08/14/00: PORT
AUTHORITY OF NEW YORK AND NEW JERSEY v. EVERGREEN INTERNATIONAL AVIATION,
INC.
New York State Supreme Court, Appellate
Division, Second Department
Insurance Procurement Clause
in Commercial Lease Deemed Unenforceable
In commercial lease,
landlord required tenant to indemnify it and provide liability coverage naming
landlord as insured. A sprinkler valve in the leased premises ruptured, causing
flood damage to tenant's property and its property insurer paid tenant to
compensate it for its loss. Insurer then commenced a subrogation action in
Federal court against the landlord alleging that its negligence led to the
rupture of the sprinkler valve. Thereafter, the landlord commenced an action
seeking, inter alia, a declaration that tenant had a duty to insure, defend,
indemnify, and hold it harmless in the underlying Federal action. The tenant
moved for summary judgment on the ground that the plaintiff is not entitled to
indemnification in the underlying action. Pursuant to General Obligations Law §
5-321, a lease provision that purports to exempt a lessor from liability for its
own acts of negligence is void and unenforceable. Although lease provisions in
which the parties allocate the risk of liability to third parties between
themselves through the use of insurance are generally enforceable, a landlord
may not circumvent General Obligations Law § 5-321 "simply by placing the burden
to procure insurance on the tenant." In this case, the lease placed the sole
obligation to obtain insurance upon the tenant, but it lacked any language
demonstrating a mutuality of intent to directly exculpate the landlord from
negligence towards its tenant-indemnitor. Accordingly, the court found that the
insurance procurement clause contained in the lease was unenforceable since it
attempted to relieve the landlord of its responsibility for damages caused to
tenant as a result of its own negligence.
08/14/00 PRUDENTIAL
PROPERTY & CASUALTY INS. CO. v. SINGH
New York State,
Appellate Division, Second Department
Rental Endorsement
Supersedes Business Pursuits/Rental Exclusion Contained in
Policy
In an action by insurer for declaration that it was not
obligated to defend or indemnify its insureds in an underlying action, the court
dismissed the insurer’s cause of action premised upon the policy’s rental
exclusion. The Court determined that a rental endorsement added to the policy
superseded the business pursuits/rental exclusion provision contained in the
policy.
08/10/00:
AMERICAN HOME ASSURANCE CO. v. McDONALDNew York State Supreme Court, Appellate Division, First Department
Professional Liability Policy Cap on Damages for Sexual Misconduct Upheld -- Public Policy Does Not Prohibit Limit on Indemnity
Reversing a lower court judge, the court determined that a cap of $25,000 for sexual misconduct in a professional liability policy does not violate public policy. The sexual misconduct limitation in the policies was clear and unambiguous, and gave the policyholder clear notice of the restrictions. It is not contrary to the public interest to allow insurers to offer varying amounts of coverage depending on the nature of the claim asserted against the insured, especially where, as here, there is no requirement by New York State that social workers and psychotherapists carry malpractice insurance.
ACROSS BORDERS
From time to time we highlight significant cases of interest from other jurisdictions. This week we offer decisions from Texas, California, Alaska and Maine.
08/15/00: EMPIRE
FIRE & MARINE INS. CO. v. BANTLEY TRUCKING, INC.
Fifth Circuit
(applying Texas law)
Bobtail Coverage Examined -- Vehicle
Being Taken for Maintenance is Being Used For Business
Purposes
This dispute arose between owner’s and lessee’s policies
for accident that occurred when a tractor, being driven "bobtail" for
maintenance operation, was involved in an accident. The Owner's policy had a
"business use" exclusion, which the court found unambiguous. The policy at issue
was a lease agreement entitled "Insurance for Non-Trucking Use", commonly
referred to as a bobtail policy. The fact that the lessee was leasing the truck
was evidence that it was being used in pursuit of its business interests.
08/11/00: VILLAS
v. UNITED PACIFIC INS.
Ninth Circuit (applying California law)
Insurer Which Wrongfully Fails to Defend is Responsible
for Entire Judgment, Even if Taken by Default
A homeowner’s
association of a 12-unit condominium filed a construction defect suit against
the developers of the project. The developers tendered the action to its
insurer, which defended them under a reservation of rights. Four months prior to
trial, it withdrew from the defense on the grounds, based on a legal opinion
from outside counsel, that the damages sought were not covered under its policy.
The insured did not retain new counsel and the homeowners obtained a default
judgment against the insured. The homeowners and the insured brought suit
against the insurer for breach of contract and bad faith arising out of their
withdrawal from the defense and refusal to pay the judgment. The trial court
granted plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment, finding that the withdrawal
from the defense was wrongful as a matter of law and holding them liable for the
entire judgment. The appellate court affirmed the judgment as to the
developers-insureds. It held that under California law, an insurer that
wrongfully refuses to defend is liable for the entire judgment, even if the
judgment is obtained by default, and that the insured does not have the burden
of proving that its damages were caused by the failure to defend. Thus, an
insurer that wrongfully and in bad faith refuses to defend is liable for the
entire judgment and all other damages consequential to it. However, the court
held that the same result does not automatically apply to judgment creditors,
such as the homeowners in this case. Because the homeowners were not insureds
under the policy, there was no covenant of good faith and fair dealing as
between them and the insurer and damages based on "bad faith" should not have
been awarded. The appellate court also affirmed the emotional distress award,
holding that an insured may recover damages for all emotional distress incident
to an insurer’s bad faith denial of coverage, so long as the insurer’s conduct
also resulted in substantial financial loss. It rejected the insurer’s argument
that there must be an additional showing that the emotional distress was severe,
substantial and enduring. Further, the damages awarded for the emotional
distress were found not to be excessive as they amounted to a small fraction of
the damages awarded for financial injury.
Submitted by Bryan Weiss, an attorney with the Los Angeles firm of Murchison & Cumming.
08/11/00: POWERS v.
UNITED SERVICES AUTOMOBILE ASSOC.
Alaska Supreme Court
Excess Carrier May Relitigate Uninsured Motorist Case Lost by
Primary
May an injured plaintiff who has successfully arbitrated
an uninsured motorist claim against a primary carrier preclude a secondary
carrier from further arbitration where the secondary carrier had neither
adequate notice of the first arbitration nor any opportunity to participate in
it? The trial court answered this question in the negative. The Alaska Supreme
Court agrees and affirms. The evidence indicates that the excess carrier had no
involvement in the arbitration, and had no contractual relationship with the
underlying carrier. In addition, while the carriers had similar interests, they
were not identical. The excess carrier had no liability until the primary policy
limit was exceeded. The primary would have considerably less interest in
appealing the final award than the excess insurer, as even a substantial
reduction would still result in the primary paying its full limit.
08/10/00: ROYAL
INS. CO. v. PINETTE
Maine Supreme Judicial Court
An Assault and Battery Committed in Self Defense is Still an
Intended Event and Thus Excluded Under Liability Policy
The
Parties stipulated that the insured was defending himself when he assaulted
the plaintiff. The insured argued that he did not intend to cause injury, only
to defend himself from an attack by the tort plaintiff. The fact that
self-defense motivates the battery does not change the reality of the event: the
batterer actively intends to harm another in a way that a trespasser who enters
land under a mistaken claim of right does not. The claim of self-defense is a
plea to justify what the batterer knows would otherwise be an improper action,
rather than an indication that the batterer was unaware that he or she was
harming the victim. However, it is still intentional and still excluded.
Hurwitz & Fine, P.C. is a full-service law firm
providing
legal services throughout the State of New York.
Kevin T. Merriman
[email protected]
Insurance Coverage Team
[email protected]
Sheldon Hurwitz
Carolyn M. Henry
Kevin T. Merriman
Fire, First Party & Subrogation Team
James D. Gauthier, Team Leader
Donna L. Burden
Andrea Schillaci
Jody E. Briandi
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REPORTED DECISIONS
PRUDENTIAL PROPERTY AND CASUALTY INSURANCE COMPANY v SINGH
In an action for a judgment declaring, inter alia, that the plaintiff is not obligated to defend and indemnify the defendants Esther Singh, Arjune Singh, and Allan Ramlochan in an action entitled DeJesus v Singh, pending in the Supreme Court, Kings County, under Docket No. 2 847/97, the plaintiff appeals from so much of an order of the Supreme Court, Nassau County (Levitt, J .), dated September 15, 1999, as granted that branch of the defendants' cross motion which was for summary judgment dismissing the second cause of action for a declaration that the plaintiff is not obligated to defend and indemnify the defendants based on the rental exclusion provision of the policy.
ORDERED that the order is affirmed insofar as appealed from, with costs.
Contrary to the plaintiff's contention, the Supreme Court properly determined, as a matter of law, that the defendants were entitled to summary judgment dismissing the second cause of action for a declaration that the plaintiff was not obligated to defend and indemnify the defendants based on a rental exclusion in the subject policy . The Supreme Court properly determined that a rental endorsement added to the policy superseded the business pursuits/rental exclusion provision contained in the subject policy of insurance (cf., United States Fid. & Guar. Co. v Annunziata, 67 NY2d 229, 232; Neuwirth v Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Greater New York, Blue Cross Assn., 62 NY2d 718, 719).
SANTUCCI, J.P., S. MILLER, FLORIO and McGINITY , JJ., concur.