100 Broadway Prop. Owner, LLC
April 14, 2026
Appellate Division, First Department
 

Plaintiff's testified that that he fell from a "loose" ladder as he was putting sheetrock above a window in an area where there was no other safety device, that the ladder made a noise and wobbled, causing him to lose his balance, and causing both plaintiff and the ladder to fall. The Trial Court granted Plaintiff's motion for summary judgment on liability as to the Labor Law §§ 240(1) and 241(6) claims against defendants NW 100 Broadway Property Owner, LLC and LSL Construction Services, Inc.
 
Labor Law § 240(1) (TJE)
The First Department Affirmed the Trial Court’s decision granting Plaintiff’s Labor Law § 240(1) claim. Plaintiff met his prima facie case by submitting testimony that the unsecured ladder he was using “wobbled” and caused him to fall. Defendant’s failed to raise any issue of face in opposition.
 
PRACTICE POINT: A Plaintiff is entitled to a presumption of a violation of Labor Law § 240(1) if an unsecured ladder he was working on moved or shifted and caused him to fall and sustain injuries. In order to prevent an award of summary judgment as a matter of law, Defendants must present a material of issue of fact in opposition.
 
Labor Law § 241(6) (JLD)
In light of the decision on the Labor Law 240(1) claim, review of the court’s grant of summary judgment on plaintiff’s Labor Law §241(6) claim is academic.
 

 
Pina v City of New York
  April 16, 2026
Appellate Division, First Department
 

Plaintiff testified that a mini dumpster which allegedly tipped over and fell on him was filled with concrete debris and was too heavy for him to straighten after it tilted. The Trial Court denied Defendants/Third-Party Plaintiffs/Second Third-Party Plaintiffs New York City Housing Authority’s and Mill Brook Housing Development Fund Company Inc.’s motion for summary judgment dismissing Plaintiff's Labor Law § 200 and common-law negligence claims, and denied the Third-Party Defendants Procida Construction Corp.’s, Procida Construction Co.’s, LLC, and Alvin H. Butz, Inc.’s (Procida defendants) motion for summary judgment dismissing Plaintiff's Labor Law §§ 200, 240(1), 241(6) claims and common-law negligence claim against defendants.
 
Labor Law § 240(1) (TJE)
The First Department affirmed the Trial Court’s denial of Procida Defendant’s  summary judgment motion seeking dismissal of Plaintiff’s Labor Law § 240(1) claim. The First Department agreed with the Trial Court that since the mini dumpster was filled with concrete debris and was too heavy to move, it could have posed a significant elevation-related hazard despite being only chest level. Further, Defendants failed to establish that the mini dumpster was an adequate safety device, and the record indicated they sometimes had to be moved with a pallet jack due to their weight.
 
PRACTICE POINT: An elevation differential cannot be viewed as de minimus, even over the course of a relatively short descent, if the weight of the object and the amount of force it could generate render it an elevation-related hazard. There is no categorical exclusion of injuries caused by falling objects that at the time of the accident were on the same level as Plaintiff.
 
Labor Law § 241(6) (JLD)
The court properly denied the branch of defendant Procida’s summary judgment motion seeking dismissal of plaintiff’s § 241(6) claim predicated on Industrial Code § 23-1.28(a) and (b). Under those sections, there is an issue of fact as to whether the wheels of the mini dumpster were defective. Procida’s foreman stated in affidavit that after the accident the mini-dumpster was in a fully upright position, with all its wheels working, and remained in use the rest of the day. IN contrast, the plaintiff testified that there was a bad wheel on the mini dumpster. The trier of fact must resolve the competing evidence as to the cause of the accident.
 
 
Labor Law § 200 and Common-Law Negligence (AMC)
The Appellate Division held that the Trial Court should have dismissed Plaintiff's Labor Law § 200 and common-law negligence claims against Defendants NYCHA and Mill Brook because: the allegedly defective mini dumpster involved the manner of Plaintiff's work and did not constitute a dangerous condition existing on the premises; it is irrelevant as to whether these defendants had constructive notice of the allegedly defective mini dumpster because they may only be held liable under § 200 if they exercised supervisory control over Plaintiff's work; and, there is no evidence that Plaintiff's Labor Law § 200 claim arises from an alleged dangerous condition existing on the premises, and Defendants submitted unrebutted evidence to show they did not supervise Plaintiff's work. 

 
Hearns v Blended Family LLC
  April 21, 2026
Appellate Division, First Department
 

Plaintiff, a telecommunications field technician employed by nonparty Verizon, alleges that he was injured while he was installing wi-fi services at a mixed-use building. While pulling the cable, he felt the ladder shift to the right and fall all the way over, taking him with it. According to plaintiff, he did not observe any defects or problems with the ladder before or after his accident and did not know what caused him to fall. The Trial Court denied Plaintiff's motion for summary judgment on his Labor Law § 240(1) claim and granted the motions of Blended Family and Abeken seeking dismissal of that claim. Regarding the indemnification claim, the Trial Court found that the broad provision was triggered because the accident occurred in the course of work being performed on behalf of Blended Family. However, it reasoned that because there were questions of fact concerning Abeken's negligence in providing Plaintiff with the ladder, the indemnification would be conditional.
 
Labor Law § 240(1) (TJE)
The First Department affirmed the Trial Court’s decision on alternative grounds, finding plaintiff’s work was not construction-related activity. The Trial Court dismissed Plaintiff’s 240(1) claims against Abeken based on application of Public Service Law §228, but the First Department found Public Service Law §228 does not apply to a telecommunications worker. Nevertheless, the First Department found Plaintiff’s Labor Law §240(1) claims were properly dismissed as to both Abeken and Blended Family as plaintiff’s work was not construction-related activity within the meaning of Labor Law §240(1).
 
PRACTICE POINT: For work to qualify as “altering under Labor Law §240, it must effect a significant physical change to the configuration or composition of the building or structure. Plaintiff’s action of drilling two holes in order to run cable wire did not constitute an alteration under Labor Law 240(1).
 
Indemnity Issues in Labor Law  (TJE)
The First Department affirmed the Trial Court’s grant of conditional summary judgment to Abeken on its contractual indemnity claim, finding the lease’s indemnity provision was triggered as the claim arose by reason of work performed at the behest of Blended Family and as a result of Blended Family’s occupation and alteration of the demised premises. As the indemnification clause contained a savings clause permitting partial liability and did not render the provision void under General Obligations Law § 5-322.1, questions of fact regarding Abeken’s negligence did not prevent a conditional indemnification finding as a matter of law.
 

 
Bacchus v 676 E. 179 LLC
  April 21, 2026
Appellate Division, First Department
 

Plaintiff was allegedly injured when a grinder he was using suddenly kicked back and injured him. The Trial Court granted Plaintiff's motion for summary judgment on the Labor Law § 241(6) claim insofar as predicated on Industrial Code (12 NYCRR) §§ 23-1.5(c)(1) and (3) and 23-9.2(a) as against defendant 676 East 179 LLC; and denied East 179's motion for summary judgment dismissing the same portions of that claim.

 

Labor Law § 241(6) (JLD)
The First Department affirmed that the trial court properly granted plaintiff’s motion for partial summary judgment on the Labor Law § 241(6) claim insofar as predicated on Industrial Code §§ 23-1.5(c)(3) and 23-9.2(a). It is undisputed that plaintiff was using a grinder that noticeably lacked a safeguard and plaintiff submitted evidence that his employer had notice of the grinder’s visibly missing safeguard. Plaintiff testified that the unguarded grinder was the only tool available capable of performing this task. East 179, as the owner of the premise, was not entitled to dismissal by showing that it lacked notice of the missing safeguard. Rather, plaintiff’s evidence established that his employer was negligent in permitting plaintiff to use the unguarded grinder in violation of the relevant Industrial Code provisions. The trial court should have dismissed the Labor Law § 241(6) claim insofar as predicated on Industrial Code § 23-1.5(c)(1) as this provision is not sufficiently specific to serve as a predicate for Labor Law § 241(6) liability.  
 

Gavilanes v 919 GroundLease LLC
  April 21, 2026
Appellate Division, First Department
 

Plaintiff was injured when he was climbing on the cross-pipes of the structure. Although Plaintiff had a harness, he could not tie it off because its hook was too small for the pipes. The Trial Court granted Plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment on Labor Law § 240 (1) claim; and denied Defendants' cross-motion seeking dismissal of the Labor Law § 240(1) claim.
 
Labor Law § 240(1) (TJE)
The First Department affirmed the Trial Court, finding that the record contained sufficient evidence to establish that defendants’ negligence resulted in a Labor Law §240(1). Plaintiff testified that although he needed a mobile scaffold to perform his work, he was directed by his foreman to climb the structure without a harness. Although he did not use a harness, he claimed he could not tie it off because its hook was too small for the pipes. The First Department acknowledged a factual dispute whether a ladder was available, there was no evidence provided or that using it would be a suitable alternative to a mobile scaffold.
 
Further, the First Department noted that the translated evidence provided was not properly offered, as the translator attestations failed to indicate credentials necessary to establish the translation was provided by a competent, objective interpreter whose translation was accurate. The First Department does not clarify the nature of the translated evidence offered, or its potential impact on Plaintiff’s testimony to create a question of fact.
 
PRACTICE POINT: In order to prevail on a sole proximate cause defense under Labor Law § 240(1) it is not sufficient to provide evidence there was a ladder on site. Rather, the defense needs to provide evidence that an alternative safety device was available, known to plaintiff, suitable for the assigned work, and that Plaintiff refused or unreasonably failed to use it. Defendants failed to provide evidence the ladder was a suitable alternative to the mobile scaffold.

 
 
Bista v State of New York
April 1, 2026
Appellate Division, Second Department
 

The claimant was injured when he fell off of a ladder while working on a construction project at Farmingdale State College. The unsecured ladder moved suddenly and tilted to the left, causing him to fall.  The claimant moved for summary judgment on the Labor Law 240(1) claim. The Court of Claims denied the motion. 

 

Labor Law § 240(1) (MRV)
The Second Department reversed and granted claimant’s motion on § 240(1). The claimant established prima facie entitlement to judgment as a matter of law on § 240(1) because he testified that an unsecured ladder moved suddenly and tilted to the left, which caused him to fall. Defendant failed to raised a triable issue of fact as to whether plaintiff’s own acts or omissions were the sole proximate cause of the accident.
 
PRACTICE POINT: Be sure to work up your sole proximate cause defense through depositions in cases where a ladder slides, tips, or collapses for no apparent reason. Plaintiff will be able to establish a prima facie case with evidence that the ladder moved unexpectantly so it is critical to fully explore the sole proximate cause defense to create a question of fact sufficient to defeat summary judgment on § 240(1).

 
 
Estrella v BMG Monroe I, LLC
April 1, 2026
Appellate Division, Second Department
 

The plaintiff was performing framing work for his employer, Plaza Construction, at a project called Smith Farms, which was owned by the defendant BMG. The defendant Verticon was the general contractor for the project. The defendant Upstate Framing had subcontracted to perform framing work on the project, and Upstate Framing, in turn, subcontracted the framing work to Plaza Construction.  Plaintiff and his coworkers had been installing plywood floors in a house as part of the project. An eight- or nine-foot-deep trench surrounded parts of the foundation that had not yet been backfilled, and the plaintiff's coworkers had placed a metal plank, intended for the purpose of pouring concrete, across the trench as a makeshift ramp. It was snowing, and the plaintiff stepped on the metal plank, which was not secured, when it shifted and fell into the trench, causing him to fall and sustain injuries. It is undisputed that there was a means of accessing the house through the garage, which had already been backfilled and did not require traversing over a trench. 

The Supreme Court denied the plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment on the Labor Law §§ 240(1) and 241(6) claims and granted the separate motions of the defendants BMG, Verticon, and Upstate Framing for summary judgment dismissing the complaint as asserted against each of them.
 

Labor Law § 240(1) (MRV)
The Second Department affirmed dismissal of plaintiff’s § 240(1) claim because plaintiff was attempting to use the metal plank as a passageway on the worksite which is outside the scope of the statute.
 
PRACTICE POINT: It is critical to lock down plaintiff’s version of events and the location of plaintiff’s fall to establish that plaintiff is not covered by § 240(1) based on the particular location of his or her fall.

 

Labor Law § 241(6) (JLD)
The First Department affirmed that the trial court properly granted the defendants’ motions which were for summary judgment dismissing the cause of action alleging a violation of Labor Law §241(6). Insofar as that cause of action was premised upon a violation of 12 NYCRR 23-1.22(b), defendants established that the regulation was inapplicable to the facts of this case, as the metal plank from which the plaintiff fell was not a runway or ramp constructed for the use of persons. Insofar as the cause of action was premised upon a violation of 12 NYCRR 23-1.7(b), Upstate Framing established that the regulation is inapplicable to the facts of this case as the trench was not a hazardous opening as contemplated by the regulation.

 
 

Labor Law § 200 and Common-Law Negligence (EDA)
The Appellate Division Affirmed the Supreme Court finding that the defendants demonstrated, prima facie, that the plaintiff's injuries did not result from a dangerous condition, but rather were caused by the injured plaintiff's own conduct in stepping on a metal plank, which was not intended for that purpose (see id.; Singh v 180 Varick, LLC, 203 AD3d 1194, 1196). In opposition, the plaintiffs failed to raise a triable issue of fact.

 

Simone v. Colin Dev., LLC
April 18, 2026
Appellate Division, Second Department
 

The plaintiff was employed as an office building's superintendent by nonparty, HOP, which owned the office building complex where the office building was located. HOP had an oral contract with the defendant Colin whereby Colin was to act as the property manager for the office buildings. The Sims defendants provided HVAC service for the office buildings. The plaintiff was injured while standing on a ladder attempting to manually turn on an HVAC unit located on the roof of the office building.  The Supreme denied the motion of the Sims defendants for summary judgment dismissing the Labor Law § 200 and common-law negligence claims asserted against them and dismissing the cross-claims asserted against them for common-law indemnification and contribution. It also denied the cross-motion of the defendant Colin for summary judgment dismissing the Labor Law § 200 and common-law negligence claims asserted against it and dismissing the cross-claims asserted against it for common-law indemnification and contribution.

 

Labor Law § 200 and Common-Law Negligence (EDA)
The Appellate Division affirmed the Supreme Court finding that the plaintiff alleged that he was injured by both a dangerous condition and the manner in which he was directed to perform the work. The Sims defendants failed to meet their prima facie burden of demonstrating that they lacked the authority to supervise and control the manner in which the plaintiff performed his work and that they did not have actual or constructive notice of the alleged condition, the way the ladder was set up, which caused the plaintiff to fall, the Supreme Court properly denied their motion which were for summary judgment dismissing the causes of action alleging a violation of Labor Law § 200 and common-law negligence insofar as asserted against them.

 

Indemnity Issues in Labor Law (MRV)
The lower court properly denied the summary judgment motions seeking dismissal of the crossclaims for common-law indemnification and contribution because the Colin and Sims defendants failed to meet their prima facie burdens when seeking dismissal of the Labor Law § 200 and common-law negligence claims.

 

Bryant v Boston Props., Inc.
April 15, 2026
Appellate Division, Second Department
 

In June 2018, the plaintiff brought suit against the defendants, Boston Properties, and Turner for injuries he alleged he sustained while working at a commercial property owned by Boston Properties at which Turner was the general contractor. In March 2020, the defendants moved pursuant to CPLR 3126 to dismiss the complaint due to the plaintiff's failure to appear for his deposition and medical examination. In the alternative, the defendants moved to preclude the plaintiff from offering any testimony or evidence in support of his claims at trial and to compel the plaintiff to appear for his deposition and medical examination. The Supreme Court directed the plaintiff to appear for a deposition on or before January 5, 2021, and to appear for a medical examination on or before March 5, 2021. The plaintiff failed to do so. 

In April 2021, the defendants filed a second motion to dismiss the complaint due to the plaintiff's failure to appear for his deposition and medical examination. The plaintiff opposed the motion, contending that he could not appear for his deposition due to the defendants' allegedly deficient discovery responses. The Supreme Court granted the defendants' motion to the extent of directing the plaintiff to appear for his deposition by June 30, 2021, "irrespective of whether or not all [discovery] responses have been provided by defendant." The May 2021 order also specified that the "[f]ailure of either party to comply shall result in appropriate sanctions pursuant to CPLR 3126." The plaintiff failed to appear for his deposition.

In October 2021, the defendants filed a third motion to dismiss the complaint due to the plaintiff's failure to appear for his deposition and medical examination. In opposition to the defendants' motion, the plaintiff's counsel submitted an affirmation in which she asserted that the plaintiff did not appear for his deposition prior to the May 2021 order because the defendants had failed to produce certain outstanding discovery. The plaintiff's counsel further affirmed that she had been unable to schedule the plaintiff's deposition following the May 2021 order because the plaintiff was incarcerated and the facility where he was being held had provided conflicting information regarding the procedure for scheduling a deposition in light of its COVID-19 protocols. In an order dated October 22, 2021, the Supreme Court granted the defendants' motion.

 

Labor Law § 240(1) (EDA)
The Appellate Division affirmed the Supreme Court finding that the willful and contumacious character of the plaintiff's actions can be inferred from his repeated failures to appear for his deposition and medical examination over a period of more than two years, despite five court orders directing him to do so.  Further, the plaintiff failed to offer a reasonable excuse for his failure to appear. His counsel's purported excuse about the plaintiff's incarceration and the COVID-19 protocols at the facility where he was being held did not constitute a reasonable excuse.  The plaintiff's counsel also failed to detail her purported efforts to schedule the plaintiff's deposition.
 
PRACTICE POINT: While it likely would not have mattered in this case due to the repeated violation of the multiple orders, counsel did not do themselves any favors by not detailing repeated and conscientious efforts to schedule the deposition and examination and/or accommodate the incarceration and COVID 19 protocols.  Counsel can’t rely on an obstacle if they do not demonstrate what steps they took to overcome it. 

 

Lannon v. Everest Nat'l Ins. Co.
April 15, 2026
Appellate Division, Second Department
 

In 2009, the plaintiff was while working as a carpenter for nonparty McM Homes, a subcontractor hired by the defendant Bay Creek Builders, a general contractor. The defendant Everest had issued a general liability insurance policy to McM that was in effect at the time of the plaintiff's injury. In March 2010, the plaintiff commenced an action against Bay Creek, among others, for negligence and Labor Law violations. In February 2011, the plaintiff commenced a declaratory judgment action alleging that Everest failed to add Bay Creek as an additional insured under the insurance policy covering McM. In an order dated June 14, 2012, the Supreme Court granted Everest's motion to dismiss the complaint in the prior declaratory judgment action as asserted against it based on the plaintiff's lack of standing and to dismiss cross-claims asserted by Bay Creek against Everest.
 
In November 2018, a judgment was entered in favor of the plaintiff and against Bay Creek in the personal injury case, after Bay Creek defaulted in that action.  In April 2019, the plaintiff commenced this action for a declaratory judgment alleging that McM was to add Bay Creek as an additional insured. Everest moved, among other things, pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(5) to dismiss the complaint arguing that the action was barred by the doctrines of res judicata and collateral estoppel. The Supreme Court, granted Everest's motion. The plaintiff appealed and this Court reversed, determining that Everest failed to provide a judgment on the merits that determined that Everest need not indemnify Bay Creek (see Lannon v Everest Natl. Ins. Co., 212 AD3d 798, 799). Thereafter, the plaintiff moved to compel Everest to produce the underwriting file for the policy and the full, unredacted "notes report" for any and all claims involving the plaintiff. Everest cross-moved pursuant to CPLR 3103 for a protective order. The Supreme Court denied the plaintiff's motion and granted Everest's cross-motion.

 

Labor Law § 240(1) (EDA)
The Appellate Division affirmed the Supreme Court finding that it providently exercised its discretion in denying the plaintiff's motion to compel Everest to produce the underwriting file and the full, unredacted "notes report" and granting Everest's cross-motion pursuant to CPLR 3103 for a protective order. It held that “[w]here an insurance policy is unambiguous, extrinsic evidence of its meaning is not considered (see Allied World Ins. Co. v National Union Fire Ins. Co. of Pittsburgh, PA, 204 AD3d 512, 513; Nisari v Ramjohn, 85 AD3d 987, 989-990). Accordingly, the plaintiff failed to demonstrate that disclosure of the underwriting file will result in the disclosure of relevant evidence or that his demand was reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of information bearing on his cause of action (see Orange & Rockland Utils., Inc. v County of Rockland, 206 AD3d at 669). Further, Everest demonstrated that the redacted portions of the "notes report" were privileged (see Teran v Ast, 164 AD3d 1496, 1498; Bombard v Amica Mut. Ins. Co., 11 AD3d 647, 648-649).
 
PRACTICE POINT: A careful examination of a document demand, especially for the claim file and notes, will protect your client and your insurance client from providing unnecessary and often privileged materials, but only if you act promptly and move for a protective order within the allotted 20-day response deadline.

 

Romero v. Evergreen Gardens II, LLC
April 15, 2026
Appellate Division, Second Department

 
The plaintiff was injured when two bricks fell onto his head while he was working for the third-party defendant, Reliable Masonry Corp., a subcontractor for Brooklyn GC, at a construction site on premises owned by Evergreen. The Supreme Court denied the plaintiff's cross-motion for summary judgment on the Labor Law § 240(1) claim and so much of the Labor Law § 241(6) claim that was predicated on violations of 12 NYCRR 23-1.7(a), 23-5.1(i), and 23-1.17.

 

Labor Law § 240(1) (MRV)
The Second Department held the lower court properly denied plaintiff’s motion on § 240(1) because plaintiff failed to eliminate triable issues of fact as to what caused the bricks to fall and whether a securing device of the kind enumerated in the statue would have been necessary.
 
PRACTICE POINT: In falling object cases, the plaintiff must show more than simply that an object fell and caused injury. Instead, the plaintiff must establish that the object was being hoisted or secured at the time it fell or that the falling object needed to be secured for the purposes of the undertaking. Without this evidence, plaintiff will not be able to establish a prima facie case under § 240(1) in a falling objects case.

 

Labor Law § 241(6) (JLD)
The trial court also properly denied plaintiff’s cross motion alleging a violation of Labor Law § 241(6) as was predicated on a violation of 12 NYCRR 23-1.7(a)(1) as the plaintiff failed to establish, prima facie, that he was standing in an area normally exposed to falling materials or objects as the time of the accident. Plaintiff failed to establish triable issues of fact as to whether the standards set in that provision for scaffolds and life nets were applicable.

 
 

Perez v ZZZ Carpentry, Inc.
April 15, 2026
Appellate Division, Second Department

 

The plaintiff Osiel Perez, an employee of AR Equipment, was injured when a section of a ceiling collapsed and fell on him while working on a construction project at property owned by the defendant Angela Sun. The project was managed by the general contractor, ZZZ Carpentry. ZZZ Carpentry hired the third-party defendant, A.R. Equipment to perform demolition work on the project. The Supreme Court granted the motion of the plaintiff Osiel Perez for summary judgment on Labor Law §§ 240(1) and 241(6) as asserted against the defendant ZZZ Carpentry and denied the third-party defendant's motion for summary judgment dismissing the third-party causes of action for contractual indemnification and breach of contract and failure to procure insurance.
 

Labor Law § 240(1) (MRV)
The Second Department held the lower court properly granted plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment on § 240(1) because the evidence established that the ceiling collapsed and the need for safety devices to protect plaintiff from this hazard were foreseeable.
 
PRACTICE POINT: When dealing with cases involving the collapse of a ceiling or similar structure, it is important to have your witnesses prepared to address foreseeability, or the lack thereof, of the collapse at depositions to create a question of fact on summary judgment.
 

Labor Law § 241(6) (JLD)
The Second Department concluded that Plaintiff established, prima facie, that ZZZ Carpentry violated Industrial code § 23-3.3(b)(3). Defendants acknowledge that the phrase “by wind pressure or vibration” does not attach to the words “fall” or “collapse,” but only to the immediate preceding words, “be weakened,” and therefore, Perez was not required to show that the ceiling collapsed or fell due to wind pressure or vibration to state a claim under 12 NYCRR 23-3.3(b)(3). Perez also established, prima facie, that ZZZ Carpentry violated Industrial Code § 23-3.3(c), which mandates continuing inspections during hand demolition operations, by submitting evidence that no such inspections were performed.  Defendants failed to raise a triable issue of fact with respect to either Industrial Code provision.

 

Jamieson v Noble Constr. Group, LLC
April 29, 2026
Appellate Division, Second Department

 

The plaintiff was injured while working on a construction site, when vertical safety netting installed around the perimeter of a building under construction, on the edge of the first floor, gave way at the top and the bottom, causing him to fall. The plaintiff commenced this action against the defendants alleging negligence and violations of Labor Law §§ 200, 240, and 241(6). The defendants commenced a third-party action against the third-party defendants Monolithic, a subcontractor which installed the netting, and Lippolis, which was an electrical subcontractor and the plaintiff's employer. The third-party complaint asserted causes of action for contractual and common-law indemnification and to recover damages for breach of contract for failure to procure insurance against Monolithic, and for contractual indemnification against Lippolis.   The Supreme Court granted Lippolis's motion for summary judgment dismissing the third-party cause of action for contractual indemnification asserted against it, denied the defendants' motion for summary judgment on their third-party causes of action for contractual and common-law indemnification and to recover damages for breach of contract asserted against Monolithic, and for contractual indemnification asserted against Lippolis, and denied Monolithic's cross-motion for summary judgment dismissing the third-party cause of action for contractual indemnification asserted against it.

 

Indemnity Issues in Labor Law (MRV)
The Second Department held that the lower court erred in granting Lippolis’s motion for summary judgment dismissing the third-party cause of action for contractual indemnity asserted against it because Lippolis failed to establish that plaintiff’s injuries did not arise out of his work and, therefore, failed to establish that the indemnification provision was not triggered or applicable. The lower court also properly denied defendants’ motion for summary judgment on their third-party cause of action for contractual indemnification against Monolithic and Lippolis because defendants failed to establish they were free from negligence and that they lacked the authority to exercise supervisory control over plaintiff’s or Monolithic’s work. The lower court properly denied Monolithic’s cross-motion for summary judgment dismissal of the third-party cause of cause for contractual indemnification asserted against it because Monolithic failed to establish that plaintiff’s accident did not arise out of its work. The lower court properly denied defendants’ motion for summary judgment on their third-party cause of action for common-law indemnification against Monolithic because the defendants failed to establish they were not responsible for the supervision and control of the means and methods of Monolithic’s work which allegedly caused plaintiff’s injuries. Lastly, the lower court properly denied defendants’ motion for summary judgment on their third-party cause of action against Monolithic alleging breach of contract for failure to procure insurance because the defendants failed to present any evidence to establish that Monolithic did not comply with its obligation to procure insurance naming Noble Construction Group, LLC as an additional insured.

 
 

Johnson v Cremoux
April 29, 2026
Appellate Division, Second Department

 

The plaintiff, an employee of the defendant third-party defendant, Bavosa Corp, was working on a renovation project at a property owned by the defendants third-party plaintiffs, the Cremoux defendants. The plaintiff was using a table saw to cut a piece of Masonite when the saw blade caught on his glove and cut off the middle and index fingers, as well as parts of the pinky and ring fingers, of his left hand.  The Supreme Court denied the plaintiff's motion for summary judgment on the Labor Law § 241(6) claim and granted the cross-motion of the defendants third-party plaintiffs for summary judgment dismissing that cause of action asserted against them. The order, insofar as cross-appealed from, denied the motion of the defendant third-party defendant for leave to amend its third-party answer.

 

Labor Law § 241(6) (JLD)
The Second Department modified the order of the lower court, concluding that the trial court erred in concluding the Cremous defendants were entitled to the homeowner’s exemption pursuant to Labor Law § 241(6). Both parties failed to eliminate all triable issues of fact as to whether the homeowner’s exemption applied. To establish liability under Labor Law § 241(6), a plaintiff must demonstrate that his injuries were proximately caused by a violation of an Industrial Code provision that is applicable under the circumstances of the case. Here the § 241(6) cause of action was predicated upon a violation of §§ 23-1.5, 23-1.12, and 23-9.2. The Plaintiff submitted an affidavit in which he averred there was no saw blade guard and images of the saw from the worksite, which do not depict the saw blade guard on or near the saw. Plaintiff established a prima facie showing of entitled to judgment as a matter of law. In opposition, Bavosa Corp raised a triable issue of fact, submitting affidavits from two of its employees who were at the worksite, both of whom testified that there was a saw blade guard on the premise that any of the employees could have used. 

 

Kingstone Ins. Co. v Barranco
April 29, 2026
Appellate Division, Second Department

 

On October 21, 2017, while employed by LSM, the plaintiff was injured when he fell from a ladder while performing work on the outside wall of a one-family residence in Brooklyn owned by the defendants. The defendant Marina was married to the defendant Marat who was the owner of LSM.  In November 2017, the plaintiff commenced this action against the defendants, alleging, violations of Labor Law §§ 240(1) and 241(6).  The Supreme Court granted the defendants' motion for summary judgment dismissing the Labor Law §§ 240(1) and 241(6) claims, and denied the defendants' motion pursuant to CPLR 3025(b) for leave to amend their answer to assert the affirmative defenses of collateral estoppel and res judicata. On January 7, 2022, the court issued a judgment, among other things, in favor of the defendants and against the plaintiff dismissing the Labor Law §§ 240(1) and 241(6) claims.

 

Labor Law § 240(1) (MRV)
The Second Department held that the lower court properly granted defendants’ motion for summary judgment dismissing plaintiff’s § 240(1) claim because the defendants established that the accident occurred at a one-family residence and that Marina did not supervise the method or manner of the plaintiff’s work. The lower court also properly granted defendants’ motion for summary judgment because Marat and plaintiff were co-employees acting within the scope of their employment at the time of plaintiff’s injury and, as such, the claims against Marat were barred by the exclusivity provisions of the Workers' Compensation Law.
 
PRACTICE POINT: The Workers’ Compensation Law is designed to protect a co-employee who causes another co-employee’s injury while both are acting within the scope of their employment. If you have a case involving a claim against a co-employee, it is critical to establish that both the co-employee and plaintiff were in the course and scope of their employment at the time of injury so that the Workers’ Compensation Law can serve as the exclusive remedy.

 

Labor Law § 241(6) (JLD)
Defendants established, prima facie, that the property where the accident occurred was a one-family residence and that Marina did not supervice the method or manner of the injured plaintiff’s work. In opposition, the injured plaintiff failed to raise a triable issue of fact. Defendants were not required to demonstrate that Marina contracted for the work in order for her to receive the protection fo the homeowner’s exemption. Accordingly, the trial court properly granted summary judgment for defendant dismissing the cause of action alleging violation of Labor Law § 241(6).

 

Travers v Briarcliff Manor Invs., LLC
April 29, 2026
Appellate Division, Second Department

 

The defendant third-party plaintiff SHI-III Briarcliff REIT, LLC, the owner, hired the defendant third-party plaintiff Andron Construction Corp., the general contractor, to act as the general contractor for a construction project. The general contractor, in turn, contracted with OCI to provide and install steel for the project as a subcontractor. OCI thereafter engaged the third-party defendant, Gabriel, as a sub-subcontractor to install steel for the project. The contract between OCI and Gabriel required Gabriel, "[t]o the fullest extent permitted by law," to indemnify and hold harmless, among others, the owner and the general contractor, from and against claims, damages, losses, and expenses arising out of or resulting from Gabriel's negligent acts or omissions in the performance of its work under the contract.  The plaintiff, an ironworker employed by Gabriel, was injured when he fell from an extension ladder while working on the project. Thereafter, the injured plaintiff, and his spouse suing derivatively, commenced this action to recover damages for personal injuries alleging, inter alia, violations of Labor Law §§ 200, 240, and 241(6), against the owner and the general contractor, among others. The Supreme Court granted Gabriel's motion for summary judgment dismissing the third-party causes of action for contractual indemnification.

 
 

Indemnity Issues in Labor Law (MRV)
The Second Department reversed and held that the lower court erred when it granted Gabriel’s motion for summary judgment dismissing the third-party causes of action for contractual indemnification. The contract provided that Gabriel was obligated to indemnify and hold harmless the owner and general contractor from and against claims, damages, losses, and expenses arising or resulting from Gabriel’s negligent acts or omissions. There were triable issues of fact as to whether Gabriel assumed primary responsibility for the safety of its workers based on plaintiff’s testimony that he only received instructions from Gabriel. Further, contractual provisions requiring indemnification “to the fullest extent permitted by law” do not violate General Obligations Law § 5-322.1 because they allow for partial indemnification as to the portion of damages not caused by the indemnitee’s own negligence.

 
  

Mock v New York Athletic Club of City of New York
April 24, 2026
Appellate Division, Fourth Department

 

Plaintiff was injured when he fell from a scaffold at defendant-third-party plaintiff NYAC. The Supreme Court granted the motion of defendant-third-party defendant Next Level for summary judgment dismissing NYAC's cross-claim against it for contractual indemnification, granted the cross-motion of third-party defendant Anderson for summary judgment dismissing the amended third-party complaint against it, and denied NYAC's motion for summary judgment on its contractual indemnification cause of action against Anderson.

 

Indemnity Issues in Labor Law (MRV)
The Fourth Department held the lower court properly granted Next Level’s motion seeking dismissal of NYAC’s contractual indemnification cross-claim against it because the contract provision pertained to claims actually or allegedly arising out of Next Level’s work or the work of any subcontractor retained by Next Level. Next Level established that plaintiff’s employer did not work for Next Level and plaintiff’s injuries did not arise out of Next Level’s work. The lower court also properly granted Anderson’s cross-motion seeking summary judgment dismissing NYAC’s contractual indemnification and breach of contract causes of action because the indemnification provision was executed after plaintiff’s accident and there was no evidence the agreement was intended to apply retroactively.

 

 New York Industrial Code Regulations (EDA)