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NOTE FROM ROCHESTER ATTORNEY BRADON S. CARLSON:
You all know what they say about April showers—brighter skies are on the horizon. Just like the changing weather, the legal landscape in New York is constantly shifting; this time with a significant development in the state’s law regarding injuries caused by domestic animals.
As background, for almost 140 years, the New York Court of Appeals recognized two distinct avenues for recovery when personal injuries were caused by domestic animals: negligence and strict liability. But in 2006, the Court of Appeals broke with other jurisdictions, creating a bright line standard by holding that when such injuries are caused by domestic animals, only strict liability applies—thus barring common-law negligence causes of action. On nearly 19 years to the day since Bard took effect, the Court of Appeals reversed course again.
Below is a closer look at the Court’s pivotal change.
04/17/25 Flanders v. Goodfellow
New York State Court of Appeals
A Change in Season: Court of Appeals Overrules Bard, Reinstates Traditional Negligence Standard for Dog Bites
On December 8, 2018, Rebecca Flanders (the plaintiff), a postal worker, arrived at Stephen and Michelle Goodfellow’s (the defendants) house to deliver mail but found their mailbox missing. As she approached the house to leave a package on the porch, she heard a dog barking. She had not seen a warning that the Goodfellows had a dangerous dog either at the post office or on the scanner given to postal carriers, and she did not see a "beware of dog" sign on the property.
Before exiting her vehicle, she took a moment to confirm that the dog was not outside. Once this was confirmed, she exited her vehicle and approached the defendant’s porch. The defendant Stephen Goodfellow opened the front door to greet the plaintiff. As the plaintiff was handing the defendant the package, the defendant’s dog slipped through the doorway and lunged at the plaintiff’s neck. The plaintiff raised her hand to cover her face and neck and was bitten on the shoulder. The defendant broke the dog’s grip from the plaintiff’s shoulder, and the plaintiff hurried back to her vehicle. The plaintiff later learned that the bite had caused a "snap tear" in her shoulder muscle, which required several surgical procedures and resulted in scarring.
The plaintiff introduced affidavits from two postal workers who had previously delivered mail to the defendants' residence. Both witnesses testified that the dog had displayed aggressive behavior, including baring its teeth, snarling, barking, and biting at the window in what appeared to be an attempt to attack them. Both believed the dog was dangerous, and that the defendants should have been aware of the dog’s aggressive behavior but had failed to report it as required by the work rules of the Postal Service. Contrarily, the defendants testified that the dog was not aggressive, and that they never received prior complaints regarding the dog’s behavior.
Following discovery, the defendants moved for summary judgment, which the Supreme Court granted. As to strict liability, the court concluded that the evidence did not raise a triable issue of fact regarding whether the defendants had actual or constructive knowledge of their dog’s alleged vicious propensities. As to negligence, the court dismissed the claim based on New York precedent, which forecloses negligence liability in dog bite cases.
The plaintiff appealed, arguing (1) that the defendants knew or should have known of the dog’s vicious propensities, and (2) that the negligence claim represented a good faith argument for the modification or reversal of existing law. In support of the latter, the plaintiff contended that landowners have a duty to maintain their property in a reasonably safe condition under the circumstances—including consideration of the likelihood and seriousness of potential injuries, as well as the burden of avoiding the risk. The plaintiff asserted that it was foreseeable that the defendants’ failure to properly secure their dog would result in injury, and that this failure constituted negligence.
In response to the plaintiff’s negligence argument, the defendants relied on longstanding New York precedent, emphasizing that negligence causes of action are precluded in dog bite cases.
The Fourth Department affirmed the Supreme Court’s decision, holding that the defendants neither knew nor had reason to know of the dog’s alleged vicious propensities, and that the negligence claim was properly dismissed. The plaintiff was subsequently granted leave to appeal.
On appeal to the Court of Appeals, the plaintiff urged the Court to overturn Bard v. Jahnke, the 2006 decision in which the Court held that when harm is caused by a domestic animal, its owners’ liability is determined solely by the application of strict liability.[1]
In Bard, the plaintiff, a carpenter, was injured by a free-roaming breeding bull while repairing cow mattresses in a barn. He asserted both negligence and strict liability claims, alleging that the defendant was negligent in failing to restrain the bull and in failing to warn him of its presence. The plaintiff’s expert opined that bulls, particularly breeding bulls, are generally dangerous. The Court, however, rejected the argument for applying a negligence standard based on the general dangerous nature of bulls, holding that liability depends on the defendant’s specific knowledge of the animal’s vicious propensities.
The plaintiff here argued that the Bard rule was unworkable and inconsistent with general modern tort principles, which require individuals to act reasonably to prevent foreseeable injuries to others.
In further support of her argument, the plaintiff emphasized New York’s longstanding pre-Bard history of permitting simultaneous negligence and strict liability claims against domestic animal owners. She argued that the two causes of action are complementary, each serving distinct public policy goals. Strict liability, she asserted, discourages the harboring of dangerous animals, since “even the most elaborate and extensive measures [would] not avoid strict liability.”[2] However, strict liability alone fails to incentivize precautionary measures by the animal’s owner. The prospect of negligence liability, by contrast, encourages owners to exercise reasonable care to protect the public from unnecessary danger posed by domestic animals.
The defendants, represented by Michael F. Perley of our office as appellate counsel, countered that the Bard rule is consistent with prior New York case law and comports with general tort principles by imposing strict liability on owners who have notice of their animal’s dangerous propensities. In other words, even if the owner was not negligent, liability still attaches upon such notice.
Turning to the plaintiff’s negligence claim, the Court first considered whether principles of stare decisis supported continued adherence to Bard. The first factor was whether Bard was well reasoned and consistent with tort jurisprudence. The Court emphasized that tort law seeks to deter harm by imposing a duty of care. It noted that in other areas, such as operating a motor vehicle, riding a bicycle, or manufacturing machinery, individuals are expected to exercise due care. The Bard rule, the Court found, was inconsistent with these principles because it shifted both the burden of care and the costs of injury from animal owners to those harmed by the animals. It also failed to incentivize owners to learn of their animals’ dangerous propensities and take reasonable steps to prevent injury.
The second stare decisis factor considered was whether subsequent legal developments had undermined Bard. The Court observed that later decisions had carved out exceptions to the rule, gradually eroding Bard’s original bright-line approach.
Lastly, the Court emphasized that the Bard rule proved to be unworkable in the lower courts and an obstacle in the “path of justice.”[3]
For these reasons, the Court overruled Bard and adopted a two-pronged approach to liability for injuries caused by domestic animals. First, if an owner knew or should have known of the animal’s vicious propensities, the plaintiff may pursue a strict liability claim. In addition, or in the alternative, the plaintiff may assert a negligence claim, seeking to prove that the owner failed to exercise reasonable care under the circumstances regardless of whether or not their dog acted unreasonably in the past.
Accordingly, the Court reversed the Appellate Division’s decision, which had dismissed the plaintiff’s negligence claim based solely on Bard and denied the defendants’ motion for summary judgment.
[1] 6 NY3d at 599.
[2] Colarusso v Dunne, 286 AD2d 37, 39-40 [2d Dept 2001].
[3] Woods v Lancet, 303 NY 349 [1951].
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