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Volume XV, No. 2
Wednesday, January 7, 2026
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 Note from David R. Adams:
Do you have a situation? We love situations. Give us a call, send an email, drop by; we truly enjoy solving complex Labor Law and Risk Transfer issues.
Happy New Year to all our readers. We hope that 2026 will be a banner year for all of you.
We have had a busy month with 26 cases to be summarized and analyzed for inclusion in the newsletter. There were a lot of hours put into this by our team, and I am blessed to have so much help with this endeavor.
We start the new year with a major change to our practice. The AVOID act, which I am sure all have heard about by now, completely changes that way that multi-party litigation will need to be handled from the outset. By putting a very short time limit on filing third-party claims the act is going to force third-party suits to be filed in cases where tenders would have been worked out, and making it even harder get the excess carriers to take a position on a tender before the time limit, currently at 60 days. Even worse, in many cases if the time limit is missed for lack of information, the court has no ability to extend the time absent consent of the plaintiff’s attorney.
We will be hosting a Webinar on this topic to outline the act, inform about the various time limits, the lack of judicial oversight and the anticipated chapter amendments. Perhaps most importantly to allow for an open discussion of the concerns of those of us facing this drastic change to our practice, and the steps we are taking to make sure we all comply and protect of clients.
To sign up for this webinar click here. I encourage you to attend and participate. While we schedule our monthly webinars for only 30 minutes, if there are questions and an ongoing dialogue, we will not cut anyone off and will address all concerns. We are all stronger together and will all benefit from sharing our concerns and solutions.
In addition, we have a very interesting case from the Third this month. I urge you to read not only the analysis, but the entire opinion in Nusbaum v 1455 Wash. Ave. LLC. In a 3-2 decision the court upheld an award of summary judgment when the plaintiff arguably misused a multi position ladder as an A-frame ladder as opposed to an extension ladder. The dissent is very well reasoned and written and we can hope that it goes to the Court of Appeals.
On to the photos of the month, in our first offering of the month the soon to be plaintiff worked for a company hired to paint the apartment building. He and a coworker, designated as the “counterbalance”, were at the job site and needed to paint around the window. While they had a ladder that would have easily reached the location and had been specifically instructed to use it, they decided that they could save time using a technique perfected years ago on the school playground, the teeter totter technique. When the reality that the plaintiff had gained a few pounds and that “counterbalance” had lost a few becomes apparent, the plaintiff falls to the ground and is injured. § 240(1) case?
No question this is a prima facie case of § 240(1). The plaintiff is a person so employed, and a valid plaintiff. The owner of the apartment is an owner of a commercial building and a valid defendant. The plaintiff was engaged in a protected activity and thus entitled to the protection of the statute and the plaintiff was injured by an elevation differential and the effect of gravity. In response the defendant will claim a sole proximate cause defense. The claim is that the plaintiff had 1) an appropriate safety device, the ladder, that it was 2) available to him, that 3) he had been instructed to use the safety device, that 4) he failed to use it and 5) did so for no good reason. Sounds like he hit all 5 necessary elements, doesn’t it? The sole proximate cause defense will fail as the plaintiff did not do it alone and thus, he can never be the sole proximate cause. Plaintiff awarded summary judgment on § 240(1) is the likely outcome.
In our second photo, we have a plaintiff who came over to paint the support beams holding the skylights over the pool attached to his neighbor’s home. He loved swimming in the pool with his neighbor but, as a retired painter it always bothered him that the paint was pealing so he offered to help. He arrived with his ladders and plank, and the homeowner brought out his ladder and some rope. Together the two of them constructed the “scaffold” for the neighbor to paint. Just seconds after the owner took the picture (see below) of the plaintiff to show their friends how smart they were in constructing the “scaffold” the board slipped off one of the ladders and the plaintiff fell and was injured. § 240(1) case?
At first it may have seemed that there was going to be applicability of the single-family homeowner’s exemption from § 240(1) but remember that the homeowner actually helped to set up the exact safety device which failed causing the injury and thus the exemption was lost. So, we then have a valid defendant as he was the owner and lost the exemption, painting is an enumerated activity and thus the protections of the statute are available, and the injury was caused by the height differential and the effect of gravity. So far so good for the plaintiff except that he was not being paid for the work he was doing, thus not a person so employed and not a valid § 240(1) plaintiff. Summary judgment for the defendant on § 240(1).
That is it for this month, we really hope you will join us for the webinar. Discussion with knowledgeable readers will help us all to handle this change better. Thanks.
-David
Hurwitz Fine P.C.
The Liberty Building
424 Main Street, Suite 1300
Buffalo, New York 14202
Phone: 716.849.8900
Fax: 716.855.0874
Email: [email protected]
Labor Law Pointers is published the first Wednesday of each month. If you know of others who may wish to subscribe to this free publication, please feel free to forward it. If you wish to subscribe or unsubscribe, please send an e-mail to [email protected] or call the Editor/Labor Law Team Leader David R. Adams directly at (716) 849-8916.
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Plaintiff moved for partial summary judgment on his Labor Law § 241(6) claim. The trial court denied Plaintiff’s motion.
The ramp was used by workers to traverse a bi-level staging area with a 12-to-16-inch height differential and to reach stairs down to a basement bathroom. Workers on the project who needed to reach the stairway leading down to a basement bathroom could either step up the 12-16 inch height differential unaided, or use the ramp provided as an alternative. The ramp was intended to accommodate the movement for heavy equipment, but workers were permitted to use it. The day before the accident, a heavy mechanical lift was moved over the ramp, which partially collapsed it and left the ramp’s lower “nose” raised about two to three inches.
Plaintiff, a marble-floor finisher, was working on a store renovation project at 650 Madison Avenue in Manhattan. He injured his shoulder when he tripped on the front edge of a makeshift plywood ramp while walking to a bathroom.
The Appellate Court held the ramp was a “passageway” and “working area,” and the two-to-three-inch raised nose was both a tripping “obstruction” under § 23-1.7(e)(1) and a “sharp projection” under § 23-1.7(e)(2), and that this hazard was a proximate cause of Plaintiff’s injuries as a matter of law and modified the decision to grant Plaintiff’s motion based on these Industrial Code violations.
The Appellate Court also denied Defendants’ “integral to the work” defense as the ramp could have been repaired without preventing work from continuing.
Plaintiff was injured while he and coworkers were lifting a “400-to-600-pound gang box,” about four feet high, five feet long, and three feet wide, three to four feet off the ground to load it into a truck. The gang box “began to fall,” and Plaintiff lifted his leg to stop its descent.
Plaintiff moved for partial summary judgment on Labor Law §240(1) against Site 2 DSA Owner, LLC, Delancey Street Associates, LLC, and T.G. Nickel & Associates, LLC. Plaintiff’s motion was denied by the trial court, who granted Defendants’ summary judgment motion dismissing Plaintiff’s Complaint.
 Labor Law § 240(1) (MRV)
The First Department modified the lower court’s Order to deny Defendants’ motion for summary judgment and grant summary judgment on Labor Law §240(1) in favor of Plaintiff because the pleadings established Defendant Delancey Street Associates, LLC owned the subject property.
PRACTICE POINT: Be sure you have not admitted an essential fact by failing to address it in the pleadings. You cannot argue there is no liability under §240(1) based on non-ownership of the subject property when ownership was admitted by omission in the Answer.
Plaintiff alleged he was injured when he fell from an A-frame ladder at a construction project. He claimed he informed the foreman that “the rubber feet were missing” on part of the ladder, but the foreman told him to do the work anyway. As plaintiff was using the ladder, it moved to the right and he fell backward, landing on his back.
Plaintiff moved for summary judgment on liability on his Labor Law § 240(1) and § 241(6) claims, which the trial Court granted.
Labor Law § 240(1) (MRV)
The Appellate Division affirmed the Order granting plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment and denying defendants’ motion. Plaintiff established he was entitled to summary judgment on his § 240(1) claim because he submitted his deposition testimony wherein he testified that the ladder moved as he stood upon it, which caused him to fall. This evidence was sufficient to establish a prima facie case. Defendants failed to rebut Plaintiff’s prima facie showing because no issues of fact arose from the alleged discrepancies between Plaintiff’s account of the accident and the video of the accident location.
PRACTICE POINT: A plaintiff is not obligated to make an affirmative showing that the ladder was defective when making a § 240(1) claim. A plaintiff can meet his or her burden simply by showing that the ladder moved and caused the fall. Minor inconsistencies in a plaintiff’s version of events are not sufficient to rebut this prima facie showing. Rather, you must offer evidence that contradicts a plaintiff’s version of the accident or raises credibility issues.
 Labor Law § 241(6) (TJE)
The Appellate Division declined to address the Labor Law § 241(6) issues, as they were academic in light of the finding of Labor Law § 240(1) liability.
Plaintiff, a carpenter employed by CBI Drywall, Corp. as a foreman, was unloading cabinetry for a Bath & Body Works retail-space buildout. While he walked backward pulling a pallet jack carrying a cabinet weighing about 1,000 pounds, a coworker helped push it out of a truck onto an unguarded liftgate. The cabinet pushed Plaintiff and his foot was caught under the pallet jack, and he fell from the liftgate to the street about four feet below.
The non-owner defendants (E.C. Provini Co., Inc., Bath & Body Works, LLC, L. Brands, Inc., and L. Brands Store Design & Construction, Inc.) moved for summary judgment dismissing Plaintiff’s Labor Law § 240(1) and Labor Law § 241(6) claims. The trial court denied their summary judgment motion.
The trial court also denied dismissal of Plaintiff’s Labor Law § 200 and common-law negligence claims against the non-owner defendants, and denied as premature their request for summary judgment on contractual indemnification against CBI.
Plaintiff’s employer, CBI Drywall, Corp., moved for summary judgment dismissing Plaintiff’s claims (including Labor Law §§ 240(1), 200, and 241(6) and common-law negligence), and also moved for summary judgment dismissing the third-party claims/counterclaims/cross-claims asserted against it. The trial court denied CBI’s summary judgment motion.
The owner defendants (441 Lexington Avenue Co. Limited Partnership and Gordon Property Group, LLC) moved for summary judgment dismissing Plaintiff’s Labor Law §§ 200, 240(1), and 241(6) claims and sought summary judgment on their contractual indemnification claims against CBI, which the trial court denied.
Labor Law § 240(1) (MRV)
The Appellate Division affirmed denial of defendants’ motion for summary judgment on § 240(1) because plaintiff raised a triable issue of fact as to whether the pallet jack was a inadequate safety device for this task given the specific weight and dimensions of the cabinet Plaintiff was unloading.
PRACTICE POINT: Even if a defendant can establish prima facie entitlement to summary judgment dismissing a § 240(1) claim, a plaintiff can defeat summary judgment by raising a triable issue of fact regarding the inadequacy of a safety device depending on the dimensions of the item the safety device is being used to maneuver.
Labor Law § 241(6) (TJE)
On Labor Law § 241(6), the Appellate Division reversed the trial court and dismissed plaintiff’s § 241(6) claim in its entirety. The Court held there was no evidence supporting a violation of Industrial Code §§ 23-9.8[d] or [e], as there was no proof the pallet jack was compromised by a faulty “automatic device for retaining a raised load,” or that it was operated on a surface so uneven as to make it likely to upset. Additionally, § 23-6.1(d) was not violated as the pallet jack’s load did not exceed its estimated 2,000-pound capability and there was no evidence the cabinet required “trimming” or was susceptible to dislodgment.
 Labor Law § 200 and Common-Law Negligence (JLD)
The Appellate Division affirmed the Trial Court’s decision in dismissing plaintiff’s § 200 cause of action, finding that there as no dangerous condition upon the premises. The Appellate Division additional concluded that the facts demonstrated that defendants BBW, LBI, LBSD&C, 441 Lexington and Gordon did not exercise any direct control or supervision over the means and methods of plaintiff’s work. The Appellate Division similarly dismissed the common-law negligence claims against the defendants. However, the Appellate Division concluded that as to Defendant E.C. Provini, there were triable issues of fact as to whether it made the decision not to provide a requested forklift for truck unloading, supervised the unloading process, and was present at the time of the accident.
 Indemnity Issues in Labor Law (AMC)
The Appellate Division reversed the Trial Court’s decision and: (1) awarded the non-owner defendants’ conditional contractual indemnification from CBI Drywall; and (2) granted CBI Drywall’s dismissing the cross-claims against it for common-law and reinstated BBW, LBI, 441 Lexington Ave. Co. Limited Partnership, and Gordon Property Group LLC claims for contractual indemnification against CBI. The Appellate Division upheld the Trial Court’s denial of 441 Lexington Ave.’s and Gordon Properties’ motion for summary judgment on their contractual indemnification claims against CBI.
The Appellate Division held evidence of CBI’s negligence was not required to grant E.C. Provini’s conditional contractual indemnification as the subcontract contained broad indemnification language, which was “triggered solely by virtual of plaintiff’s accident occurring while in the performance of [CBI’s] contractual duties”. E.C. Provini would be precluded from indemnification if it is found that its own negligence contributed to Plaintiff’s accident.
BBW, LBSD&C, and LBI established their entitlement to contractual indemnification from CBI under the indemnification language in the LBSD&C/E.C. Provini construction contract documents, which expressly extended indemnification coverage to LBSD&C's affiliates. The subcontractor agreement between E.C. Provini and CBI expressly incorporated by reference the terms of the contract documents between E.C. Provini and LBSD&C.
The Appellate Division recognized that the record is not clear as to whether 441 Lexington and Gordon would be entitled to contractual indemnification under the broad language in the E.C. Provini/CBI subcontract agreement. The intent of the parties is not clear as to whether the contractual indemnification provision in the E.C. Provini/CBI subcontract ran to 441 Lexington as "Owner" of the building, rather than to LBSD&C as "Owner" of the project, or whether 441 Lexington and/or Gordon fit within the descriptions of other potential indemnitees under the subcontract's indemnification provision.
Finally, CBI has established that the cross-claims for common-law indemnification and contribution against it should be dismissed, as plaintiff received workers' compensation and there is no evidence offered to indicate that he suffered a grave injury.
Plaintiff, employed by Mellifont Construction Corp., was building a scaffold inside an elevator shaft when a welder employed by Stephen Foy Mechanical Service Corp. dropped a welding clamp. The clamp fell down an adjacent utility shaft from the eighth floor, bounced off the second floor, passed through an opening between the shafts via gaps between exposed pipes, and then fell into the elevator shaft and struck plaintiff in the basement.
R & S was the general contractor for a project to add floors and install a freight elevator to a building owned by 100 Church and managed by SL Green. R & S subcontracted with Stephen Foy to move and install pipes on the new floors and subcontracted with Mellifont to perform demolition work, including work inside the shaft where the new elevator was to be installed.
The trial Court granted plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment on liability for his Labor Law § 240(1) claim. Defendants 100 Church Fee Owner, LLC, SL Green Realty Corp., and R & S Construction Contracting, Inc. cross-moved against for summary judgment dismissing Plaintiff’s Labor Law § 241(6) and § 200 claims against them, and against Stephen Foy Mechanical Service Corp. and Plaintiff’s employer for common-law and contractual indemnification, which the trial court denied in full.
Labor Law § 240(1) (MRV)
The Appellate Division affirmed summary judgment in favor of plaintiff on his § 240(1) claim. Plaintiff met his burden by submitting evidence that the welding clamp was an object that required securing and there were no adequate safety devices to protect him from the falling welding clamp. The defense witnesses’ testimony confirmed the sequence of events leading up to plaintiff’s injury. Therefore, the record established that the absence of a protective device proximately caused Plaintiff’s injuries.
PRACTICE POINT: It is essential that you create a triable issue of fact as to whether the object that fell was required to be secured for purposes of the undertaking or whether any adequate safety devices were used to protect from the falling object to defeat a summary judgment motion on § 240(1).
Labor Law § 241(6) (TJE)
The Appellate Division declined to address the Labor Law § 241(6) issues, as they were academic in light of the finding of Labor Law § 240(1) liability.
Labor Law § 200 and Common-Law Negligence (JLD)
The Appellate Division held that the Supreme Court should have dismissed the § 200 claim against Defendant 100 Church as plaintiff does not dispute that 100 Church did not coordinate the work. The accident arose solely from the means and methods of the work, thus limiting 100 Church’s liability in this instance.
Indemnity Issues in Labor Law (AMC)
The Appellate Division held that defendants failed to establish entitlement to summary judgment on their claims against Stephen Foy and Mellifont for common-law and contractual indemnification. The record presents issues of fact as to R & S's and SL Green's negligence in coordinating the subcontractors' work.
Moreover, the Appellate Division held that although 100 Church is not liable under Labor Law § 200, it is not entitled to summary judgment on its contractual indemnification claims, as Stephen Foy's and Mellifont's indemnity obligations are contingent on findings that their negligence in performing their work caused the accident.
Plaintiff was excavating a trench to repair a compromised gas line. As he moved from the trench to an equipment truck carrying an air compressor which powered the jackhammer and blowpipe he was using, he tripped and fell on a “one-to-two-foot square piece of asphalt.”
Plaintiff moved for partial summary judgment on their Labor Law §241(6), §200, and common-law negligence claims which was denied by the trial court, who granted Defendants motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint.
Labor Law § 241(6) (TJE)
On Labor Law § 241(6), the Appellate Division modified the order to deny defendants’ summary judgment motion only as to the Labor Law § 241(6) claim predicated on 12 NYCRR 23-1.7(e)(1) and (e)(2) as against Consolidated Edison Company of New York, Inc. The court otherwise affirmed, leaving plaintiff’s complaint dismissed in all other respects.
The Appellate Court found triable issues of fact as to whether the asphalt debris was integral to plaintiff’s work, or whether it could have been mitigated by defendants without making the work impossible to perform.
The Appellate Court also found triable issues of fact as to whether the path on which plaintiff tripped between the trench and the truck constituted a passageway within the meaning of 12 NYCRR 23-1.7(e)(1) as the work zone was barricaded and limited the area where Plaintiff could walk, and the air hose powering his equipment limited his movement. Nevertheless, the Appellate Court did not decide whether it was a passageway, as the defendants weren’t arguing that 12 NYCRR 23-1.7(e)(2) didn’t apply, and as a result whether the area was a passageway under 12 NYCRR 23-1.7(e)(1) was unnecessary for Plaintiff to establish 241(6) liability.
Labor Law § 200 and Common-Law Negligence (JLD)
The Appellate Division affirmed the Trial Court’s finding that Defendant Con Ed was entitled to dismissal of the § 200 and common law negligence causes of action because co-defendant alone controlled the means and methods of the work. Plaintiff failed to offer any evidence that Con Ed actually supervised and controlled the injury-producing work. As to the common-law negligence claim, plaintiff offered no evidence to show that Defendant Con Ed had actual or constructive notice of the defect.
Plaintiff was performing exterior building façade repairs from a suspended scaffold when the scaffold “suddenly moved approximately one foot away from the building.” As the scaffold shifted, the tip of the chipping hammer Plaintiff was using slipped into a hole where a brick had been removed, and Plaintiff injured his shoulder and fell onto the scaffold platform. Nova was the general contractor on the project.
Plaintiff moved for partial summary judgment on his Labor Law § 240(1) and § 241(6) claim predicated on 12 NYCRR § 23-5.8(g), which was denied by the trial court. Defendants 975 Park Avenue Corp., Charles H. Greenthal Management Corp., and Nova Construction Services, LLC moved for summary judgment, which was granted to the extent of dismissing the common-law negligence and Labor Law § 200 claims as against 975 Park and Greenthal, and dismissing Plaintiff’s Labor Law § 240(1) claims against all moving Defendants.
Labor Law § 240(1) (MRV)
The Appellate Division reversed, denying Defendants’ motion for summary judgment on § 240(1) and granting plaintiff’s motion on that claim because Plaintiff was injured by the very safety device intended to protect him from the gravity-related risks posed by working on the building’s exterior.
PRACTICE POINT: To defeat a motion for summary judgment on § 240(1) where a plaintiff is injured by the very safety device intended to protect him or her from a gravity-related risk, a defendant must raise a triable issue of fact as to whether the safety device was adequately secured.
Labor Law § 241(6) (TJE)
The Appellate Division declined to address the Labor Law § 241(6) issues, as they were academic in light of the finding of Labor Law § 240(1) liability.
Labor Law § 200 and Common-Law Negligence (JLD)
The Appellate Court reversed the denial of Labor Law § 200 as to Defendant Nova because plaintiff testified he received all his instructions from his foreman had had no communication with Nova employees. Nova’s general responsibility for site safety was insufficient to raise an issue of fact as to whether it actually exercised sufficient control over the work to be held liable under common law or Labor Law § 200.
Plaintiff was injured when an excavator operator pushed a dumpster into him, pinning him between that dumpster and another dumpster. Plaintiff’s testimony, which was corroborated by video evidence demonstrated that he walked between the dumpsters to remain in the operator’s line of sight, and the operator moved the dumpster by pushing it, rather than rigging it.
The trial court granted partial summary judgment on Plaintiff’s Labor Law § 241(6) claim based on Industrial Code 12 NYCRR § 23-9.4(e), and denied Defendants summary judgment motion seeking dismissal of Plaintiff’s § 241(6) claim predicated on Industrial Code § 23-9.5(c) and § 23-9.4(e).
Labor Law § 241(6) (TJE)
The Appellate Court affirmed the trial court, finding Industrial Code § 23-9.4(e)(1) was violated as "any load handled by such equipment" must be secured as provided by the regulation,” and the excavator clearly “handled” the dumpster when the operator began moving it by pushing it and it was undisputed the operator did not rig the dumpster.
This is contrasted with the Appellate Court finding an issue of fact as to whether Industrial Code § 23-9.5(c) was violated. Plaintiff testified he told the operator he was going to get rigging, and the operator moved the dumpster after he left the cab before he obtain the rigging and was still in the range of the excavator. Based on these facts, the Appellate Court found a question of fact on whether the excavator was “not in use” at the time of the accident.
Plaintiff, a journeyman ironworker, slipped and fell on a puddle of water that leaked from a ceiling pipe in a dimly lit mechanical room on the top floor while heading to the roof to install a window-washing rig. Three coworkers (including his foreman) exited to the roof without incident, and Plaintiff, the last to leave, slipped before reaching the door.
Plaintiff moved for partial summary judgment on his Labor Law § 241(6) claim based on Industrial Codes 12 NYCRR § 23-1.7(d) and § 23-1.30, which was granted by the Court. Defendants’ motions for summary judgment seeking dismissal of Plaintiff’s claims based on the same provisions were denied.
Labor Law § 241(6) (TJE)
The Appellate Court modified the trial Court’s order, finding an issue of fact as to whether Plaintiff was engaged in “construction work” at the time he slipped, given that the project was “essentially completed,” the building was fully occupied, and the mechanical room was not a continuing construction area.
Despite these facts, the Appellate Court declined to grant Defendants summary judgment pursuant to 12 NYCRR § 23-1.7(d), as the record indicated that Plaintiff’s foreman exited the room before Plaintiff, and thus knew or should have known about the puddle and lighting conditions.
The Appellate Court also reversed the trial court finding of a violation of § 23-1.30 as testimony from the record indicated the area was dimly lit and not completely dark with no light. As a result, the witnesses’ conclusive and nonspecific assertions about the amount of darkness are insufficient to create an interference as a matter of law that the lighting was below the statutory standard.
Plaintiff alleged he was injured on July 25, 2018 while working at a school building construction site in Brooklyn. He was directed to retrieve lumber located next to an approximately 10-foot-deep trench when the trench “caved in and collapsed,” causing him to fall.
Plaintiff moved for summary judgment on liability for his Labor Law § 240(1) claim, and his § 241(6) claim based on 12 NYCRR 23-1.7(b)(1), which was denied by the trial court.
Labor Law § 240(1) (MRV)
The Appellate Division reversed and granted Plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment on § 240(1). Plaintiff made a prima facie showing that Defendants violated § 240(1) by failing to provide the plaintiff with an adequate safety device and this violation was the proximate cause of his injuries. Plaintiff testified that he was directed to retrieve lumbar next to a trench that was un-shored and lacked planking, barricades, or guardrails when he fell. Photographs showed that there were no protective measures in the immediate vicinity of the trench. Defendants failed to raise a triable issue of fact as to whether the plaintiff’s conduct was the sole proximate cause of his injuries by simply presenting evidence that plaintiff was wearing sneakers instead of construction boots at the time of his fall.
PRACTICE POINT: Potential comparative negligence of the plaintiff is not a defense to a § 240(1) claim and is not sufficient for a sole proximate cause defense.
Labor Law § 241(6) (TJE)
The Appellate Court reversed the trial court finding a violation of 12 NYCRR 23-1.7(b)(1) based on plaintiff’s prima facie showing that the trench was an unguarded hazardous opening that lacked a substantial cover or safety railing as required, which proximately caused his accident.
Plaintiff was injured when a plank placed on a scaffold component which extended outside the scaffold frame, was allegedly “improperly secured” and fell on him.
The Trial Court granted Plaintiff’s summary judgment on his Labor Law §240(1) claim, and denied Cydonia W71, LLC, CCNY Construction Inc., and Standard Waterproofing Corp.’s contractual indemnification claims.
Labor Law § 240(1) (MRV)
The Appellate Division affirmed the Trial Court’s decision granting plaintiff summary judgment on his § 240(1) claim. Plaintiff satisfied his prima facie burden by pointing to evidence in the record establishing that the plank placed on a scaffolding component was improperly secured when it fell on him and proximately caused his injuries. No one witnessed the accident. Defendants failed to raise a triable issue of fact as nothing in the records demonstrated that the scaffolding component did not need to be secured for purposes of the undertaking.
PRACTICE POINT: When nothing in the records contradicts a plaintiff’s account of the accident, it is irrelevant that the accident was unwitnessed.
Indemnity Issues in Labor Law (AMC)
The Appellate Division modified the Trial Court’s decision in so far as it conditionally granted Cydonia and CCNY summary judgment on their contractual indemnification claim against Standard. The Appellate Division affirmed the Trial Court’s decision denying Standard’s motion for summary judgment on its contractual indemnification claim against Xuntos.
The indemnification provision between CCNY and Standard requires Standard to indemnify Cydonia and CCNY "from and against claims . . . arising out of or resulting from performance of [Standard's] Work . . . but only to the extent caused by the negligent acts or omissions of [Standard and its subcontractors]." As Cydonia and CCNY their liability, if any, is purely vicarious and there are issues of fact regarding Standard’s negligence, they are entitled to conditional contractual indemnification.
However, the motion court properly denied Standard's motion for summary judgment on its contractual indemnification against Xuntos. Standard failed to prove its own freedom from negligence. Additionally, as noted above, there are issues of fact as to Standard's negligence.
Plaintiff was injured on a construction project on the seventh floor of a building owned by Sutton Place South Corporation, where Clark Construction Corporation was the general contractor. While following his foreman’s instructions, plaintiff carried an “unwieldy” 70–75 pound 4' x 8' sheetrock board down a service-door stairway using both hands, which the court noted prevented him from using a handrail to maintain his balance, and he fell down the stairway.
The Trial Court granted plaintiff’s motion for partial summary judgment on his Labor Law § 240(1) claim.
Labor Law § 240(1) (MRV)
The Appellate Division affirmed as Defendants were required to provide plaintiff with an adequate safety device for his undertaking and the absence of the safety device was the direct cause of plaintiff’s injury.
PRACTICE POINT: While a stairway is a permanent structure, it covered area under § 240(1) when it constitutes an elevated work platform and is the sole means of access for plaintiff to complete his undertaking.
Plaintiff was injured while using a saw at the worksite when the saw “jumped back” and the saw’s guard failed to retract, causing serious lacerations to his wrist.
The trial court granted plaintiff’s summary judgment motion on his Labor Law § 241(6) claim pursuant to violations of §§ 23-1.12(c)(1) and 23-9.2(a). The Trial Court also denied Defendants cross-claim for contractual indemnity against Ground Force Construction LTD in both a prior order and upon re-argument.
Labor Law § 241(6) (TJE)
The Appellate Court affirmed the Trial Court, finding that the saw’s guard failure to react and the saw jumping back were prima facie violations of §§ 23-1.12(c)(1) and 23-9.2(a), and defendants failed to rebut plaintiff’s prima facie showing. The Court found that plaintiff cannot be the sole proximate cause of his accident where he was merely working with the tools provided to him.
Indemnity Issues in Labor Law (AMC)
The Appellate Division found that the Trial Court erred in dismissing 240 West’s, Yorke’s and the Ideal Interior defendants’ (hereinafter “appellants”) contractual indemnity cross claim against Ground Force; and that Ground Force met its burden to demonstrate entitlement to dismissal of the cross claim as a matter of law.
The Appellate Division reinstated appellants’ cross claims for contractual indemnifications but converted same to a third-party action. It held that just because the Trial Court dismissed plaintiff’s complaint against Ground Force, that did not render appellants’ cross claims moot.
The Appellate Division also held that summary judgment cannot be granted in appellants' favor as there was no testimony or affidavit authenticating the contract containing the indemnity clause.
Plaintiff was injured when he fell from an unsecured A-frame ladder that suddenly moved and tilted while he was working on it.
The Trial Court granted plaintiff’s summary judgment motion on his Labor § 240(1) claim. Defendants also moved for dismissal of plaintiff’s Labor Law § 241(6) claims based on § 23-1.21(b)(iv) which was denied by the Trial Court.
Labor Law § 240(1) (MRV)
The Appellate Division affirmed the Trial Court’s order granting summary judgment in favor of Plaintiff on § 240(1). Plaintiff established prima facie entitlement to summary judgment on §240(1) based on his testimony that he was given an unsecured A-frame ladder, the ladder moved while he was working on it, and the ladder movement caused plaintiff to fall. Despite proving an expert opinion that plaintiff’s accident could not have occurred as described, defendants failed to raise a triable issue of fact.
PRACTICE POINT: Providing an expert opinion that the accident could not have occurred as described is insufficient to defeat a § 240(1) claim because there is no requirement under the statute that a plaintiff know exactly what caused the accident or what caused the ladder to move.
Labor Law § 241(6) (TJE)
The Appellate Court reversed the Trial Court, finding § 23-1.2(b)(4)(iv) was inapplicable as the provision only applies to “leaning ladders” and plaintiff’s ladder was an open self-supporting A-frame ladder.
Plaintiff, a dock builder working in Flushing Bay near the World’s Fair Marina, was removing old floating dock sections known as “finger piers” to allow for dredging. He allegedly was injured when he lost his balance after placing his knee on an unsecured finger pier while reaching for a second finger pier.
The trial court granted Defendants’ summary judgment motion dismissing Plaintiff’s Labor Law § 200 and § 241(6) causes of action, but denied dismissal of Plaintiff’s Labor Law § 240(1) cause of action. The trial court denied plaintiff’s cross-motion seeking liability for his Labor Law § 240(1), 241(6), and §200 causes of action.
Labor Law § 240(1) (MRV)
The Appellate Division affirmed the Trial Court’s order because the parties’ submissions failed to eliminate triable issues of fact as to the § 240(1) claim. Plaintiff testified that he was ordered by his supervisor to continue working after a boat they had been using as a work platform temporarily left. This was directly rebutted by an affidavit from plaintiff’s supervisor stating that he told plaintiff to take a break and wait for the boat to return. The Court properly exercised its discretion in considering the affidavit where plaintiff was aware of his supervisor’s existence, the affidavit was provided prior to note of issue being filed, and there was no evidence that defendants willfully failed to disclose the supervisor as a witness.
PRACTICE POINT: When both parties move for summary judgment and neither party is able to eliminate triable issues of fact, both motions will be denied.
Labor Law § 241(6) (TJE)
The Appellate Division affirmed the trial court, finding the Industrial Code provisions relied upon by plaintiff were inapplicable to the facts of the case and the “hazardous opening” contemplated by the regulations was not present.
Labor Law § 200 and Common-Law Negligence (JLD)
The Appellate Division affirmed the trial court, finding that defendants met their burden of demonstrating, prima facie, they did not create the allegedly dangerous condition and it was open and obvious and not inherently dangerous.
Plaintiff allegedly fell from a ladder after the ladder shifted underneath him when it was struck by a falling metal object.
The trial court granted plaintiff’s summary judgment motion pursuant to Labor Law § 240(1) liability as asserted against 58 Gerry St, LLC.
Labor Law § 240(1) (MRV)
The Appellate Division affirmed the Trial Court’s order granting summary judgment in favor of plaintiff. Plaintiff demonstrated prima facie entitlement to judgment as a matter of law on § 240(1) by establishing that the ladder shifted from underneath him when it was hit by a metal object, causing him to fall. Defendants failed to raise a triable issue of fact in opposition.
PRACTICE POINT: A plaintiff will be successful in seeking summary judgment on § 240(1) when he or she can establish that the subject ladder was inadequately secured and the failure to secure the ladder was a substantial factor in causing the plaintiff’s injuries and the defendant fails to raise a triable issue of fact on either issue.
Plaintiff, an employee of Justino Landscaping, Inc., was assigned to cut branches from a tree next to a stand-alone garage. A coworker set a ladder against the side of the garage, plaintiff climbed it, and he allegedly was injured when he fell from the ladder.
The trial court granted Defendants summary judgment dismissing Plaintiff’s Labor Law § 240(1) claim, and denied plaintiff’s cross-motion for summary judgment pursuant to Labor Law § 240(1).
Labor Law § 240(1) (MRV)
The Appellate Division affirmed dismissal of plaintiff’s § 240(1) claim because plaintiff’s tree-cutting work was outside the scope of § 240(1) as a tree is not a “building or structure” within the meaning of the statute.
PRACTICE POINT: To survive a summary judgment motion under § 240(1) for an injury sustained while tree-cutting, a plaintiff must raise a triable issue of fact as to whether the tree removal was done to effectuate structural change or performed as part of a larger renovation project.
Plaintiff allegedly was injured while performing construction work on premises owned by the Defendant.
Plaintiff and his spouse (derivatively) sued, alleging, among other things, violations of Labor Law §§ 200 and 241(6). Defendant moved to dismiss the complaint, arguing it did not supervise plaintiff’s work and was exempt from Labor Law § 241(6) as the owner of a single-family dwelling. The trial court granted the motion and dismissed plaintiffs’ complaint.
Labor Law § 241(6) (TJE)
The Appellate Court reversed the trial court and denied their Defendant’s motion to dismiss pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(1), finding that the documentary evidence proffered by defendants did not “utterly refute” plaintiff’s allegations or conclusively establish either defense as a matter of law. It is unclear what documentary evidence Defendant submitted in support of their motion, but the Appellate Court mentioned “judicial records” and documents reflecting out-of-court transactions as qualifying as documentary evidence in the proper case.
Labor Law § 200 and Common-Law Negligence (JLD)
The Appellate Court reversed the trial court and denied Defendant’s motion to dismiss pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(1). The Appellate Division noted that Labor Law § 200, unlike the other Labor Law sections, does not contain any single- and two- family homeowners’ exemptions. However, recover against the owner cannot be had unless it is shown that the party to be charged had authority to supervise or control performance of the work. The Appellate Court concluded that the documentary evidence proffered did not “utterly refute or conclusively establish a defense” to the Labor Law § 200 claims.
Plaintiff, an employee of Aaron S. Construction Corp., was working on an elevator installation in a new-home construction project. A four-foot by eight-foot box containing an elevator door, which had been left standing on “a little bit of garbage,” fell and pinned Plaintiff’s leg, fracturing it.
Kader Elite Construction, Inc. moved for summary judgment dismissing plaintiff’s complaint against it, which was granted by the trial court. Plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment on Labor Law § 240(1) and § 241(6) based on 12 NYCRR 23-2.1(a)(1) was denied by the trial court.
Labor Law § 240(1) (MRV)
The Appellate Division held the trial court properly denied Plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment on § 240(1) because plaintiff failed to eliminate triable issues of fact as to whether Defendant was a general contractor for purposes of the Labor Law with respect to Plaintiff’s work. Additionally, defendant established its prima facie entitlement to summary judgment dismissing the § 240(1) claim because plaintiff’s accident did not fall within the scope of the statute. Here, defendant established that the box that fell on plaintiff was not a load that was being hoisted or secured nor a load that required securing for purposes of the undertaking and the box did not fall due to the absence or inadequacy of a safety device.
PRACTICE POINT: To prevail on a falling object claim under § 240(1), a plaintiff must prove the existence of a hazard contemplated under the statute and failure to use, or the inadequacy of, a safety device of the kind listed within the statute. This requires a plaintiff to show that at the time the object fell, it was either being hoisted or secured or required securing for purposes of the undertaking in order to recover under § 240(1).
Labor Law § 241(6) (TJE)
The Appellate Court reversed the trial court’s grant of summary judgment on Labor Law § 241(6) predicated on a violation of 12 NYCRR 23-2.1(a)(1), finding an issue of fact as to whether it was violated.
According to 12 NYCRR 23-2.1(a)(1), building materials must be stored in a safe and orderly manner and material piles must be stable and so located that they do not obstruct any passageway, walkway, stairway or other thoroughfare. Plaintiff alleged that the building materials were not stored in a safe and orderly manner, and Kader failed to eliminate all triable issues of fact as to whether building materials were properly stored.
Plaintiff allegedly was injured when he fell from scaffolding while working at a construction site owned by 32-42 55th Street Realty, LLC. 32-42 55th Street Realty, LLC hired Crescent Street Construction Corporation to act as the general contractor. Crescent Street hired B green Construction Corp. to install a brick façade on the front of the subject property and B Green hired Plaintiff’s employer, R & S Construction, Corp. to perform the masonry work. Plaintiff described the accident as a fall from “loose and unsecured planks” on the scaffold and attributed the fall to a “defective condition” of the scaffolding.
Plaintiff moved for summary judgment on his Labor Law 240(1) cause of action, which was denied by the trial court.
(MRV) Labor Law § 240(1)
The Appellate Division reversed and granted summary judgment on § 240(1) in favor of plaintiff. Plaintiff made a prime facie showing that he fell from loose and unsecured planks atop the scaffolding and that his fall was caused by the defective condition of the scaffolding. Any inconsistency in plaintiff’s deposition testimony regarding the absence of safety devices does not present an issue of fact as to the plaintiff’s credibility.
PRACTICE POINT: Once a plaintiff has made a prima facie showing, any failure on the plaintiff’s part to use available safety devices would not be a defense under § 240(1).
Plaintiff allegedly was injured on November 17, 2011 while working at a construction site in the course of his employment with Bond Painting Company, Inc. He suffered an electric shock and fell off a scaffold after coming into contact with an electrical box in space leased by Coach, Inc. within a building owned by 450 Partners, LLC.
Commercial Electrical Contractors, ACC Construction Corporation’s electrical subcontractor, moved for summary judgment dismissing ACC’s second third-party causes of action for contractual and common-law indemnification and dismissing all cross-claims for contribution and contractual and common-law indemnification insofar as asserted against Commercial. The trial court granted Commercial’s summary judgment motion on these issues.
Indemnity Issues in Labor Law (AMC)
The Appellate Division found that Commercial Electrical Contractors demonstrated its entitlement to judgment as a matter of law dismissing the second third-party cause of action and cross-claims for common-law and contractual indemnification.
Commercial proffered evidence that its scope of work related only to the installation of new wiring on the work site and that the identification and removal of preexisting wiring was the obligation of a different contractor. As a result, the accident was not "caused by the negligent acts or omissions of Commercial, such that the indemnification clause was not triggered. It also found that the Appellants failed to raise a triable issue of fact; thus, the Trial Court property granted those branches of Commercial's motion which were for summary judgment dismissing the second third-party cause of action and cross-claims for contractual indemnification insofar as asserted against it.
In August 2014, plaintiff, an employee of Palace Electric Contractors, was working at a construction site in Medford. He was standing in a hole in the ground while a crane operator lowered an “800-1000-pound” cement base for a light pole into the hole, and plaintiff was guiding the base with his hands when it allegedly “jerked” or suddenly moved, struck him, and injured him.
Defendants moved for summary judgment dismissing plaintiff’s amended complaint which was denied by the trial Court. RBSL Realty, LLC, Landtek Group, Inc., and Williams Scotsman, Inc. also moved for dismissal of cross-claims against them, which were also denied by the Trial Court.
Labor Law § 240(1) (MRV)
The Appellate Division held the trial court properly denied defendants’ motions for summary judgment on plaintiff’s § 240(1) claim. The single decisive question when considered a § 240(1) claim is whether the plaintiff’s injuries were the direct consequence of a failure to provide adequate protection against a risk arising from a physically significant elevation differential. Here, the plaintiff’s testimony established that he was injured when a heavy, cement light pole base suddenly moved and made contact with him when it was in the process of being hoisted by a crane. Therefore, defendants failed to make a prima facie showing that plaintiff was not exposed to an elevation-related or gravity-related risk covered by § 240(1).
PRACTICE POINT: A motion for summary judgment will be denied regardless of the sufficiency of the opposition papers when the moving papers fail to make a prima facie showing of entitlement to judgment as a matter of law.
Labor Law § 241(6) (TJE)
The Appellate Court found the Defendants failed to demonstrate a prima facie case that the Industrial Code violations were inapplicable under the circumstances. As a result, defendants’ motions seeking to dismiss these claims were properly denied regardless of the sufficiency of plaintiff’s opposition papers.
Labor Law § 200 and Common-Law Negligence (JLD)
The Appellate Division affirmed the denial of the Labor Law § 200 cause of action as to defendant Potente, but reversed the Labor Law § 200 cause of action as to defendant RBSL because the right to generally supervise work stop work if a safety violation is noted or ensure compliance with safety regulations does not amount to supervision and control necessary to impose liability pursuant to Labor Law § 200.
Indemnity Issues in Labor Law (AMC)
The Appellate Division held that the Trial Court properly denied RBSL’s motion seeking to dismiss the contractual and common law indemnification cross claims against it.
Regarding its claim for contractual indemnification, RBSL failed to submit the relevant contracts in support of their motion. Thus, it did not establish its entitlement to judgment as a matter of law, dismissing the cross claim for contractual indemnification.
In order to establish judgment, as a matter of law, dismissing a cross claim for common law indemnification, movant is required to demonstrate that it was not negligent, and did not have the ability to direct, supervise or control the injury producing work. RBSL failed to establish that it was not negligent. Thus, it did not meet its burden to dismiss cross claims for common law indemnification.
Plaintiff was allegedly injured at a construction site when he was struck in the eye by a spark from ironwork being performed on the floor above him. Plaintiff was a foreman employed by Construction Directions, LLC, which had been retained as a subcontractor to perform excavation and concrete work.
Plaintiff commenced this action against 88th Avenue Owner, LLC as the owner of the subject property, and NY Developers & Managers, Inc., as the general manager of the construction project. Plaintiff moved for summary judgment on his Labor Law § 240(1) and § 241(6) causes of action, and the Trial Court granted plaintiff’s motion.
Labor Law § 240(1) (MRV)
The Appellate Division reversed the lower court, denying plaintiff’s motion on § 240(1) and granting summary judgment in favor of 88th Avenue and NY Developers after searching the record. Plaintiff failed to make a prima facie showing that the sparks resulting from the ironwork were objects that required securing for the purpose of his undertaking or that his alleged injuries arose from an elevation-related risk contemplated by § 240(1) rather than the ordinary dangers of a construction site. The evidence established that § 240(1) is inapplicable to the facts of this case.
PRACTICE POINT: The Court has authority pursuant to CPLR 3212(b) to search the record and award summary judgment to a party even in the absence of a cross-motion.
Labor Law § 241(6) (TJE)
The Appellate Court revered the Trial Court, finding plaintiff did not establish a prima facie violation of 12 NYCRR § 23-1.8(a) as he did not show he was personally engaged in welding, burning, cutting, chipping, cutting, or grinding, or any other operation which may endanger the eyes as required by the statute. As a result, the Appellate Court dismissed plaintiff’s claims based on this regulation.
While a new home was under construction, plaintiff visited the premises to take kitchen measurements for custom cabinetry. He tripped on a wooden construction brace that ran at a 45-degree angle from ceiling to floor and was positioned in the middle of the kitchen, and he injured his leg.
Plaintiff sued the contractor defendants for common-law negligence and Labor Law § 200 based on allegations that they failed to maintain the premises in a safe condition and failed to warn about the construction brace.
The trial court granted defendants’ summary judgment motion dismissing plaintiff’s complaint, concluding defendants had no duty to warn, and any failure to maintain a safe premises was not a substantial factor in causing the injury as the construction brace was readily observable and any hazard posed was inherent under the circumstances.
Labor Law § 200 and Common-Law Negligence (JLD)
The Appellate Division reversed, finding that Defendants failed to meet their prima facie burden as questions of fact remain as to whether defendants maintained the worksite in a reasonably safe condition. While defendant’s expert placed emphasis on the fact that the tripped-over brace was open and obvious, and plaintiff saw it before his fall, the Court has repeatedly held that the open and obvious nature of an allegedly dangerous condition does not necessarily preclude a defendant’s duty to maintain a worksite in a reasonably safe condition. It remains question of fact as to whether defendant’s worksite was maintained in a reasonably safe condition; that question is for the for the trier of fact to resolve.
Plaintiff, an AJ Sign employee, was taping off an exterior wall of a 7-Eleven in connection with sign installation and related paint touch-up. While standing near the top of a two-sided extendable step ladder and reaching to the right, the ladder “wobbled and fell away from the building’ and plaintiff fell “face first onto the sidewalk.”
The trial court denied plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment, finding issues of fact as to whether plaintiff was the sole proximate cause of his injuries.
Labor Law § 240(1) (MRV)
The Appellate Division held the lower court erred in finding plaintiff failed to meet his prima facie burden. When the unrefuted evidence establishes an unexplained fall from a ladder while plaintiff was using it to reach an elevated work area, he is entitled to the presumption that the ladder did not afford proper protection. The burden then shifts to the Defendants to raise a question of fact that there was no statutory violation and that plaintiff’s own acts were the sole cause of the accident.
PRACTICE POINT: When arguing sole proximate cause, the defense will fail under this holding where a plaintiff has no choice as to the equipment to use to accomplish his task. Additionally, the fact that a plaintiff has to straddle the ladder, overreach, and stand beyond the height limit of the ladder to complete his work only highlights that the equipment provided was inadequate, not that the plaintiff was the sole proximate cause.
In the dissent Justice Clark argued for a question of fact. He based the opinion on testimony from the plaintiff that he was aware that the ladder could be used either as an A-frame ladder or as an extension ladder. Plaintiff met his prima facie burden as the ladder, which was, per the plaintiff without visible defect collapsed and locked into position and on level ground. He felt, however, that as the ladder was labeled and prohibited use as an A-Frame above 6’8”, which was how the plaintiff used the ladder. The warning label also pointed out that the ladder should be used at that height as an extension ladder, and the plaintiff testified that he was aware the ladder could be used as an extension ladder. The defendant’s expert opined that the use of the ladder in that manner, as an A-frame above the safe level, can cause the ladder to fall over sidewise, thus, the plaintiff’s sole proximate cause.
The dissent opinion reads importantly
“Plaintiff testified during his EBT that he straddled the ladder because he had previously observed other workers perform work in this manner, not due to a concern that such positioning was necessary to perform the work to which he was assigned. In these circumstances, the manner in which plaintiff performed the work informs the analysis of whether he was the sole proximate cause of the accident, not whether the ladder provided proper protection”
This is important for a variety of reasons, not least because in many cases the misuse of a safety device has been deemed allowed simply because others have been known to use the safety device in that manner and it is deemed tacitly allowed on the work site. This language would seem to discount that exclusion from having been instructed on the manner in which the safety device was to be used. The court cites to Yau Zong Wu v Zhen Jia Yang for the premise that "whether a particular safety device provided proper protection is generally a question of fact for a jury".
It is important to note that this is a 3-2 decision that may go up to the Court of Appeals. It is a case worth watching, we would love to see the dissent rule the day.
Plaintiff was injured when he fell from the roof of a building owned by Patricia A. Siskar while his employer, a contractor, was performing roof-repair work. The parties’ motion papers raised factual disputes about whether tie-off brackets on the roof were properly placed to provide adequate protection and whether plaintiff’s failure to use them was a cause of the fall.
Plaintiff moved for partial summary judgment on his Labor Law § 240(1) and § 241(6) causes of action against the homeowner. The Trial Court denied his motion as to Labor Law § 240(1) but granted it as to 241(6).
Labor Law § 240(1) (MRV)
The Appellate Division held that neither party was entitled to judgment as a matter of law on § 240(1). The parties’ submissions raised triable issues of fact as to whether the tie-off brackets were properly placed on the roof to provide Plaintiff with adequate protection and, if the tie-off brackets were properly placed, whether Plaintiff’s failure to use them was the sole proximate cause of the accident.
PRACTICE POINT: When neither party is able to eliminate triable issues of fact in support of their motion for summary judgment, neither party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
Labor Law § 200 and Common-Law Negligence (JLD)
The Appellate Division held that he trial court erred in denying defendant’s motion with respect to Labor Law § 200 and common law negligence causes of action against defendant to the extent that plaintiff abandoned those causes of action by not opposing the motion and not addressing those causes of action on appeal.
Labor Law § 241(6) (TJE)
The Appellate Court reversed summary judgment on Plaintiff’s § 241(6) claim, finding neither plaintiff nor Siskar established entitlement to judgment as a matter of law. The Appellate Court found there was triable issues of fact, including whether plaintiff was the sole proximate cause of the accident.
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Labor Law Pointers
Editor
David R. Adams
Associate Editor
Eric D. Andrew
Associate Editor
Patrice C. S. Melville
Associate Editor
Ashley M. Cuneo
Associate Editor
Tyler J. Eckert
Associate Editor
Jessica L. Deren
Associate Editor
Marten R. Violante
Labor Law Team
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David R. Adams, Team Leader
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Patrice C. S. Melville
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Brian F. Mark
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Elizabeth K. Ognenovski
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Bradon S. Carlson
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Joseph P. Mendoza
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