Labor Law Pointers

 

Volume V, No. 12

Wednesday, October 5, 2016

 

A Monthly Electronic Newsletter Addressing

New York State Labor Law

Decisions and Trends

 

From the Editor:

 

Do you have a situation; we are always here to help with any situations that may come your way.

 

The case doldrums of summer have passed and we once again have a full newsletter of decisions to analyze for your reading pleasure.  I would direct you especially to the  Seales v Trident Structural Corp. which covers all bases, 240(1), 241(6), 200 and indemnity.  The second writes a great decision which explains very well the reasoning behind the decision. 

 

Remember that to read any decision in our newsletter all you need to do is to click on the hyperlink (for some of you it is necessary to hit Ctrl and click) and you will be taken directly to the decision.  The same hold true for all hyperlinks in the newsletter, our names or initials will open an email directly to the author of that portion of the publication.

 

Some months I receive labor law related photos from readers, some months I find them on the internet, some months I take pictures while on vacation (my personal favorite by the way), but this month I took a picture while walking out the door of my office while heading to court.  Apparently I started a firestorm of concern when they saw me taking a picture, thinking that I was OSHA, or some other agency who was going to fine them for their methods.  I assured them that I was not from any agency, local, state or federal, and that I had absolutely no interest in supervising, directing or controlling the means and methods of their work.

 

Without further ado then, here is the staff of my building changing light bulbs.  The questions we could pose from this are about endless.  Note the box specially made to allow the ladder to be set up in the marble steps and the co-employee holding the ladder as one of the building’s employees changes the light bulbs, or is he the employee of the maintenance company, and does that matter?  As they used to say on Monday Night Football, “you make the call.”

 

Have a great October, see you after Halloween.  David

 

 

 

Adams HighC

 

David R. Adams
Hurwitz & Fine, P.C.

424 Main Street

Suite 1300 Liberty Building
Buffalo, New York 14202
Phone:  716.849.8900
Direct:  716.849.8916

Fax:  716.855.0874

Cell:  716.553.6901
Email:  [email protected]
H&F Website:  www.hurwitzfine.com

 

Labor Law Pointers is published the first Wednesday of each month.  If you know of others who may wish to subscribe to this free publication, please feel free to forward it.  If you wish to subscribe or unsubscribe, please send an e-mail to [email protected] or call the Editor/Labor Law Team Leader David R. Adams directly at (716) 849-8916.

 

Gopie v Mutual of Am. Life Ins. Co.

September 8, 2016

Appellate Division, First Department

 

Gopie allegedly was injured after the scaffold upon which he was working collapsed. The trial court granted Gopie’s motion for partial summary judgment on his Labor Law § 240(1) claim and denied defendant’s cross-motion for summary judgment dismissing the Labor Law §§ 240(1), 200 and common-law negligence claims.

 

Labor Law § 240(1) (DRA) 

 

The First Department held that neither side is entitled to summary judgment because the record presents a triable issue that cannot be resolved as a matter of law as to whether Gopie was engaged in a protected activity within the meaning of the statute at the time of his alleged accident, or routine maintenance, citing to Abbatiello v Lancaster Studio Assoc., 3 NY3d 46, 53 [2004] [cable technician does not come within Labor Law § 240[1] protections]).

 

PRACTICE POINT:  The question of routine maintenance or covered activity is one that needs to be explored early in the case so that you are prepared long before depositions.  If the defense is attempting to establish that the task was routine maintenance then work logs from prior years evidencing that the task is done on a regular basis would be key evidence in establishing the routine nature of the task.  It is never too early to start preparing for the defense of a case.

 

 

Labor Law § 200 and Common-Law Negligence (VCP)

 

The First Department held that the trial court also correctly denied defendant's cross motion for summary judgment dismissing Gopie’s Labor Law § 200 and common-law negligence claims because defendant admits it owned the scaffold that collapsed under plaintiff, and the record presents factual issues as to whether the collapse resulted from a defect in the scaffold of which defendant had notice.

 

Albino v 221-223 W. 82 Owners Corp.

September 8, 2016

Appellate Division, First Department

 

Albino allegedly was injured when he fell while attempting to descend scaffold attached to the side of the building. Albino testified that as he attempted to swing down from the roof to the scaffold, a wire attaching the scaffold to the building snapped, causing the scaffold to swing away from the wall. Albino’s foreman testified that after his accident, Albino told him that he fell because his foot had slipped as he stepped onto the scaffold from the roof, without mentioning any movement of the scaffold.

 

Albino also testified that, although he had his own harness, there were no safety ropes available at the site to attach the harness to the scaffold. Conversely, Albino’s foreman testified at his deposition and averred in his affidavit that he instructed all employees, including Albino, to wear safety equipment, and that he and Albino had worn attached harnesses while working together earlier that day. The trial court denied Albino’s motion for summary judgment on his Labor Law §§ 240(1) and 241(6) claims against defendant 221-223 West 82 Owners Corp.

 

Labor Law § 240(1) (DRA) 

 

With respect to the issue of whether Albino had available to him a harness and safety line but disobeyed instructions to use this equipment, the First Department found an issue of fact in light of the conflicting testimony as to whether Albino, in working on the roof without wearing an attached safety harness, recalcitrantly failed to use available equipment that he had been directed to use and that, if used, would have averted his injuries, citing to Gonzalez v Rodless Props., L.P., 37 AD3d 180 (1st Dept 2007]).

 

As to whether Albino’s fall was caused by a violation of the statute, the First Department held that the two versions of how the accident occurred, each given by Albino, the sole witness to the accident, are inconsistent with each other such that an issue of fact exists as to whether Albino’s fall was caused by a failure of a safety device within the purview of the statute, relying on Smigielski v Teachers Ins. & Annuity Assn. of Am., 137 AD3d 676 [1st Dept 2016], citing Goreczny v 16 Ct. St. Owner LLC, 110 AD3d 465 [1st Dept 2013]; Jones v W. 56th  St. Assoc., 33 AD3d 551 [1st Dept 2006] [plaintiff not entitled to summary judgment as to liability where inconsistencies in his accounts of how he came to be injured raised “a factual issue … as to whether a violation of Labor Law § 240[1] was a proximate cause of plaintiff’s injury”]).

 

Justice Moskowitz concurred as to the issue of whether Albino was the sole proximate cause of his injuries but disagrees that the record presents an issue of fact as to whether Albino fell because he slipped or, rather, because the scaffold moved away from the building. Even assuming that Albino told his supervisor that his foot slipped when he stepped onto the scaffold, that statement would, according to Justice Maskowitz, not make any difference to the outcome of the case because the fact remains that Albino fell because the scaffold moved away from the building and Albino submitted an uncontradicted affidavit from a certified safety manager who opined that the scaffold was “jerry-rigged and incomplete” and the wire holding the scaffold to the building was inadequate.

 

PRACTICE POINT:  The importance of early and complete investigation is again thrust upon us.  Here it is the statements made by the plaintiff immediately after the accident that are inconsistent with his deposition or affidavit version of the accident, precluding the plaintiff from obtaining Summary Judgment.  These statements of the plaintiff, while they might have been remembered by others years later, are much better recorded in an interview with the witnesses close in time to the accident.  It is the differing versions of the accident, all from the plaintiff, that precluded Summary Judgment in this case.

 

 

 

Rohan v Turner Constr. Co.

September 27, 2016

Appellate Division, First Department

                                         

Rohan allegedly was struck by an unsecured plank. The trial court denied the summary judgment motions of defendants Turner Construction and Gladden Properties LLC (defendants) dismissing the Labor Law § 241(6) claim predicated upon Industrial Code regulation § 23-1.22(b)(1) against them, and the Labor Law § 200 and common-law negligence claims against Turner.

 

Labor Law § 241(6) (JAE)

 

With regard to the Labor Law § 241(6) claim, the First Department affirmed, agreeing that issues of fact existed as to whether Industrial Code (12 NYCRR) § 23—1.22(b)(1), pertaining to runways and ramps, was applicable. Defendants maintain the plank that allegedly struck Rohan did not constitute part of a ramp. However, the affidavit of plaintiffs’ expert, who opined that the unsecured wooden planks served as a “temporary construction ramp” and that the ramp violated 12 NYCRR 23-1.22(b)(1), was entitled to consideration.

 

Labor Law § 200 and Common-Law Negligence (VCP)

 

The First Department affirmed the holding that Turner, the general contractor, is not entitled to summary judgment dismissing the Labor Law § 200 and common-law negligence claims. Rohan’s testimony that one of Turner's employees told him to use a pile of wood planks to address the one-foot height differential he had observed between the temporary loading dock and the trailer of delivery trucks raises a triable issue of fact as to whether Turner exercised supervisory control over the injury-producing work.

 

McManus v City of New York

September 29, 2016

Appellate Division, First Department

                                         

McManus allegedly fell through an opening of the flocculation tank on defendant’s property. The trial court granted plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment on his Labor Law § 240(1) claim.

 

Labor Law § 240(1) (DRA) 

 

The First Department reversed, finding summary judgment inappropriate because questions of fact exist concerning whether a scaffold purportedly covering the opening of the flocculation tank was a proper and adequate safety device, citing Ortega v City of New York, 95 AD3d 125, 128 [1st Dept 2012]. The Court also found an issue of fact as to whether, if the scaffold was an adequate safety device, McManus removed the device by moving it away from the opening, citing Boyd v Schiavone Constr. Co., Inc., 106 AD3d 546, 548 [1st Dept 2013]).

 

PRACTICE POINT:  First things first, a flocculation tank is used for many purposes including cheese making, bear brewing and, as it appears to have been used here, for water treatment.  Perilously few facts provided here to go on here so we will speak of the concept here.  Summary judgment for a plaintiff is not going to be granted if there is a question of the plaintiff’s sole proximate cause.  The factors establishing sole proximate cause are that here must be an available, appropriate safety device which the plaintiff was instructed to use, or knew he was expected third party use, which for no good reason the plaintiff chose not to use or misused.  Thus, if a safety device is appropriate, as the scaffold being used as a cover to the opening may have been in this case and thus both appropriate and available, we then move second to the question of whether the plaintiff failed to use it or misused it causing his injury.  Here the court found that to be a second cause for the denial of the plaintiff’s Summary Judgment motion.

 

 

Vatavuk v Genting N.Y., LLC

September 14, 2016

Appellate Division, Second Department

                                         

Plaintiff alleged that he was injured when the top of a 10-foot high piece of board he was fitting into a wall frame of a building broke, snapped forward, and fell on the brim of his hard hat. The trial court granted defendants Genting NY, the lessee of the premises, and the construction manager Tutor Perini Corp.’s (collectively defendants) motions for summary judgment dismissing the Labor Law §§ 240(1) and 241(6) claims.

 

Labor Law § 240(1) (DRA) 

 

The Second Department affirmed dismissal because defendants established that the piece of board which struck plaintiff was not in the process of being hoisted or secured and did not require securing for the purpose of being installed, and that the object did not fall on plaintiff due to the lack or failure of a device prescribed under the statute, citing Fabrizi v 1095 Ave. of the Ams., 22 NY3d 658 (2014). The Court also rejected plaintiff’s assertions in opposition as conclusory and thus insufficient to raise an issue of fact.

 

PRACTICE POINT:  There are, as you will recall, two basic types of 240(1) cases, falling worker and falling object cases.  With a falling object case the basic threshold question is whether the object which fell was an object that should have been secured to prevent it from falling.  Here, a piece of board which is being installed as a part of a wall which fell and struck the plaintiff was not the type of object which need be secured or, to use the language of the court, which required securing and thus the 240(1) did not apply to the incident. 

 

Labor Law § 241(6) (JAE)

 

The Second Department likewise affirmed dismissal of the Labor Law § 241(6) claim predicated on violations of 12 NYCRR 23-1.7(a)(1) and (2). The court instructed that in order to establish liability under Labor Law § 241(6), a plaintiff must demonstrate that the defendant’s violation of a specific rule or regulation was a proximate cause of the accident. 

 

Here, defendants made a prima facie showing that 12 NYCRR 23-1.7(a)(1) and (2) were inapplicable with evidence that the area in which plaintiff was working was not one where workers were “normally exposed to falling…objects”.  In opposition, plaintiff failed to raise a triable issue of fact.

 

Hoa Lam v Sky Realty, Inc.

September 29, 2016

Appellate Division, Second Department

                                         

Sky Realty owned a mixed use building and leased the commercial area on the ground floor of the building to Lin’s Garden for a take-out restaurant. Lin’s Garden hired Triple 8 to renovate the premises. Plaintiff started working on the roof of the premises installing a ventilation system. He was provided with a handheld electric grinder, and shown where to cut an opening in a metal fence for a ventilation pipe. While using the saw, the blade came loose and plaintiff allegedly sustained injuries.

 

The trial court denied the summary judgment motions of Triple 8, Sky Realty and Lin’s Garden to dismiss the Labor Law § 200 and common-law negligence claims, and denied Sky Realty’s motion for summary judgment on its third-party claim against Lin’s Garden for contractual indemnification.                                                                    

 

Labor Law § 200 and Common-Law Negligence (VCP)

 

The Second Department upheld the trial court decision denying summary judgment on the Labor Law § 200 and common-law negligence claims against each of defendants Sky Realty, Lin's Garden, and Triple 8.  Where a cause of action arises out of the means and methods of the work, a defendant may be held liable for common-law negligence or a violation of Labor Law § 200 only if he or she had the authority to supervise or control the performance of the work.  When a defendant lends allegedly dangerous or defective equipment to a worker that causes injury during its use, in moving for summary judgment that defendant must establish that it neither created the alleged danger or defect in the instrumentality nor had actual or constructive notice of the dangerous or defective condition. Each of the moving defendants failed to establish their prima facie entitlement to judgment as a matter of law because the evidence in the record fails to eliminate all triable issues of fact as to the identity of the plaintiff's employer, whether the plaintiff's injuries arose out of or in the course of his employment, and the role each of the defendants played in the renovation of the subject premises.  

 

Indemnity Issues in Labor Law (SEP)

 

Having failed to eliminate the common law negligence claim against it, it follows that Sky Realty’s motion for indemnification was denied in turn.  Another example of the long standing rule that a party to a construction contract may not be indemnified for their own negligence.

 

                                      Seales v Trident Structural Corp.

September 28, 2016

Appellate Division, Second Department

 

Plaintiff was installing a new sprinkler system as part of a renovation project at a building owned by defendants 138 West and 2794 Broadway (collectively the owners).  Defendant Trident was the contractor responsible for carpentry, structural work, framing, roofing and sheetrock installation. While ascending a staircase from the fifth to the sixth floor, plaintiff allegedly was struck in the head and rendered unconscious by a piece of falling sheetrock.

 

Third-party defendant Trident’s president testified that shortly after the accident, he observed several 4X8 feet sheets of sheetrock leaning against the wall on the sixth floor. One sheet had fallen away from the wall and was leaning against a railing, and a portion of that sheet was broken away. A jagged piece of sheetrock 8-12 inches was on the landing of the fifth floor on the stairs. Conversely, plaintiff’s coworker testified that the piece of sheetrock that fell onto the stairwell in the vicinity of plaintiff was approximately the size of an entire sheet of sheetrock.

 

The trial court denied plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment on his Labor Law § 240(1) claim, and denied the owners’ cross-motion for summary judgment dismissing the Labor Law §§ 240(1), 241(6), 200 and common-law negligence claims. The trial court also denied the owners’ cross-motion on their third-party claims for common-law and contractual indemnification against Trident, and granted Trident’s cross-motion to dismiss all third-party claims against it.

 

Labor Law § 240(1) (DRA) 

 

The Second Department held defendants established their prima facie entitlement to dismissal of plaintiff’s Labor Law § 240(1) claim because the sheetrock, which was being stored against a wall, was not a material being hoisted or a load that required securing for purposes of the undertaking at the time it fell, citing Narducci v Manhasset Bay Assoc., 96 NY2d 259 (2001), nor was it expected, under the circumstances of this case, that the sheetrock would require securing for purposes of the undertaking at the time it fell. Accordingly, the trial court properly denied plaintiff’s motion, but should have granted that portion of the owners’ cross-motion to dismiss this claim.

 

PRACTICE POINT:  As in Vatavuk above, for a plaintiff to prevail in a falling object case the object causing the injury must be the type of object which would require securing for the task being undertaken.  Here the object which fell, a portion of a sheet of drywall, is not an object that required securing.  A careful reading of the case reveals that the second department inserts the element of foreseeability into the analysis, “nor was it expected, under the circumstances of this case, that the sheetrock would require securing for the purposes of the undertaking at the time it fell”.

 

 

Labor Law § 241(6) (JAE)

 

With regard to the alleged violation of Labor Law § 241(6), the Second Department found that dismissal was not warranted.  It noted that the plaintiffs relied solely upon an alleged violation of 12 NYCRR 23-1.8(c)(1), which provides: “[e]very person required to work or pass within any area where there is a danger of being struck by falling objects or materials or where the hazard of head bumping exists shall be provided with and shall be required to wear an approved safety hat.” 

 

In order to prevail on a Labor Law § 241(6) cause of action premised upon a violation of 12 NYCRR 23-1.8(c)(1), the plaintiff must establish “that the job was a hard hat job and that the plaintiff’s failure to wear a hard hat was a proximate cause of his injury.”  Here, the defendants failed to eliminate triable issues of fact as to whether work on the site had progressed to the point that there was no longer a danger of being struck by falling objects or materials.

 

Labor Law § 200 and Common-Law Negligence (VCP)

 

The Second Department reversed and granted the owner’s motion for summary judgment dismissing the Labor Law § 200 and common-law negligence claims, and denied Trident’s motion.  Here, plaintiff alleges the accident was caused by a dangerous or defective premises condition at the work site. The owners established their prima facie entitlement to judgment as a matter of law by establishing that they did not create or have actual or constructive notice of the alleged dangerous condition involving the placement of the sheetrock. In opposition, the plaintiffs failed to raise a triable issue of fact and the Supreme Court should have granted those branches of the owners' motion which were for summary judgment dismissing the causes of action alleging violation of Labor Law § 200 and common-law negligence.

 

However, Trident, whose workers were engaged in sheetrocking at the project site at the time of the accident, failed to establish its prima facie entitlement to judgment as a matter of law dismissing the causes of action alleging violation of Labor Law § 200 and common-law negligence because it failed to establish that it did not create or have constructive notice of the alleged dangerous condition.  

 

Indemnity Issues in Labor Law (SEP)

 

The owners and Trident both moved for summary judgment on the contractual indemnity piece of this case.  Owners argued that they were entitled to an aware of contractual indemnity, while Trident argued that the unsigned contract was unenforceable.  With regard to the question of whether the contract was properly enforceable, the Court noted that a question of fact existed as to whether the parties wished to be bound by its terms.  While an unsigned contract may be enforceable, it was owners’ obligation to come forward with evidence demonstrating both parties intent to be bound by the operative language therein. 

 

Even if the contract was enforceable, a question still existed as to whether the events of the case at bar triggered the indemnity provision.  The contract only obligated Trident to indemnity owners where Trident (or Trident’s subcontractors) negligent acts or omissions contributed to the loss.  Here, Trident was unable to establish itself free of negligence, or the negligence of its subcontractors.

Lastly, the unresolved factual issues regarding negligence also precluded either side from prevailing upon motions for common law indemnification. 

 

Cummings v Doo Wha Sung

September 30, 2016

Appellate Division, Fourth Department

                                         

Cummings was working as a laborer on defendant’s renovation project when he allegedly sustained injuries that resulted in the amputation of his thumb while using a table saw.

 

The trial court granted Cummings’ motion for summary judgment on his Labor Law §§ 241(6), 200 and common-law negligence claims, and denied defendant’s summary judgment motion dismissing the complaint.

 

Labor Law § 241(6) (JAE)

 

In considering the motions, the Fourth Department agreed that defendant’s motion should have been denied finding that he failed to meet his burden of establishing as a matter of law that he is entitled to the benefit of the statutory homeowner’s exemption from liability.  The court also noted that Cummings raised a triable issue of fact because it could not be determined as a matter of law whether defendant directed or controlled the method and manner of the work being done on the house, including the work being carried out by Cummings at the time of the accident.

 

Due to these issues, and triable issues of fact concerning whether there was culpable conduct on the part of plaintiff and whether any violation of the Industrial Code was a proximate cause of the accident, the plaintiff’s cross-motion for partial summary judgment with regard to the cause of action premised on a violation of Labor Law § 241(6) should have been denied. 

 

Labor Law § 200 and Common-Law Negligence (VCP)

 

The Fourth Department modified the Supreme Court by denying both the plaintiff’s and defendant’s motions for summary judgment on the Labor Law § 200 and common-law negligence claims.   There are triable issues of fact concerning whether defendant lacked the authority to direct, supervise, or control plaintiff and his work and whether defendant was free from negligence in the occurrence of the accident.  Conflicting evidence also precludes partial summary judgment in plaintiff's favor on the section 200 cause of action. Whether a defendant's conduct fell short of the standard of ordinary care is an issue that can rarely be decided as a matter of law.

 

Fawcett v Stearns

September 30, 2016

Appellate Division, Fourth Department

 

Plaintiff allegedly sustained injuries when he fell from a roof while renovating a cottage owned by defendant. The trial court granted defendant’s motion for summary judgment dismissing the Labor Law §§ 240(1) and 241(6) claims, and denied plaintiff’s cross-motion for partial summary judgment on his § 240(1) claim based on the homeowner’s exemption.

 

Labor Law § 240(1) (DRA) 

 

The existence of both residential and commercial uses on a property does not automatically disqualify a dwelling owner from invoking the exemption. Instead, whether the exemption is available to an owner in a particular case turns on the site and purpose of the work. The site and purpose test must be employed on the basis of the homeowners’ intentions at the time of the injury underlying the action.

 

The Fourth Department affirmed the trial court’s decision to grant defendant’s motion because defendant established the applicability of the homeowner’s exemption by submitting his deposition testimony that he purchased the cottage with the intention of renovating it so that he and his wife could use it “as a gateway, second home” and eventually as a retirement property.”

 

The Court determined that defendant demonstrated that the work performed by plaintiff directly related to the intended residential use of the cottage by defendant and his wife as a second home even though it also served the commercial purpose of making the property more attractive to renters and, as a consequence, the Fourth Department held defendant “is shielded by the homeowner exemption from the absolute liability of Labor Law §§ 240 and 241.”

 

The Court rejected, among others, plaintiff’s arguments that defendant intended to use the cottage exclusively for commercial purposes or that the renovation work was unrelated to the residential use of the property.

 

PRACTICE POINT:  Basically with a mixed use property, the homeowner’s exemption defense rests on the defendant’s intentions for the work, is it to enhance the commercial or the residential purpose of the property.  Careful planning in the early stages helps to provide a strong case when it comes to Summary Judgment motions.   Here there was an articulable residential reason for the work being done, even though the home was rented for 7 of the 8 prime weeks of the year, the defendant’s plan to augment the home so that it could be used more by the owner, their espoused intention, was sufficient even in the fourth, to carry the day.

 

 

 

LABOR LAW § 241(6) REGULATIONS; SPECIFIC OR GENERAL (MAS)

 

 

12 NYCRR § 23-1.7(h) – Protection in Construction, Demolition and Excavation Operations; Protection from general hazards; Corrosive substances.

 

§ 23-1.7(h),  requires all corrosive substances and chemicals be so stored and used as not to endanger any person and that the employer provide protective equipment for the use of such corrosive substances and chemicals, and is deemed sufficiently specific.

 

Welsh v Cranesville Block Co., Inc., 258 AD2d 759, 685 NYS2d 825 (3d Dept. 1999);

Flores v Infrastructure Repair Service, LLC, 115 AD3d 543, 982 NYS2d 103 (1st Dept 2014).

 

 

In Welsh, genuine issue of material fact as to whether cemetery breached nondelegable duty owed to P by employer's failure to provide adequate boots to protect him from corrosive effects of concrete he was required to kneel in while performing his work on mausoleum precluded summary judgment.

Flores held a hot rubberized asphalt substance was not a corrosive substance or chemical requiring protective equipment under reg., even if a worker was injured while carrying the substance.

 

\Hurwitz & Fine, P.C. is a full-service law firm
providing legal services throughout the State of New York

 

Labor Law Pointers

 

Editor
David R. Adams


Associate Editor
V. Christopher Potenza


Associate Editor
Steven E. Peiper


Associate Editor
Jennifer A. Ehman

 

Associate Editor
Marc A. Schulz

 

Labor Law Team

David R. Adams, Team Leader         Steven E. Peiper

  [email protected]                       tzfine.com

 

            Dan D. Kohane                           Jennifer A. Ehman

[email protected]                           rwitzfine.com

           

Michael F. Perley                                Marc A. Schulz

[email protected]                          [email protected]

           

            V. Christopher Potenza                     Howard Altman                   

[email protected]                     [email protected]

 

            Eric D. Andrews

            [email protected]

 

 

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424 Main Street

Suite 1300 Liberty Building
Buffalo, New York 14202

Phone:  716.849.8900
Fax:   716.855.0874
www.hurwitzfine.com

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