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Jagdeo v Borden House Condominium
February 11, 2025
Appellate Division, First Department
Plaintiff was injured when a coworker, who was on a ladder installing metal “Z clips,” dropped the clips on plaintiff’s head while working on a renovation of a single-family apartment in a condominium building. Plaintiff was not wearing a hard hat. The trial court granted summary judgment dismissing plaintiff’s Labor Law §§ 240(1) and 241(6) claims against all defendants and granted summary judgment dismissing the Labor Law § 200 and common-law negligence claims against certain defendants.
 Labor Law § 240(1) (MAS)
The First Department unanimously affirmed the trial court’s decision to dismiss the Labor Law §§ 240 and 241(6) claims against Caceres and Michael Novogratz. As owners, they demonstrated their entitlement to the homeowners’ exception by showing that they did not direct or control plaintiff’s work. Plaintiff’s hearsay evidence that Caceres gave his supervisors instructions, was insufficient to raise a triable issue of fact.
The Court also properly dismissed the claims against the Condo defendants, who established that plaintiff’s accident occurred within the apartment and that plaintiff was not working on common elements of the building. The Condo defendants also established that they did not have authority to supervise or control the job and thus were not liable as an agent of the owner.
PRACTICE POINT: Under the homeowner’s exemption, owners of one and two-family dwellings who contract for but do not direct or control the work are exempt from Labor Law §§ 240(1) and 241(6).
 Labor Law § 241(6) (TPW)
The First Department also dismissed the Labor Law § 241(6) claims as against Caceres and Michael Novogratz because of the homeowner's exemption as owners of the apartment who did not control the construction. Further, the remaining defendants did not have authority to supervise or control the job and thus were not liable as agents of the owner.
 Labor Law § 200 and Common-Law Negligence (EDA)
The First Department unanimously affirmed the trial court’s decision, finding that there were no issues of fact as to whether Caceres directed or controlled plaintiff's work. It also affirmed the dismissal of the claims against Condo defendants because they did not exercise supervisory control over the activity that brought about plaintiff's injury.
Konstantinovic v Finch Apt. Corp.
February 13, 2025
Appellate Division, First Department
Plaintiff, an employee of Finch, allegedly was injured while working in the boiler room at a building owned by Finch, after he fell from a ladder. Plaintiff alleges that Finch hired Abilene, a boiler installation and repair company, to work on the boiler before the accident and that Abilene was responsible for maintaining the boiler and boiler room in a reasonably safe and suitable condition and in good repair. The trial court denied Abilen’s motion seeking dismissal of the Labor Law §§ 240, 241 and 200 claims.
Labor Law § 240(1) (MAS)
The First Department unanimously affirmed the trial court’s decision, finding that Abilene failed to establish its entitlement to judgment as a matter of law. The affidavit of Abilene’s principal failed to address plaintiff’s central allegation that he fell and emails attached Abilene’s motion established that it had worked in the boiler room where plaintiff fell that day of his incident. Additionally, the motion was premature because plaintiff demonstrated that facts essential to oppose the motion – including invoices, work orders, proposals, and other evidence of Abilene’s work before plaintiff’s incident – were in Abilene’s exclusive control.
PRACTICE POINT: When moving for summary judgment, you must address the central allegations against you and your motion will be denied, like here, without regard to the sufficiency of your opponent’s opposition papers.
Mannino v Waldorf Exteriors, LLC
February 13, 2025
Appellate Division, First Department
Plaintiff was injured while working on a construction project in a building owned by the City and occupied by FIT. TDX was the construction manager for the project. Plaintiff's employer, nonparty general contractor Vanguard, retained Waldorf and Calvin as the demolition subcontractors. On the day of his injury, plaintiff was tasked with chipping cement encasements from two-story, steel vertical columns located in the lobby of the building. Plaintiff was going up in a scissor lift when he was struck by a 200-to-300-pound piece of cement that fell from the middle tier of a column.
The trial court denied plaintiff's motion for summary judgment on liability on his Labor Law §§ 240(1) and 241(6) claims, granted the motion of The Board of Trustees of Fashion Institute of Technology, FIT, the City of New York, and the New York City Department of Education (together, the City), and TDX for summary judgment dismissing the Labor Law §§ 240(1) and 241(6) claims against them, and granted the cross-motion of Waldorf Exteriors and Calvin for summary judgment dismissing the Labor Law §§ 240(1) and 241(6) claims against them.
Labor Law § 240(1) (MAS)
The First Department reversed the trial court’s decision, reinstated plaintiff’s § 240(1) claim and granted summary judgment in plaintiff’s favor as he demonstrated that he was injured by falling cement from an area on a vertical column, and that at the time of the accident he was not otherwise engaged in actual cement removal. Moreover, shoring or bracing of the cement casing on the columns could have been accomplished by wire mesh or other means without making the work impossible to complete. In opposition to plaintiff’s motion, the Court held that FIT and the City failed to show how adequate safety measures would interfere with or preclude plaintiff from completing his assigned demolition task.
However, questions of fact remain as to whether TDX was a statutory agent of FIT because of testimony that TDX could stop the work to enforce safety practices, as well as testimony that TDG was the “eyes and ears” of FIT during the renovation project. Questions of fact are also raised as to whether Walforf and Calvin were statutory agents, as the evidence indicates that their supervision over earlier demolition work on the columns could reasonably have destabilized the cement encasements.
PRACTICE POINT: A party may be vicariously liable as an agent of the owner for injuries where the party had the ability to control the activity which brought about the injury. When the work giving rise to the duty to conform to the requirements of Labor Law § 240(1) has been delegated to a third-party, that third-party then obtains the concomitant authority to supervise and control that work and becomes a statutory agent of the owner or general contractor. Where, as here, the party had such supervisory control and authority, they are an appropriate Labor Law defendant.
Saula v Harlem Urban Dev. Corp.
February 13, 2025
Appellate Division, First Department
Plaintiff slipped on the top, first rung of a wet ladder while descending and suffered injuries. The trial court granted plaintiff’s motion for partial summary judgment on his Labor Law §§ 240(1) and 241(6) claims.
Labor Law § 240(1) (MAS)
The First Department unanimously affirmed the trial court’s decision. Plaintiff established entitlement to partial summary judgment under § 240 based on the uncontested testimony that he slipped on the top, first rung of a wet ladder while descending, and that defendants did not require him to use fall protection gear when using the ladder. The evidence also showed that the wet ladder, the only means of access between the first and second floors, lacked slip protection and a tie-off point, in violation of § 240.
As plaintiff established that his injury was causally related to a violation of Labor Law § 240(1), the court also properly dismissed defendants’ affirmative defense asserting that plaintiff was the sole proximate cause of his accident.
PRACTICE POINT: If a statutory violation of § 240(1) is a proximate cause an injury, then plaintiff cannot be solely to blame for it.
Rossi v Doka USA, Ltd.
February 18, 2025
Appellate Division, First Department
Plaintiff, an employee of the concrete subcontractor Roger & Sons, was injured while using a ratchet to move a reusable concrete formwork system used to construct concrete walls. The concrete formwork system was supplied by Doka, which also trained the Roger & Sons employees on how to use the system and the ratchets. The trial court denied the cross-motion of Doka for summary judgment dismissing the complaint and all crossclaims against it.
Labor Law § 241(6) (TPW)
The First Department unanimously affirmed the trial court’s denial of Doka’s motion for summary judgment. Doka failed to establish that it was not a "statutory agent" under Labor Law § 241(6). Based on Doka's contract with Roger & Sons and testimony that a Doka employee remained on site after training the Roger & Sons employees on the formwork system, issues of fact existed as to whether Doka had the authority to supervise and control plaintiff's work with the formwork system.
Labor Law § 200 and Common-Law Negligence (EDA)
The First Department unanimously found that Doka failed to establish that it is not a "statutory agent" under Labor Law § 200. Based on Doka's contract with Roger & Sons and testimony that a Doka employee remained on site after training the Roger & Sons employees on the formwork system, issues of fact exist as to whether Doka had the authority to supervise and control plaintiff's work with the formwork system. The authority to supervise and control is the key issue.
 Indemnity Issues in Labor Law (AMC)
The First Department upheld the trial court’s decision denying Doka’s cross-motion for summary judgment for contractual indemnification against Roger & Sons. The trial Court found, and the First Department agreed that Doka failed to establish it was not negligent.
Suazo v 501 Madison-Sutton LLC
February 18, 2025
Appellate Division, First Department
Plaintiff was engaged in wall plastering work atop an A-frame ladder, that he held plaster material in one hand and his spreading knife in the other as he worked, and that the ladder suddenly toppled, causing him to fall. The trial court granted plaintiff’s motion for partial summary judgment on his Labor Law §§ 240(1) and 241(6) claims.
Labor Law § 240(1) (MAS)
The First Department unanimously affirmed the trial court's decision. Contrary to defendants’ argument, none of the alleged inconsistencies in plaintiff’s testimony as to the ladder’s height, the ceiling height, the stability of the ladder as he stood on it, or even whether the ladder had moved before it toppled, undermine plaintiff’s proof warranting summary judgment. The Court also rejected defendants’ sole proximate cause argument as there was no evidence that plaintiff was reaching or leaning at the time the ladder toppled, and to assume as much would be speculative. In any event, it is “conceptually impossible”
PRACTICE POINT: Another case reminding us that it is “conceptually impossible” for a plaintiff’s negligence to be the sole proximate cause of an accident where, as here, it is shown that a violation of 240(1) was a concurrent cause of the accident.
Traub v Basketball City N.Y. LLC
February 18, 2025
Appellate Division, First Department
Plaintiff was one of a team of 60 stagehands belonging to a union hired to erect a temporary stage for an awards show at Pier 36 in Manhattan. During the day prior to the show, plaintiff performed a number of construction tasks including going up in a "genie" lift to fix a malfunctioning speaker and helping the carpenters install decking and staging. Plaintiff was then tasked with wiring the audio system for a rolling drum riser to be used during the show. While backstage retrieving necessary audio cables for the riser, plaintiff was holding onto the stage's railing to guide himself when the lights were turned off and on during a lighting test, causing him to become disoriented and fall off the stage because part of the railing was missing and was injured.
The trial court granted plaintiff’s motion for partial summary judgment under Labor Law § 240(1), and denied defendant’s cross-motion for summary judgment and the BBC defendants’ common-law indemnification claims against NGPI.
Labor Law § 240(1) (MAS)
The First Department unanimously affirmed the trial court’s decision granting summary judgment to plaintiff under Labor Law § 240(1). BBC’s contention that the activity engaged in at the exact moment of injury is determinative of liability is belied by this Court’s jurisprudence that a full assessment of the work being performed is required. On this record, the Court held it was clear that plaintiff was engaged in construction-related activity covered by the Labor Law as plaintiff participated in the construction of the stage and the riser throughout the project, including on the day of the accident, in service of a union that was performing a contract to carry out construction activities clearly covered under the statute. Moreover, plaintiff’s task of wiring the drum apparatus for use in the show was ultimately part and parcel of the stage’s overall construction. That plaintiff’s discrete task of fetching the cables neither involved the physical construction of the stage itself, nor its attached rigging and electronics fails to compel a different result.
PRACTICE POINT: Courts rejected defendant’s argument that the court should limit its analysis of plaintiff’s activity to the moment of the injury, instead analyzing the totality of work plaintiff performed on the project because it is neither pragmatic nor consistent with the spirit of the statute to isolate the moment of injury and ignore the general context of the work.
Indemnity Issues in Labor Law (AMC)
The First Department upheld the trial court’s decision denying BBC’s cross-motion for summary judgment for common-law indemnification against New Games Productions. The trial Court found, and the First Department agreed, that BBC failed to establish its freedom from negligence regarding the lighting conditions.
Williams v McAlpine Contr. Co.
February 18, 2025
Appellate Division, First Department
Plaintiff was injured when he fell while walking on raised curbing that was in the middle of a pathway leading to his employer's shop at a construction site. Sandy 350 was the owner, McAlpine Contracting was the general contractor, and Bedrock, a subcontractor, was plaintiff's employer. The trial court denied defendants’ motion seeking dismissal of plaintiff’s Labor Law § 241(6) claim based on 12 NYCRR 23-1.7(e), denied plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment under Labor Law § 200, granted defendants’ motion to dismiss the § 200 and common-law negligence claims, and denied defendants’ motion for summary judgment seeking contractual indemnification and breach of contract against Bedrock.
Labor Law § 241(6) (TPW)
Defendants established entitlement to summary judgment dismissing the Labor Law § 241(6) claim predicated on an alleged violation of Industrial Code § 23-1.7(e)(1), which pertains to tripping hazards, because plaintiff admitted he did not trip on the raised curbing or any debris. In opposition, the Court held that plaintiff did not raise a triable issue of fact. The opinion of plaintiff's expert that plaintiff tripped on the raised curbing was not supported by admissible evidence in the record and was contradictory to plaintiff's own testimony.
Labor Law § 200 and Common-Law Negligence (EDA)
The First Department unanimously found issues of fact that precluded summary judgment to either plaintiff or defendants on the Labor Law § 200 and common-law negligence claims as it was based on a dangerous condition on the site, not from the means and methods of plaintiff's work. Defendants' witness acknowledged that workers were not supposed to walk on the pathway with the raised curbing, which was to become part of the final structure. McAlpine Contracting's superintendent testified that it would be against the rules for a worker to use the pathway as a shortcut. However, the record contained conflicting evidence as to whether defendants knew or should have known that workers continued to use the pathway, despite a plywood barrier, which according to testimony could easily be removed. There was also an issue of fact as to whether plaintiff's fall was caused by a dangerous condition of the curbing, or whether he lost his footing as he was stepping off the curbing.
Indemnity Issues in Labor Law (AMC)
The First Department held that because there are questions of fact as to whether the defendants’ (McAlpine Contracting and Sandy 350) negligence, they are not entitled to summary judgment on their contractual indemnification claim against Bedrock.
Castro v Brito
February 20, 2025
Appellate Division, First Department
Defendants hired plaintiff to repair the garage roof of a two-unit home. Plaintiff was injured when the wooden ladder he was using collapsed as he descended from the roof. He alleged that defendants provided a defective, unsecured ladder causes of action for negligence and violations of Labor Law §§ 240(1), 241(6), 200 and common-law negligence. The trial court granted plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment on the § 240(1) claim against Tito and denied Villavicencio’s cross-motion for summary judgement, while denying defendants’ cross-motion for summary judgment dismissing plaintiff’s Labor Law § 200 claims.
Labor Law § 240(1) (MAS)
The First Department unanimously affirmed the trial court’s decision. Villavicencio was not entitled to the homeowners’ exemption. Although he was the spouse of the owner, Brito, Villavicencio was not a legal owner of the property where plaintiff worked and thus lacked any legal interest in the property that would have entitled him to the exemption. Plaintiff also established that Villaviencio is a statutory agent, who acted as the owner’s agent by hiring plaintiff with Brito’s authorization and providing materials and tools for the garage roof repair.
Plaintiff further established entitlement to summary judgment by showing he was provided with an old, unstable wooden ladder that was too short to reach the roof. The court rejected Villaviencio’s sole proximate cause argument because even if a metal ladder shown in a photograph of the garage was available on the date of the accident, defendants’ failed to establish that plaintiff knew that the taller ladder was available for his use; he was expected to use the taller ladder for his work; he chose for no good reason not to do so; and, he refused to follow a specific instruction to use the taller ladder for his work.
PRACTICE POINT: Remember the four essential elements of the sole proximate cause defense under Labor Law § 240(1): (1) plaintiff had adequate safety devices available; (2) plaintiff knew both that the safety devices were available and that he or she was expected to use them; (3) plaintiff chose, for no good reason, not to do so; and (4) would not have been injured had he or she not made that choice. Without all four elements, this defense will not succeed, as in this case.
Labor Law § 200 and Common-Law Negligence (EDA)
The First Department unanimously affirmed the dismissal of the Labor Law § 200 and common-law negligence claims, finding that the evidence established that defendants exercised supervisory control over the means and methods of the work, such as by providing the ladder.
Lopez v 18-20 Park 84 Corp.
February 27, 2025
Appellate Division, First Department
Plaintiff fell from a ladder while in the course of his employment with Dowd as a painter. Plaintiff was performing renovation work in an apartment at premises owned by 18-20 Park, which apartment was leased by Marissa Reese. The trial court granted plaintiff’s motion for partial summary judgement on the Labor Law § 240(1) claim against 18-20 Park, and denied Dowd’s motion for summary judgment claims for common-law indemnification and contribution.
Labor Law § 240(1) (MAS)
The First Department affirmed the trial court’s decision to grant plaintiff summary judgment as plaintiff met his burden that the ladder on which he was standing moved from under him for no apparent reason. To the extent that plaintiff was required to identify a safety device that would have prevented the incident, the Court held that plaintiff established that he was provided with a safety device, i.e., a ladder, but that the ladder proved inadequate.
PRACTICE POINT: A plaintiff is not required to demonstrate that a ladder is defective to be entitled to summary judgment. Even if plaintiff misused the ladder by standing on its fifth rung, this constitutes at most comparative negligence, which is not a defense under Labor Law § 240(1). Moreover, plaintiff is entitled to summary judgment although he was the only witness as nothing in the record controverts his account of the accident or calls his credibility into question.
Indemnity Issues in Labor Law (AMC)
The First Department reversed the trial court’s decision denying Dowd’s motion for summary judgment seeking to dismiss the common law indemnification claims, finding that Dowd established plaintiff did not suffer a “grave injury” within the meaning of Workers Compensation § 11 and defendants and Reese failed to raise a question of fact.
Martinez v Nader Enters., LLC
February 5, 2025
Appellate Division, Second Department
Plaintiff was employed by Sunfar, who was the general contractor at a construction site owned by defendant. Plaintiff was injured while cutting a cement block with a grinder without a blade guard when the grinder kicked back and cut plaintiff's leg. Sunfar owned and provided the subject grinder. Plaintiff commenced an action asserting violations of Labor Law §§ 241(6) and 200. The trial court granted plaintiff’s cross-motion for summary judgment on Labor Law § 241(6) predicated on a violation of 12 NYCRR 23-1.5(c)(3) and denied Sunfar’s motion for summary judgment seeking dismissal of the Labor Law § 200 and common-law negligence claims.
Labor Law § 241(6) (TPW)
The Second Department reversed the trial court’s decision. Industrial Code (12 NYCRR) § 23-1.5(c)(3), provides that “[a]ll safety devices, safeguards and equipment in use shall be kept sound and operable, and shall be immediately repaired or restored or immediately removed from the job site if damaged." Here, the Court held that plaintiff failed to eliminate all triable issues of fact as to whether defendant had notice of any defect or unsafe condition in the subject grinder and the trial court should have denied plaintiff's cross-motion, regardless of the sufficiency of defendant's opposition papers.
Labor Law § 200 and Common-Law Negligence (EDA)
The Second Department unanimously reversed the trial court’s decision and dismissed the Labor Law § 200 claim, finding that it did not have the authority to supervise or control the manner and method of plaintiff's work. Defendant's submissions established that it did not interact with Sunfar's employees during the construction and that it did not provide any equipment or tools to Sunfar's employees. In opposition, the Court held that plaintiff failed to raise a triable issue of fact.
Magistro v New York City Hous. Auth.
February 13, 2025
Appellate Division, Second Department
Plaintiff was injured while working as a plumber on a project involving the replacement of an underground leaking water pipe by plaintiff's employer, Richard's Plumbing., at premises owned by New York City Housing Authority (hereinafter NYCHA). To access the pipe, part of the sidewalk had to be broken up, and a hole four feet deep was created using an excavator. At the time of the incident, plaintiff and a coworker were manually loading pieces of broken concrete from the hole into the excavator bucket, which was on the ground level near the hole. Plaintiff was standing "waist high" in the hole, while his coworker was on the ground level. The slabs varied in size, with the largest measuring two feet by two feet. While plaintiff put a piece of concrete into the bucket, his coworker "slammed" a two-feet-by-one-foot piece of concrete into the bucket directly on top of plaintiff's right hand, causing him to sustain injuries.
The trial court granted the motion of NYCHA for summary judgment dismissing the complaint against it and denied plaintiff’s motion for leave to amend his bill of particulars and for summary judgment on violations of Labor Law §§ 240(1) and 241(6) against NYCHA.
Labor Law § 240(1) (MAS)
The Second Department reversed the trial court and denied NYCHA's motion as premature, with leave to renew after the completion of discovery, because discovery, some of which were exclusively in the knowledge of NYCHA, was necessary to oppose the motion. For the same reason, the trial court should have denied that branch of plaintiff’s motion seeking partial summary judgment on liability under Labor Law 240(1) against NYCHA.
PRACTICE POINT: A party should be afforded a reasonable opportunity to conduct discovery prior to the determination of a motion for summary judgment. A party opposing summary judgment is entitled to obtain further discovery when it appears that facts supporting the opposing party’s position may exist but cannot then be stated. A party contending that a summary judgment motion is premature must demonstrate that discovery might lead to relevant evidence or that the facts essential to justify opposition to the motion were exclusively within the knowledge and control of the movant. In this case, plaintiff was able to this meet this burden.
Labor Law § 241(6) (TPW)
The Second Department affirmed that branch of NYCHA's motion for summary judgment dismissing the Labor Law § 241(6) claim insofar as asserted against it and properly denied that branch of plaintiff's motion for summary judgment on the issue of liability on that claim against NYCHA. "To prevail on a cause of action alleging a violation of Labor Law § 241(6), a plaintiff must establish the violation of an Industrial Code provision that sets forth specific, applicable safety standards, and that his or her injuries were proximately caused by such Industrial Code violation". Here, NYCHA established that the Industrial Code provisions relied upon by plaintiff were either not applicable to the facts of this case or not sufficiently specific to support a Labor Law § 241(6) cause of action. In opposition, plaintiff failed to raise a triable issue of fact.
Labor Law § 200 and Common-Law Negligence (EDA)
The Second Department unanimously reversed the trial court’s decision, finding that NYCHA's summary judgment motion should have been denied as premature, with leave to renew upon the completion of discovery. The motion was made before written discovery was exchanged and before any depositions were taken. Further, plaintiff demonstrated that NYCHA's motion was premature with respect to the Labor Law § 200 and common-law negligence claims, as discovery with respect to several relevant issues, some of which were exclusively within the knowledge of NYCHA, was necessary to oppose those branches of the motion.
Martinez v Shore Oaks, LLC
February 26, 2025
Appellate Division, Second Department
Defendant McNulty Development Corp. (MDC) was retained by Shore Oaks as a construction manager to manage the construction and to arrange for the coordination and scheduling of construction of a single-family residence. Shore Oaks hired and paid the contractors on the project, including Castro. On January 7, 2021, plaintiff was employed as a carpenter by Castro when he fell 18 feet to the ground from the roof of the house while putting up windows and molding using an air gun. The trial court denied MDC’s motion seeking dismissal of plaintiff’s Labor Law §§ 240(1) and 241(6) claims.
Labor Law § 240(1) (MAS)
The trial court reversed the trial court’s decision and dismissed the Labor Law §§ 240(1) and 241(6) claims. MDC established entitlement to judgment as a matter of law through the testimony of plaintiff and the contractual agreement between itself and Shore Oaks, that MDC did not have the authority to control or supervise plaintiff's work. In opposition, the Court rejected plaintiff’s contentions that MDC was contractually responsible for reviewing and coordinating the safety programs of the contractors on the project site, yet failed to ensure compliance, and was required to coordinate the activities of all the contractors and report and deficiencies to Shore Oaks.
PRACTICE POINT: Although a construction manager of a work site is generally not responsible for injuries under Labor Law §§ 240(1), 241(6) or 200, when it functions as an agent of the properly owner or general contractor in circumstances where it has the ability to control the activity which brough about plaintiff’s injury, responsibility will attach. An agent’s liability is limited to those areas and activities within the scope of the work delegated or, in other words, to the particular agency created.
O'Connor v S&S Constr. of W. N.Y., Inc.
February 7, 2025
Appellate Division, Fourth Department
The trial court granted in part S&S’s cross-motion for summary judgment by determining Frey’s insurance carrier had a duty to defend S&S in a Labor Law and third-party case. The trial court also denied the cross-motion of Frey seeking summary judgment dismissing the second amended third-party complaint. While the appeal was pending, the third-party action proceeded to trial and a jury rendered a verdict in Frey’s favor.
Indemnity Issues in Labor Law (AMC)
The Fourth Department unanimously dismissed the appeal. Frey’s contention that the trial court improperly determined that the insurer had a duty to defend S&S against plaintiff’s claims in the first-party action is not properly before the Court. Frey has no direct interest in the controversy between the insurer and S&S, and the trial court’s order to that extent has no binding effect on Frey or its rights. Therefore, Frey is not aggrieved by that part of the order.
Frey also contends that the trial court erred in denying its cross-motion and that the order should be modified to that extent despite the jury verdict. Even if the judgment has not yet been entered in this case, the Fourth Department held that this appeal is moot. Courts are generally precluded from considering questions which, although once live, have become moot by passage of time of change in circumstances. Here, because the third-party complaint has already been dismissed pursuant to the jury’s verdict, the Court’s decision will have no immediate or practical consequences to the parties, rendering any decision moot.
New York Industrial Code Regulations (EDA)
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